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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The 1870 and 1882 Married Women’s Property Acts’ passage constituted a 
significant change in married women’s legal status in Britain. The Property Acts granted 
married women independent property rights, thereby overturning much of the English 
common law of coverture—the doctrine that a married woman had no legal identity 
independent of her husband. Married women’s property rights, consequently, introduced 
a fundamental tension into Britain’s patriarchal social order, long predicated on a married 
woman’s legal non-existence and economic dependence.  
This dissertation argues that the social and legal contradictions the Property Acts 
engendered compelled Britons to re-imagine their society: from one organized around an 
independent, property-owning male head of household to one comprised of men and 
women, married or single, with claims to individual rights. It follows social 
commentators, judges, feminists, MPs, and government officials who tried to define the 
Act’s scope via debates in the press, the courts, the halls of Parliament, and offices of 
Inland Revenue. Recovering these debates reveals two understandings of the Property 
Acts: for some, a paternalistic law that protected poor women’s property from idle 
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husbands; for feminists, a symbol of a married woman’s independence. Overall, this 
study marks a transitional moment for British society, as these competing arguments 
undermined the dominant Victorian-era separate spheres ideology and required Britons 
re-negotiate husbands and wives’ respective obligations to each other, to society, and to 
the state. 
“Reforming the Married State” deploys a trove of sources—newspapers, 
periodicals, suffragists’ papers, Parliamentary debates, and government papers—that 
reframe the Property Acts within histories of gender, liberalism and capitalism. While 
scholars acknowledge the Property Acts’ passage constituted a significant political 
victory for the women’s movement, they commonly regard women’s Parliamentary 
enfranchisement in 1918 as the impetus for subsequent economic and social reforms. As 
a result, the Property Acts are overlooked in social and economic histories of nineteenth 
and twentieth-century Britain. Re-centering the Property Acts illustrates the breadth of 
debate the Property Acts inspired, as legal changes to women’s rights in marriage 
reverberated through British social and economic life. 
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1 
Introduction 
In 1869, as the Married Women’s Property Bill made its way to the House of 
Lords, the Times reminded its readers that, although the proposal “may not attract so 
much public attention as great political schemes … few matters are of equal consequence 
to the social well-being of the community.” The editors feared that dramatic changes to 
legal and economic rights within marriage would carry social ramifications: “[T]he 
married state is the foundation of the social state,” they declared, “and it would be a 
matter of grave and universal concern if a revolution in the law tended to disorganize 
such a relation.”1  
For Victorian Britons, the “married state” meant that the relationship between a 
husband and wife and that between a family and society at large were premised on a 
patriarchal household ideal reinforced by laws regulating women’s property rights in 
marriage. Under the common law of coverture, upon marriage a husband became the 
legal owner of his wife’s moveable property—items such as money, stocks, or furniture. 
A wife retained her realty but had no legal claim to any income deriving from it. She 
could not enter into contracts on her own terms and could only purchase goods as her 
husband’s agent, buying on credit under his name. 
In the twelve years after the Times published its editorial, Parliament passed a 
series of Acts that overturned much of the law of coverture—the legal justification for 
women’s subordinate position in marriage and British society. The 1870 and 1882 
                                               
1 "When the Married Women's Property Bill passed." The Times. July 31, 1869: 9. 
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Married Women’s Property Acts (MWPA) granted every married woman control over 
her realty and moveable property, the ability to make contracts independent of her 
husband, responsibility for debts incurred before marriage or as a result of her business, 
and the responsibility to maintain her husband before he could apply for poor relief. 
Together, the Property Acts constituted a landmark legal reform that dramatically altered 
women’s rights in marriage. 
But these individual rights existed in fundamental tension with Britain’s social 
and political order—predicated on married women’s legal non-existence and economic 
dependence. Focusing on the period between 1870 and 1935, when the Married Women 
and Tortfeasors Act ended the legal distinction between a feme sole (an unmarried 
woman) and a feme covert (a married woman), this dissertation argues that through the 
social and legal conflicts created by the Property Acts, Britons came to re-imagine their 
society: from one organized a property-owning male head of household, to one 
comprised of men and women, married or single, with claims to individual rights. It 
follows social commentators, judges, activists, feminists, MPs, and government officials 
as they tried to define the Acts’ scope via debates in the press, the courts, the halls of 
Parliament, and offices of Inland Revenue. Recovering these debates reveals two 
understandings of the Property Acts.  
For some, the Property Acts remained a paternalistic law that protected a 
woman’s property in marriage. One contingent—judges, some MPs who voted for the 
law, or individuals who campaigned for reform—understood that the 1870 Property Act 
protected industrious women’s earnings from idle husbands. The 1882 Act simply 
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extended these protections. Justice Walter Phillimore, First Baron Phillimore, of the High 
Court of Justice, expressed this sentiment when he observed that the Married Women’s 
Property Act “was an Act as to married women’s property.” It was not, he emphasized, “a 
code as to married women’s rights.”2  
For others, however, the 1882 Married Women’s Property Act represented “the 
great charter of married women.” It was as “as much a great charter as Magna Charta was 
the great charter of British liberties in the past.”3 In feminists’ view, the Property Acts—
by granting married women control over their property—overturned the common law of 
coverture and introduced a new principle into law: married women’s individuality.  
These competing arguments undermined the dominant Victorian-era separate 
spheres ideology. Late-Victorian and Edwardian women’s rights activists lay claim to the 
Property Acts as a feminist symbol of married women’s equality in order to advance 
more expansive claims for women’s rights. Their claims jostled against ideals regarding a 
husband’s familial authority and paternalistic obligation to provide for his dependents. 
Attention to the Property Acts therefore highlights the ways married women’s claims to 
individual rights required Britons to re-think and, at times, defend, its gender order. 
Overall, this study marks a transitional moment for British society, as these competing 
arguments undermined the dominant Victorian-era separate spheres ideology and 
                                               
2 “High Court of Justice. King’s Bench Division,” The Times, July 3, 1905, 14. 
3 “Assessment of Income Tax on Joint Incomes of Husband and Wife. Minutes of Deputation to the Rt. 
Hon. Mr. Austen Chamberlain, M.P. (Chancellor of the Exchequer). Thursday, 10th April, 1919,” April 10, 
1919, IR 75/193 Vol. XII Royal Commission on Income Tax. Various IR Memos, pp. 327. National 
Archives, Kew. 
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required Britons to re-negotiate husbands and wives’ respective obligations to each other, 
to society, and to the state.  
*** 
Most historians date the emergence of an organized campaign for property reform 
to the 1850s. The socialite Caroline Norton’s dissolving marriage and attempt to secure a 
Parliamentary divorce, sensationalized in the press, made divorce law reform a topic of 
public debate. Independently wealthy and educated, the reformer Barbara Leigh Smith 
(eventually Bodichon) formed a committee that set about to reform the laws as they 
related to married women’s property.4 Sir Thomas Erskine Perry introduced the first bill 
to reform the property law in 1856. The effort collapsed after the 1857 Divorce Act 
circumvented reformers’ calls by introducing minor property protections for women 
separated from their husbands. 
In 1867, a resurgent effort to reform the property laws emerged alongside a 
nascent suffrage movement as debate over the 1867 Reform Act, which enfranchised 
working-class men, brought renewed attention to questions of property and political 
rights.5 In 1868, MPs George Shaw Lefevre, John Stuart Mill, and Russell Gurney 
introduced a bill, drafted by Richard Pankhurst on behalf of the Social Science 
Association, to grant married women the same property rights as feme soles.6 Russell 
                                               
4 Lee Holcombe, Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women’s Property Law in Nineteenth-
Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 58. On the origins of the property reform 
campaign see Holcombe and Mary Lyndon Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian 
England, 1850-1895 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989). Both define the campaign as a 
feminist campaign. 
5 Catherine Hall, Keith McClelland, and Jane Rendall, Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, Gender 
and the British Reform Act of 1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
6 Holcombe, 166. 
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Gurney eventually took charge of the bill, alongside Jacob Bright and Thomas Headlam 
(Mill lost his seat in the 1868 election and Shaw Levefre became secretary to the Board 
of Trade). The bill passed the Commons in 1870 and went to the Lords, who dramatically 
altered it.7 Members of the Property Reform Committee begrudgingly accepted the 
revisions upon the advice of Russell Gurney and in 1870 Parliament passed an Act To 
Amend the Law Relating to the Property of Married Women—the Married Women’s 
Property Act of 1870.8 Ben Griffin has convincingly argued that the 1870 Act’s passage 
relied less on MPs’ “feminist” political stances and more on their perception that 
working-class fathers were drinking away the family wage in the pub, leaving their wives 
and children without adequate funds for food or shelter.9 Giving married women the right 
to their own earnings, MPs reasoned, would protect working wives from their husbands, 
enable mothers to provide for their children, and shame the fathers who had abrogated 
their duties towards the family.10 
                                               
7 Holcombe, 177. 
8 Committee members feared that the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War would reduce their ability to 
secure more extensive reforms in the near future. Holcombe, 178. 
9 Ben Griffin, “Class, liberalism and the erosion of Victorian Domestic Ideology” in The Politics of Gender 
in Victorian Britain: Masculinity, Political Culture and the Struggle for Women’s Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 65-110; “Class, Gender, and Liberalism in Parliament, 1868-1882: The 
Case of the Married Women's Property Act,” The Historical Journal, 46, no. 1 (2003): 59-87. The passage 
of the Married Women’s Property Acts fits the model of government reform articulated by Oliver 
MacDonagh in “The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal,” The Historical 
Journal 1, no. 1 (1958): 52-67. This model is useful for conceptualizing legal reform as an ongoing 
process, not an end point.  
10 The London poor was a particular social concern by the late-nineteenth century. Economic change and a 
housing crisis in London entrenched a casual labor cycle that prevented working class men from holding 
consistent jobs. Although historians recognize the underlying structural issues the contributed to the 
growing numbers of poor in London, middle- and upper-class observers understood the situation 
differently. Contemporaries viewed pauperism as evidence of sin—a deficient character; elite reform 
attempts often sought to inculcate the poor with the correct values, but did not deal with the underlying 
structures contributing to the phenomenon. Two simultaneous concerns shaped the relationship between the 
poor and middle-class: first, that “residuum” would expand to contaminate other classes. Second, that 
geographic separation between the two classes—the rich in the West End and the poor occupying London’s 
  
6 
The 1870 Married Women’s Property Act’s provisions reflected these 
assumptions. Building on the idea of a separate trust in equity used by the Courts of 
Chancery, the 1870 Act established specific categories of property that constituted a 
woman’s separate property: it granted a married woman control over earnings and 
investments she acquired by carrying on a trade or occupation separate from her husband; 
money under £200 that she became entitled to; rents and profits from real estate; and 
property she owned before her marriage that a husband reserved for her separate use. It 
allowed husbands and wives to enact life insurance policies for the wife’s separate use. A 
married woman became liable for her debts, her children, and maintenance for her 
husband to the extent of her separate estate. Finally, the 1870 Act declared a husband was 
no longer liable for his wife’s ante-nuptial debts. This provision, however, was altered in 
1874, when Parliament passed the Amendment Act, which made a husband liable for his 
wife’s ante-nuptial debts to the extent of the property he acquired upon the marriage.11  
Disappointed by the 1870 Act’s limitations and contradictions, the Married 
Women’s Property Committee–whose leadership included Ursula Bright as treasurer (she 
replaced Lydia Becker), Elizabeth Wolstenholme Elmy as secretary, Jacob Bright, 
Josephine Butler, and Richard Pankhurst—carried on a campaign to secure married 
                                               
East End, was causing the wealthy to forgo their duties to the poor. Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast 
London: A Study in the Relationship Between Classes in Victorian Society, (New York; Oxford University 
Press, 1971). 
11 John Richard Griffith, The Married Women's Property Act, 1870, and the Married Women's Property 
Act, 1870, Amendment Act, 1874. Its relations to the Doctrine of Separate Use, (London: Stevens & 
Haynes, 1875). 
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women more extensive property rights.12 The 1882 Married Women’s Property Act 
realized these efforts and the Committee disbanded shortly thereafter. 
The 1882 MWPA dramatically extended the rights granted under the 1870 Act. 
Most significantly, while the 1870 Act only protected specific forms of property, the 
1882 MWPA made any married woman capable of holding and disposing of any real or 
personal property as her separate estate, as if she were a feme sole and without the 
intervention of a trustee. A married woman was capable of entering into any contract, 
suing, and being sued, to the extent of her separate property.  
Although scholars acknowledge that the Married Women’s Property Acts 
cumulatively constituted a landmark legal reform, little attention has been given to the 
meanings Britons attached to the Acts after their passage. Most scholarly attention to the 
Property Acts has focused on the political campaign outlined above. Within this 
narrative, the MWPAs are commonly regarded as a milestone on a path of progressive 
political reforms that originated in the nascent women’s movement of the 1850s and 
culminated with the 1918 Representation of the People Act, which enfranchised 
propertied women over thirty years of age. For instance, Lee Holcombe’s study, Wives 
and Property: Reform of the Married Women's Property Law in Nineteenth-Century 
England, identifies the many key advocates and politicians who sustained the property 
reform effort but deploys a teleological framework that folds the reformer’s actions into a 
history of women’s rights that hinges on political citizenship.13 It begins with the future 
                                               
12 Holcombe, 185.  
13 Barbara Caine, English Feminism, 1780-1980 (New York; Oxford University Press, 1997); Nicoletta F. 
Gullace, “The Blood of Our Sons;” Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship During the 
First World War, (New York; Palgrave, 2002); Susan Kingsley Kent, “The Politics of Sexual Difference: 
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leader of the suffrage movement, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, recounting her surprised 
reaction upon hearing in court that her purse, which had been nabbed by a pickpocket, 
was listed as the stolen property of her husband, Mr. Henry Garrett Fawcett.14 
Holcombe’s vignette implies the event made Fawcett aware of the need for property 
reform, commencing a long career working for women’s political rights. In her 
conclusion, Holcombe argues that the push for property reform “had a liberating effect on 
women.”15 The effort, she asserts, brought men and women together in common cause for 
women; the experience and political alliances forged laid the groundwork for a sustained 
women’s movement.16  
More recent scholarship has complicated Holcombe’s progressive narrative of 
feminist political action by examining how class-oriented ideas regarding the proper 
family unit and the lives of the poor influenced social reform. Ben Griffin has challenged 
the existence of a cohesive “feminist” political stance by examining how MPs’ 
assumptions regarding masculine authority and class position influenced their willingness 
to support liberal reforms in Parliament.17 
                                               
World War I and the Demise of British Feminism,” Journal of British Studies 27, No. 3, The Dilemmas of 
Democratic Politics (1988): 232-253. Works challenging a longstanding narrative that “British feminism” 
faded after the First World War continue to use women’s enfranchisement in 1918 as a hinge point to 
discuss citizenship. See: Julie Gotlieb and Richard Toye, The Aftermath of Suffrage: Women, Gender, and 
Politics in Britain, 1918-1945, (New York; Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Cowman, Krista ‘From the 
Housewife’s Point of View’: Female Citizenship and the Gendered Domestic Interior in Post-First World 
War Britain, 1918–1928.” English Historical Review Vol. CXXX No. 543 (2015). doi:10.1093/ehr/cev019. 
Caitríona Beaumont begins her periodization slightly later, in 1928, when women gained universal 
enfranchisement. See: Housewives and Citizens: Domesticity and the women's movement in England, 1928-
1964, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013). 
14 Holcombe, 3. 
15 Holcombe, 218. On an “enlightenment” moment as a trope in suffragists’ writings see Jill Richards, “The 
Long Middle: Reading Women’s Riots,” ELH 85, no. 2 (2018): 540-545, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/elh.2018.0020. 
16 Holcombe, 218. 
17 Ben Griffin, The Politics of Gender in Victorian Britain, 3-35, especially 18-20. 
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Overall, these studies have made a valuable contribution to historians’ 
understanding of reformers’ political alliances, shaped at various points by concerns for 
the poor and women’s rights, that secured the Property Acts’ passage. Yet given both 
contemporaries’ and historians’ recognition that the Property Acts constituted a 
significant reform, surprisingly little is known about how these legal changes 
reverberated through British society.  
The Property Acts’ absence from economic and social histories of the late-
nineteenth century is particularly surprising when contrasted with early-modern and 
feminist scholars’ attention to the law of coverture.18 Because married women’s 
subordinate status under coverture serves as a symbol of women’s broader social and 
political subordination, scholars have been deeply engaged in tracing the ways married 
women resisted or worked around its strictures.19 Through this work, early modern and 
                                               
18 Major works include: Susan Staves, Married Women’s Separate Property In England, 1660-1883, 
(Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1990), Amy Louise Erickson, Women and Property in Early 
Modern England, (London; Routledge, 1993); Dorothy M. Stetson, A Women’s Issue: The Politics of 
Family Law Reform in England, (Westport, CT; Greenwood Press, 1982); Holcombe, 9-17. For a recent 
discussion of early-modern women’s legal experiences see Alexandra Shepard and Tim Stretton, “Women 
Negotiating the Boundaries of Justice in Britain, 1300–1700: An Introduction,” Journal of British Studies 
58, no. 4 (October 2019): 677–83, https://doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2019.84. 
19 Margot C. Finn, “Women, Consumption and Coverture in England, c. 1760–1860,” The Historical 
Journal 39, no. 3 (September 1996): 703–22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X0002450X. Finn 
characterizes coverture as existing in “suspended animation” in women’s lives during the century before 
property reform laws were passed. By this she means that in practice, wives, husbands, and shopkeepers 
often ignored the law’s precise details during their consumer transactions, but the norms of coverture 
continued to shape women’s economic experience. Husbands and wives could use coverture to claim or 
evade their economic obligations, but the law shaped their actions. This finding is echoed in Alexandra 
Shepherd’s Accounting for Oneself: Worth, Status, and the Social Order in Early Modern England, (New 
York; Oxford University Press, 2016); Tim Stretton and K. J. (Krista J.) Kesselring, eds., Married Women 
and the Law: Coverture in England and the Common Law World (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013), 
4. Karen Pearlston, “Married Women Bankrupts in the Age of Coverture,” Law and Social Inquiry 34 
(2009): 265–299; Catherine Bishop, “When Your Money Is Not Your Own: Coverture and Married 
Women In Business in Colonial New South Wales,” Law and History Review 33, no. 1 (February 2015): 
181–200, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0738248014000510. 
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feminist historians have established women’s central role in the early-modern economy.20 
Women’s participation as investors and lenders, as well as their dowries, provided a 
critical source of capital for the expanding economy.21  
 “Reforming the Married State” contributes to scholars’ understanding of the 
history of coverture by highlighting how liberal reformers shaped a particular narrative of 
coverture—that emphasized women’s subordination under outdated laws—as they 
advocated for married women’s property rights. Both Tim Stretton and Karen Pearlston 
have suggested that Victorians’ definition of coverture—marital unity—reflected late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth century social and cultural changes.22 As Stretton has 
noted, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century commentaries on spouses’ property rights 
                                               
20 On the early-modern “credit economy” see: Craig Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of 
Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England, (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 1998); “Interpreting 
the market: The ethics of credit and community relations in early modern England," Social History. 18 no. 
2 (1998): 163-183. doi.org/10.1080/03071029308567871; “‘A Mutual Assent of Her Mind’? Women, 
Debt, Litigation and Contract in Early Modern England,” History Workshop Journal, no. 55 (2003): 47–71. 
Muldrew builds on the concept of “neighborliness” articulated by Keith Wrightson in Earthly Necessities: 
Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain, (New Haven; Yale University Press, 2002). On credit and debt in 
the nineteenth century see: Paul Johnson “Small Debts and Economic Distress in England and Wales, 
1857-1913” The Economic History Review, New Series. 46 no. 1 (1993): 65-87; Margot Finn, The 
Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740-1914, (Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), especially 265-273. Finn discusses the impact of the MWPA as well as other legislative 
changes to marriage law on legal treatments of debt. She emphasizes the uneven and discordant nature of 
judges’ rulings in county-court cases that arose from the law. Her focus on court cases and judge’s rulings 
illustrates only the legal discrepancies that persisted after the MWPA, not how the law was understood and 
used by the wider populace. Additionally, Finn’s focus on debt relations means that she is less concerned 
with changing ideas regarding property and property rights after 1870. Amy Erickson provocatively 
suggests that Britain developed a capital economy early because Britons’ experience creating trusts and 
settlements to circumvent coverture provided them with greater comfort in dealing with complex financial 
arrangements in “Coverture and Capitalism,” History Workshop Journal, no. 59 (2005): 1–16. 
21 Margaret Hunt, The Middling Sort: Commerce, Gender, and the Family in England, 1680-1780 
(Berkeley: University of California-Berkeley, 1996). On how changing notions about “work” informed 
constructions of gender and class during the Industrial Revolution see Deborah M. Valenze, The First 
Industrial Woman, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
22 Stretton, Tim, “Coverture and ‘Unity of Person’ in Blackstone’s Commentaries,” in Blackstone and His 
Commentaries: Biography, Law, History, ed. Wilfred Prest (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009), 
111–28; Karen Pearlston, “Male Violence, Marital Unity, and the History of the Interspousal Tort 
Immunity,” The Journal of Legal History 36, no. 3 (September 2, 2015): 260–98, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01440365.2015.1089972. 
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focused mostly on land tenure. They contain few references to the principle that a “unity 
of person” justified a woman’s legal non-existence. Although references to the “unity of 
person” increased during the first part of the eighteenth century, William Blackstone was 
the first to suggest that “unity of person” formed the underlying principle of the law of 
coverture in his Commentaries on the Laws of England.23 His dictum—“the husband and 
wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of women is 
suspended during marriage”—subsequently played an outsized role in defining the 
principle of coverture: marital unity. Victorians and legal scholars well into the twentieth 
century frequently referenced Blackstone’s dictum as the definition of coverture.  
Yet, in contrast to Stretton’s research showing the ways the “unity of person” 
principle emerged in tandem with Victorian cultural prescriptions—referred to in 
shorthand as Victorian separate spheres ideology—Victorian reformers located the “unity 
of person” principle in a pre-historical age. They viewed coverture as a vestige of a 
primitive time, when a wife shared the same status as a slave and the family was bound 
together by the power of the husband. Recognizing reformers’ role in writing the history 
of coverture, therefore, situates a particular understanding of coverture within a broader 
tradition of late-Victorian liberal reform and prompts further reflection about the extent to 
which “coverture” changed over time. 
Historians of coverture frequently date its end to the Property Act’s passage.24 But 
beyond these assertions there has been little focus on how the Acts’ dismantled coverture. 
                                               
23 Tim Stretton, “Coverture and ‘Unity of Person’ in Blackstone’s Commentaries,” 124.  
24 For examples see: Erickson, “Coverture and Capitalism,”5; Finn, “Women, Consumption and 
Coverture,” 705; in their Introduction to Married Women and the Law: Coverture in England and the 
Common Law World Stretton and Kesselring similarly assert that the MWPA, alongside other legal reforms 
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Instead, historians have remained divided over the Act’s material and symbolic impact. 
For instance, Pat Jalland asserts that the Property Acts’ significance was mostly symbolic 
because Britain’s upper classes continued to avail themselves of marriage settlements to 
protect their daughters’ finances.25 The persistence of marriage settlements, however, 
does not necessarily illustrate the Acts’ limited impact. Given their anxieties that a 
woman’s property rights could upend a husband’s authority in the home, Victorians 
continued use of marriage settlements to define property ownership and financial 
responsibilities in marriage deserves further scrutiny.  
Indeed, following the 1870 Act’s passage, the journal The Musical World 
published an article by “Felovese” warning “musicians about to marry” that the Act 
would allow a woman with £10,000 a year to refuse to contribute to the household 
expenses and spend the fortune on herself. The only remedy to “save the husband from an 
extravagant, thoughtless or wicked wife” was a marriage settlement. “It will now be 
absolutely necessary for a man to insist upon an ante-nuptial settlement, so as to compel 
the wife to give a fair portion of her income to the support of the family,” Felovese 
advised.26 The barrister Andrew Holdsworth provided a similar recommendation to the 
readers of his treatise, The Married Women’s Property Act. “The only certain defense 
against” a scenario in which a husband became the tenant of his property-owning wife 
(meaning he did not possess legal rights to the premises) was an “antenuptial settlement” 
                                               
such as the 1857 Divorce Act, in late-Victorian England created “enough of a disjunction” to justify 
separate study (4). 
25 Patricia Jalland, Women, Marriage, and Politics, 1860-1914 (New York: Clarendon Press, 1986): 58-61. 
26 Felovese, “To Musicians About to Marry,” The Musical World 48, no. 40 (October 1, 1870): 663. 
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that outlined spouses’ respective rights in marriage.27 Expecting the Acts to increase 
married women’s access to property, therefore, overlooks the ways Britons’ anxieties 
about the law could shape their response to it. 
Historians’ uncertainty with regard to the MWPA’s impact has likely been shaped 
by suffragists’ testimonials. Women’s rights activists strongly disliked the 1870 Act and 
their coverage of the law reflected their desire for further reform. For example, the 
Women’s Suffrage Journal—founded by Jessie Boucherett and MWPC member Lydia 
Becker—criticized the 1870s Act’s weakness when it drew attention to a story about a 
wealthy young “girl of fifteen” who “[threw] her whole wealth into the hands of an 
adventurer” and eloped with an older man.28 As a consequence of the Act’s limited 
protections, the Journal expected the man would successfully pressure his wife to 
transfer her fortune to him via a trust. Reflecting activists’ bitter disappointment over the 
1870 bill’s fortune, the article thanked “the Peers who rejected Mr. Russell Gurney’s 
Married Women’s Property Bill” for the “continuance of this risk to young girls, and for 
the misery that may hereafter result from it.”29 
Suffragists’ critiques of the 1870 MWPA were not unique. Indeed, complaints 
about the Act’s contradictions commenced with its passage. It is important, however, to 
recognize that suffragists possessed an incentive to frame Property Acts in ways that 
aligned with their main political goal: women’s enfranchisement. For instance, an 1872 
                                               
27 W[illiam] A[ndrew] Holdsworth. The Married Women's Property Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict., cap. 75), with 
an introduction, notes, and index by W. A. H. of Grey’s Inn, Barrister-at-Law. (London: George 
Routeledge and Sons. Broadway, Ludgate Hill. New York; 9 Lafayette Place. [1882]), 38.  
28 Becker left the MWPC in 1873. Holcombe, 184.  
29 “Stolen Marriages and the Married Women’s Property Act,” Women’s Suffrage Journal 1, no. 9 
(November 1, 1870): 91. 
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article in the radical The Examiner, reported on a case in which creditors claimed the 
£500 a woman lent to her husband shortly before his death, meaning the widow lost her 
life’s savings. For the paper, the outcome illustrated the “irrational caprice as well as the 
injustice of the law.” It also reinforced to “the workers for women’s suffrage” the 
“necessity” of their “most strenuous efforts to obtain justice for women, married as well 
as unmarried.”30 Similarly, after a failed attempt to amend the 1870 MWPA, the 
Women’s Suffrage Journal argued the failure provided a clear example of Jacob Bright’s 
saying: “to try to bring a woman’s question before the House of Commons while women 
are excluded from the franchise is like trying to drag along a heavy waggon [sic] without 
horses. The motive power is wanting.” 31In this vein, suffragists emphasized, the twelve 
years between the 1870 Act and the passage of the 1882 Act illustrated that meaningful 
change to women’s lives could not occur until they were enfranchised. 
 Recognizing suffragists’ framing of the Property Acts in service to a parallel 
political cause is important because suffragist publications provide a rich source for 
historians of the women’s movement. This does not deny the suffrage movement’s 
enormous significance. Indeed, Chapter 4 will examine how suffragists invoked the 
Property Acts during the suffrage campaign. It does recognize, however, that suffragists 
possessed a vested interest in demonstrating that women’s lives would not be improved 
until they could vote for their Parliamentary representatives. It behooved suffragists to 
                                               
30 “A Woman’s Grievance,” The Examiner, no. 3339 (January 27, 1872): 92. 
31 “Legislation for Women,” Women’s Suffrage Journal 4, no. 28 (April 1, 1873): 40. 
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emphasize the limits of the law. For reforming feminists, the Property Acts served a far 
more powerful function as a symbol of women’s equality than they did as a social reform.  
While no sustained analysis of the Property Acts exists, references to the Acts 
abound in studies on the late-nineteenth century and suggest their impact on Victorians’ 
lives. For instance, John Tosh suggests that the new cultural mood fostered by the 
Property Acts—a more egalitarian climate—strained the mid-Victorian ideals of a 
domestic patriarchy by the end of the nineteenth century.32 Erika Rappaport has also 
highlighted how the Property Acts emerged as a critical area of debate with regard to 
women’s consumer debts. Their research makes a valuable contribution to our emerging 
understanding of the MWPA and its impact on ideas regarding masculinity or consumer 
culture.  
Furthermore, recent scholarship has begun to explore the Property Acts’ impact 
by tracking changes to women’s investment practices after 1870. Economic historian 
Mary Beth Combs has used census and tax records from shop-keeping households in 
Leeds and Liverpool to illustrate dramatic shifts in women’s investment practices before 
and after the 1870 Act, suggesting that women and their families took advantage of the 
new law.33 Combs’ findings are reinforced by Janette Rutterford, David Green, Josephine 
                                               
32 John Tosh, A Man’s Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian England (Yale 
University Press, 2008) 157, 161. For Tosh’s reappraisal of his “flight from domesticity” thesis see “Home 
and Away: The Flight from Domesticity in Late-Nineteenth-Century England Re-Visited,” Gender & 
History 27, no. 3 (November 1, 2015): 561–75, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0424.12150. 
33 Combs shows that three generations of women married before 1870 each kept about 55% of their total 
entrusted property in realty and 44% in various forms of moveable property. In striking contrast, the 
generation of women married shortly after 1870 held only 25% of their property in realty and 75% of their 
total wealth in movable property. She argues that these shifts demonstrate that women and their families 
responded to the law by altering their wealth-management practices substantially in the decades after its 
passage. “A Measure of Legal Independence”: The 1870 Married Women’s Property Act and the Portfolio 
Allocations of British Wives.” The Journal of Economic History, 65 no.4, (2005), 1041. Combs’ findings 
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Maltby and Alastair Owens who similarly attribute increases in women’s investments to 
the Property Acts.34  
“Reforming the Married State” builds on the insights of these scholars as it 
follows the Property Acts’ contested afterlives. It deploys a trove of sources—
newspapers, periodicals, suffragists’ papers, Parliamentary debates, and government 
papers—that illustrate the breadth of debate the Property Acts inspired among Britons. 
Attention to these debates suggests that despite feminists’ proclamations about 
coverture’s demise, marriage continued to delineate social rights and obligations well into 
the twentieth century. Recognizing this, this study aims to advance historians’ 
understanding of modern British society and the emerging welfare state by demonstrating 
how legal changes to women’s rights reverberated through British social and economic 
life. 
 
*** 
 “Reforming the Married State” begins in 1870, examining how Victorians 
conceptualized the two Acts’ passages. Chapter 1 traces how activists contrasted the 
histories of legal reform in Ancient Rome, India, and the United States to advocate for 
property reform in Britain. Their arguments successfully cast the law of coverture as a 
legal relic from a barbaric age and, by contrast, the 1882 MWPA as a rational reform that 
                                               
align with similar studies that focus on changes to women’s wealth after property reforms were 
implemented in the United States. On the United States see Carole Shammas, “Re-Assessing the Married 
Women’s Property Acts,” Journal of Women’s History 6. no. 1 (1994): 9-30. 
34 Janette Rutterford et al., ““Who Comprised the Nation of Shareholders? Gender and Investment in Great 
Britain, c. 1870–1935,” Economic History Review 64, no. 1 (n.d.): 157–187. 
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reinforced Britons’ view of their society as distinctly modern: an enlightened commercial 
society.  
Once the MWPA came into effect, Victorians needed to consider under what 
circumstances property constituted a married woman’s separate property and received 
protection under the law. Chapter 2 turns to the courts, where judges grappled with this 
question. It argues that judges’ assumptions about a husband’s authority over his wife 
shaped their rulings defining a wife’s separate property. Yet, by emphasizing the ways a 
husband permitted his wife to run her business without his assistance, their rulings 
simultaneously illustrated married women’s capabilities as independent persons. Over 
time, these legal justifications became abstracted. The Acts developed a symbolic status 
that provided Britons with a causal means to explain married women’s independent 
actions.  
Chapters 3 through 5 use debates about Britain’s income tax to consider the 
prosaic and principled contradictions that arose between married women’s claims to 
individual rights and broader class-based obligations. Chapter 3 traces the debate’s 
origins to the passage of the 1882 MWPA. The 1842 Income Tax Act, reflecting the law 
of coverture, stated that a husband was liable for paying the household tax, assessed on 
the aggregate income of both spouses. Critics argued firstly, that a household income tax 
violated a married woman’s property rights because it required a wife to reveal her 
income to her husband for him to pay tax and secondly, that it unjustly obligated 
husbands to pay tax on their wives’ now-separate incomes. Prosaic motives shaped 
Inland Revenue’s response to these principled arguments: officials expected that small-
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businessmen would exploit the Act’s separate property provisions to reduce their tax 
liabilities and opposed any reform on the basis that the state could not afford the 
anticipated revenue losses. 
Married women’s tax status persisted as a slow-burning debate in Parliament until 
1909, when a suffrage society, the Women’s Tax Resistance League (WTRL), advised all 
married women to claim their rights under the 1882 MWPA and refuse to divulge their 
incomes to their husbands. The WTRL’s campaign, the focus of Chapter 4, culminated 
with Inland Revenue arresting a resister’s husband who could not afford to pay tax on his 
wife’s income. The arrest confirmed Britons’ underlying anxieties about a husband’s 
precarious legal position in his family and the ensuing public outcry compelled officials 
to introduce minor tax concessions to suffragists in the 1914 Finance Act. 
While the First World War’s outbreak abruptly concluded the WTRL’s campaign, 
the controversies the League generated ensured married women’s tax obligations 
received the attention of the 1919 Royal Commission on Income Tax. Chapter 5 
examines how the Property Acts provided feminists with legal grounds to call on the state 
to recognize married women as individuals. Revenue officials were ultimately able to 
elide these claims by reframing the problem, not as a question of women’s individual 
rights, but a matter of class-based obligations: they argued that taxing women 
independently would allow Britain’s wealthy to escape their social obligation to pay a 
higher tax rate under progressive taxation. Instead, officials embraced “marriage 
allowances” as a policy that showed the government recognized the economic burdens 
faced by lower-middle class men with families to support.  
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The study concludes in 1935, when the Married Women and Tortfeasor’s Act 
ended the legal category of a feme covert and granted all married women the same rights 
as unmarried women or men. Commentary on the Tortfeasor’s Act illustrated how 
Britons’ understanding of the MWPA had changed. In this framework, the MWPA 
emerged as a feminist legal victory that had helped secure women’s individuality. At the 
same time, commentators concerns about the way’s men suffered under the law belied 
any clear feminist victory.  
 
 
A Note on Terms 
Throughout most of “Reforming the Married State,” I refer to the individuals who 
supported the Property Acts’ passage or subsequent legal changes as “activists” or 
“reformers.” Political support for property reform coalesced among an alliance of 
individuals with multiple motives: to protect women and reform the behavior of men, to 
create uniformity between Britain’s laws, and for some, to secure women’s equality. 
Consequently, I intentionally deploy a more neutral “activists” or “reformer” to 
emphasize that not all who supported women’s property rights were committed to 
women’s equality. Furthermore, an implicit contention of this dissertation is that while 
women’s rights activists regarded the Property Acts as a critical stepping stone in 
advancing women’s equality, the Property Acts became more clearly construed as a 
“feminist” law over time. I use “feminist” in Chapter 5 to refer to the women who 
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testified before the Royal Commission on Income Tax because their arguments espoused 
a clear commitment to women’s equality.  
 
I use “Britons” and “Britain” throughout the text for simplicity. The 1870 and 1882 
Property Acts applied to England, Wales, and Ireland. Property Acts applying to Scotland 
were passed in 1877 and 1881.35 Debate and press coverage about the controversies 
surrounding the Property Acts, however, occurred throughout Great Britain.  
 
Chapter 1: A Social Revolution: The Married Women’s Property Acts’ Passages, 
1868-1883 
Introduction 
Reflecting on the recent passage of the 1882 Married Women’s Property Act at 
the annual provincial meeting of the Incorporated Law Society, Sir Thomas Paine, the 
Society President, observed that the Act’s provisions would “probably … make their 
legal ancestors of two or three generations past turn in their graves.”1 The 1882 Act 
marked the “complete reversal … of the old common-law doctrine of the identity of 
husband and wife” and Britain’s arrival in a new “epoch.” 2 These remarks captured a 
sentiment commonly expressed by Britons in the aftermath of the 1882 Property Act’s 
                                               
35 Griffin, The Politics of Gender, 11. 
1 “The Incorporated Law Society,” The Times, October 18, 1882: 10.  
2 Ibid.  
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passage: the law introduced a new principle—a married woman’s independence—into 
British marriages, thereby ushering in a new historical era.  
From this perspective, the 1882 Married Women’s Property Act’s passage marked 
the triumphant culmination of a twenty-five-year effort to reform married women’s status 
under coverture. During the mid-1850s, calls for legal reforms granting married women 
control over their property began to emerge; the 1857 Divorce Act introduced minor 
property protections for women formally separated from their husbands.3 In the late 
1860s, a resurgent reform effort, developed alongside a nascent suffrage movement, 
watched the House of Lords dismantle their preferred bill and pass the far narrower 1870 
Married Women’s Property Act, which granted married women limited property rights. 
Disappointed by the Act’s shortcomings, activists on the Married Women’s Property 
Committee commenced a sustained campaign to secure married women property rights 
on the same terms as those enjoyed by a feme sole or widow.4 Twelve years later, the 
1882 MWPA realized these efforts.  
Yet activists’ jubilant celebrations–that the law overturned coverture and 
established women’s equality with regard to property–existed in tension with Victorians’ 
understanding that the “married state” provided the foundation for the “social state.” 
Recognizing this prompts a question: how did Victorian Britons, with their attendant 
patriarchal assumptions and affinity for precedent, make sense of a legal reform that 
                                               
3 Shanley, 44-47. 
4 Holcombe, 184-205. 
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overturned the common law doctrine historically governing women’s position in 
marriage?  
This chapter surveys the four frameworks Britons drew on as they tried to make 
the Property Acts legible. Support for the 1870 MWPA coalesced around the expectation 
that the law would assist poor women suffering from their husbands’ drunken behavior. 
To counter arguments that the patriarchal family represented the ‘natural” state of 
society, during the 1870s activists sought to place married women’s property rights 
within a progressive narrative of historical change by contrasting the histories of reform 
in Ancient Rome, India, and the United States. Their arguments successfully cast the law 
of coverture as a legal relic from a barbaric age and placed the Property Acts within a 
narrative of Victorian-era progress that framed married women’s property rights as an 
enlightened reform. When Parliament passed the 1882 MWPA, supporters celebrated the 
Act for overturning the principle of coverture. Others regarded these legal changes with 
apprehension. But whether victorious or anxious about the 1882 Act, Britons viewed it as 
a change that introduced a “social revolution.”  
The twelve-year gap between the two Acts is important because it meant that 
from the late-1860s a sustained debate on married women’s property rights proliferated 
across Britain. Most scholarly work on the Property Acts has focused on the reform 
campaign and the Acts’ passages in Parliament. But outside the halls of Parliament, 
discussion of the Property Acts continued across the public sphere. Newspapers reprinted 
MPs’ speeches and published articles expressing support or opposition to reform; 
intellectuals gave public lectures on the history of married women’s property rights that 
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were subsequently published by the Property Reform Committee for the reading public; 
witnesses from the United States testified to the social benefits that followed from 
property reforms in America; and barristers and legal experts published books explaining 
married women’s new rights to Britons. It is to their arguments that the chapter turns.  
 
The Centrality of Marriage  
References to the “married state” reflected Victorian Britons’ assumption that 
marriage formed the basis of a free and moral society. During the nineteenth century 
these ideas came into their full expression with the concept of “separate spheres.” As 
many historians have discussed, Victorian separate spheres ideology viewed the home as 
a moral place of refuge from the corrupting forces of public life.5 The home, however, 
could only serve as a place of refuge if marital harmony existed between husbands and 
wives. Separate spheres ideology worked to ensure this harmony by emphasizing the 
essential unity of a husband and wife, in which a wife’s legal and social identity was 
subordinated to her husband’s authority. As The Derby Mercury reminded its readers: 
“the idea of the marriage state is one of subordination. The husband’s supremacy is its 
essential condition, and he is the responsible governor of his household.”6 This 
                                               
5 The seminal work on separate spheres ideology is Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall’s Family 
Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987). For a critique see Amanda Vickery, “Golden Age to Separate Spheres? A Review of the 
Categories and Chronology of English Women’s History,” The Historical Journal 36, no. 2 (1993): 383–
414. Lucy Delap, Ben Griffin, and Abigail William’s provide a good overview of the historiographical 
debate in their introduction to The Politics of Domestic Authority in Britain since 1800 (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 2009), 1-16. On masculinity and the middle-class home, see Tosh, A Man’s Place and 
Griffin, The Politics of Gender pp. 37-64.  
6 Emphasis mine. “Husband and Wife,” The Derby Mercury, April 21, 1869.  
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overlapping language between marriage and politics—the husband as governor—also re-
affirmed that marriage served as the model for Britain’s social and political institutions.7  
Calls to grant a married woman control over her property therefore existed in 
tension with dominant ideas regarding a husband’s authority over his wife. Property 
rights formed the basis for men’s social and political participation in the public sphere 
and justified a husband’s authority. The Derby Mercury, for instance, viewed women’s 
property rights as a change that presumed to “repudiate” marriage itself and “substitute 
the idea of equal partnership. It is, in point of fact, to abolish families in the old sense, 
and to break up society again into men and women” the paper proclaimed.8 Although 
wealthy women and their families had long secured a married woman’s property in trusts 
through the Courts of Chancery, the potential for all married women to acquire property 
rights, with their connotations of independence, posed a direct challenge to Victorian 
separate spheres ideology that assumed a woman’s inherent dependence.  
 
Property Rights for Poor Women 
While women’s property rights posed a challenge to separate spheres ideology, 
they did not foreclose the possibility for legal reform because support for reform did not 
align along a clear woman’s rights agenda. Many members of the Married Women’s 
Property Committee participated in other reform campaigns that scholars, in retrospect, 
would regard as “feminist” and did so out of a commitment to women’s equality. 
                                               
7 Griffin, “Class, Gender, and Liberalism in Parliament,” 63. 
8 “Husband and Wife,” The Derby Mercury, April 21, 1869.  
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(MWPC treasurer Ursula Bright and her husband Jacob helped found the Manchester 
Society for Women’s Suffrage; Emmeline Pankhurst, married to committee member 
Richard Pankhurst founded the militant suffragette society the Women’s Social and 
Political Union which MWPC members Elizabeth Elmy and Harriet Mcllquham joined.) 
But support for property reform did not guarantee support for suffrage, or vice versa. 
George Shaw Lefevre, Liberal MP for Reading, who introduced the 1868 bill and chaired 
the final MWPC meeting, opposed women’s suffrage.9 By contrast, Alexander Staveley 
Hill, Conservative MP for Coventry, supported women’s suffrage and opposed the 1869 
property bill on the grounds that it altered marriage relations and did not address the real 
problem: idle husbands.  
If marriage, as Victorians understood it, provided the foundation for social 
morality, it also followed that the discovery of immoral behavior in marriage could 
enable reform. As Ben Griffin has shown, reformers presented a simple narrative to 
Parliament: poor or working-class husbands were abusing their authority by taking their 
wives’ earnings, intended to support the family, and drinking these wages away in the 
pub. These women lacked the financial resources necessary to take advantage of the law 
of equity, as the wealthy did, and were left to suffer under the harsh common law. In 
effect, one law existed for the wealthy and one for the poor. Granting women property 
rights, activists argued, would resolve poor women’s suffering and create one law that 
applied to all classes.10  
                                               
9 Griffin, “Class, Gender, and Liberalism in Parliament,” 60.  
10 Ibid, 59–87.  
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This narrative helped secure MPs’ support for the 1870 Property Act. In 1868, for 
example, when Shaw Levefre introduced his bill granting married women property rights 
he argued that the common law functioned as a “fruitful source of wretchedness” that 
shaped both men and women’s behavior. In a speech that reflected the value Victorians 
placed on individual labor, morality, and responsibility, he explained that a husband’s 
control over his wife’s earnings “often acts as an inducement to the husband to become 
idle or drunken” and “prevents the wife having that moral control over him.”11 
Furthermore, because a wife knew that she had no control over her earnings, the law 
“sometimes takes from the wife the motive for exertion.” Both the husband and wife’s 
resulting idleness “urged the family downward in its career of misery.”12 Those who 
opposed Shaw Lefevre’s bill did so on the grounds that the rights granted to women were 
too extensive, but agreed that the issue of drunken husbands needed to be addressed. For 
instance, Henry Lopes, the Conservative MP for Launceston and later a justice on the 
Supreme Court of Judicature, agreed that the “spoliation of the savings of the women of 
the humbler classes by dissolute and idle husbands was an admitted evil which required 
an adequate remedy.” He opposed the bill in its current form because he felt it would 
“impair the confidence that ought to exist between husband and wife, and which was the 
mainspring of domestic happiness.”13 In other words, he viewed the bill as destroying the 
essential unity of husband and wife assumed by separate spheres ideology. Ultimately, as 
                                               
11 Ibid, 69. 
12 George Shaw Lefevre, Speech of Mr. G. Shaw Lefevre, MP. on Bringing in 'The Bill to Amend the Law 
with Respect to the Property of Married Women" in the House of Commons, April 21, 1868. (Manchester: 
A. Ireland & Co., Printers, Pall Mall, 1868), 7.  
13 “Bill 20 Second Reading” (Hansard, April 14, 1869). 
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Ben Griffin has shown, the 1870 Act’s provisions reflected the fact that political support 
for reform coalesced around MPs’ expectation that the Act would help poor women but 
would not disrupt marriage relations in their own upper-class homes.14  
Outside of Parliament, similar stories reinforced reformers’ arguments that the 
common law enabled drunk, spendthrift, or profligate men to avoid work by taking 
advantage of their industrious wives. An article in the Leisure Hour, for example, 
provided three vignettes contrasting a woman’s industriousness with the deceitful 
behavior of her idle husband. In one story, a young lady orphan named Sarah married a 
man pretending to be an officer in the Navy. Once they were married (and he controlled 
her property), he revealed he had borrowed the officer’s suit from a friend and was, in 
fact, an officer’s valet. Upon this revelation, Sarah ran away, leaving her fortune with her 
husband. Over the next five years he squandered her wealth while his industrious wife 
started a business running a “fashionable watering hole.”15 Eventually, her husband 
learned about the business and insisted she provide him with money. Aware that she had 
no recourse under common law, the narrator emphasized, Sarah was forced to support a 
man who did nothing to support himself. Such exploitation led to tragic ends: Sarah died 
young and in poverty, exhausted after a life in which her earnings were spent keeping her 
husband at bay.  
Women’s own testimonies reinforced the moral lessons of these fictional stories. 
The Women’s Suffrage Journal reprinted a letter from “An Actress,” initially written to 
                                               
14 Griffin, “Class, Gender, and Liberalism in Parliament,” 79-80.  
15 “Married Women’s Plagues.” The Leisure Hour: A Family Journal of Instruction and Recreation, no. 
937 (December 1, 1869): 798. 
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the editor of the Daily News, detailing the abuse she suffered from her husband, a 
solicitor. Her letter followed a familiar narrative. She married her husband with the 
shared understanding that upon marriage she would leave her profession. After two 
weeks of marriage the husband began arriving home drunk two or three times a week. He 
demanded her savings with the promise of investing them, but squandered the £200 on 
himself and refused to support his wife. The “Actress” eventually resumed her career in 
London while her husband remained in the country. When he did come to London, it was 
to demand money from her. At the time of her writing, he was threatening to obtain an 
injunction against her continuing to work in order to earn money. “[T]he few clients 
which my husband had have deserted him and he is penniless. Must I return to him to 
starve and to be beaten?” she pleaded to the editor.”16 Her plight conveyed a clear 
message: trapped under the terms of the common law, a woman was left with no means 
to provide for herself and her child even as the same law incentivized her husband’s 
immoral actions.  
Narratives about the injustice married women experienced under the common law 
functioned as an effective critique of the poor, but they also drew on new ideas regarding 
male criminality. In reformers’ stories, drunk husbands shared many common 
characteristics with an emerging figure of social suspicion: the vagrant.17 One article, for 
                                               
16 “The Law for Married Women,” Women’s Suffrage Journal 2, no. 17 (July 1, 1871), 75. 
17 Historian Beate Althammer has outlined the ways in which vagrancy and begging became strongly 
gendered as a form of male criminality in nineteenth-century Europe: “up to the middle of the century, it 
would be a gross overstatement to speak of vagrancy offenses as a masculine domain. … In England in 
1860, women and girls constituted 25 percent of those convicted of begging and 23 percent of those 
convicted of sleeping out. … By the late nineteenth century, however, the picture had changed quite 
radically. While convictions of men for vagrancy offenses generally increased, with peaks, depending on 
the country, between 1880 and 1910, female participation dropped away. In France in 1910, the female 
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instance, sympathized with wives “struggling against the hardships of life with a drunken, 
thriftless, idle, vagabond of a man, claiming all the rights of a husband and fulfilling none 
of the duties of that relation.”18 Charles Dicken’s magazine All the Year Round similarly 
argued that a poor woman required individual property rights because her husband was 
often a “worthless vagabond who does no work himself” or “an idle, drunken rascal” who 
lacked the decency to desert his wife.19 In these instances, a husband lived a life of legal 
criminality, allowed to steal his wife’s earnings. 
Perceptions about who the 1870 Act was supposed to help—namely poor 
women—were important for shaping Britons’ competing understandings of both Property 
Acts in two regards. In this framework, the 1870 Act enabled an important legal 
exception to the law of coverture but never challenged the broader ideology of separate 
spheres.20 For example, after a second reading of John Hinde Palmer’s 1873 bill, the 
Saturday Review published an article opposing the bill on the grounds that it was 
introducing changes that would extend beyond the specific problems faced by working 
class women. “Everyone is agreed,” the author wrote, that protection of property should 
be made for “women who have the misfortune to be married to dissipated or rapacious 
men.” But “this is the case only of a section, and we should say a very small section, of 
the community.” The author emphasized that most marriages in Britain did not require 
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legal interference and drew attention to “the great body of people” who did not suffer 
from unhappy marriages and had “some right to be considered in the matter.”21 In this 
view, the 1870 Act created a legal exception to address working men’s bad behavior but 
did not challenge coverture.  
These perceptions continued to inform one view of the 1882 Property Act. As 
Griffin has noted, John Hinde Palmer, Liberal MP for Lincoln in 1868-1874 and 1880-
1884, took charge of the 1882 bill in Parliament after he became convinced that the 1870 
Act was too limited to fully protect poor women from their husbands.22 The press also 
continued to echo lines of argument used in 1870. Chambers Journal, for instance, 
predicted that the 1882 Act would affect the “lower and middle classes more than it will 
affect the Upper Ten Thousand.” The article reiterated a common refrain: property rights 
would assist the “hard-working wife” in “thousands of English homes” who “earns the 
living, sometimes bringing up a large family of children, while the husband spends his 
time in idleness, and not unfrequently demands money from his wife to waste on strong 
drink.”23 Drawing a distinction between the lower and middle classes, and the Upper Ten 
Thousand, the author maintained the class-based logic—bad marriages existed among the 
poor and working classes—that helped convince MPs the MWPA would not impact their 
households.24  
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As a second point, it is also worth emphasizing that this rhetoric shaped Britons’ 
expectations about how women would use their earnings if they were granted property 
rights. Reformers argued married women would be able to use their separate earnings to 
provide food for their children. The Glasgow Herald reprinted an article (first published 
in the Englishwoman’s Review) that exemplified this assumption. Protecting women’s 
earnings constituted a “great victory,” because it meant that “the wife and mother’s 
earnings may now be spent, without deduction, for the benefit of the family.”25 In sum: 
reformers expected mothers would spend their wages on others, not themselves. By 
contrast, “drunken husbands and fathers will still be able to spend the whole of their 
wages on their own gratification.” Consequently, while reformers’ arguments for the 
MWPA functioned as a critique of men’s behavior, they also reinforced particular 
expectations about women’s behavior. The moral contours of this argument assumed that 
a married woman’s money was not for herself, or her husband, but for her to provide for 
others. (Although more radical reformers agreed that a woman did have the right to spend 
money on herself if she chose.) In many ways, this reflected the daily circumstances 
many poor women faced—low wages did not leave room for purchases for 
“gratification.” But these arguments also reinforced an expectation that women’s 
property rights would benefit others in ways that left little room for a married woman to 
pursue her individual economic self-interest.  
Importantly, this strand of argument made no concessions regarding married 
women’s equality. In this class-based framework, the Property Acts reflected the actions 
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of Britain’s elite men who had a social duty to legislate and care for the poor.26 As later 
chapters will show, this narrow, class-based understanding of the Property Acts existed 
alongside a more universal aim of radical reformers: that women’s property rights were a 
stepping stone to women’s equality and the 1882 Property Act had altered the principle of 
the law.  
 
Ancient Roman Legal Reform and Barbarian Influences  
Victorians’ attempts to understand the history of property rights was an important 
means through which they articulated arguments about the need for reform in their own 
society. Conservatives who opposed reform did not need to argue that the Common 
Law’s principle was flawed. They were willing to address the exceptional case of poor 
women’s earnings, but maintained that the patriarchal family unit reflected both the 
natural order and had divine sanction. Reformers therefore sought to counter these 
arguments by associating coverture with a primitive age and barbaric, eastern influences. 
By contrast, they positioned women’s property rights within a historical trajectory shaped 
by ideals of progress and enlightened civilization.  
Histories of married women’s property rights shared common assumptions about 
the progressive development of civilization. Here the line between advocacy and 
objective history blurred. The liberal education reformer Charles Pearson, a lecturer in 
modern history at Trinity College, Cambridge, argued in an article published in Josephine 
Butler’s Women’s Work and Women’s Culture (Butler was a member of the MWPC but 
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is more well-known for her role in the repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts) that the 
law of coverture remained a “relic of primitive times” when “society [was] required to be 
held together by stronger bonds than at present” and the family constituted an “artificial 
compound.”27 In this era, the family included the wife, slaves, and children, all bound 
together by the husband’s power. A wife had no property rights, and under the law, had a 
status equal to that of a slave within the family.28 Eventually, the multiplication of the 
family unit formed societies, marking the beginning of civilization.29 Civilized society 
emerged from this primitive, patriarchal, custom-bound family unit and was comprised of 
individuals with property rights and the power to contract.30 
In these histories, Ancient Rome exemplified “civilization” and served as a model 
for contemporary political debates about English society.31 For instance, in his 1873 
lecture, “The Early History of the Law of the Property of Married Women, as Collected 
from Roman and Hindoo Law,” the jurist and legal scholar Henry Maine asserted that by 
the late-Roman Empire, women’s position in marriage had changed so that “the relation 
of husband and wife became a voluntary conjugal society,” a description that echoed 
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Britons’ views of their own society.32 Marriage laws during the period of the Roman 
Empire provided a benchmark for British women’s progress. A Times editorial, for 
example, lamented that “modern English women are worse off than their Roman 
ancestors, who enjoyed a power of dominion over certain of their inherited or self-
acquired property.”33  
Consequently, reformers’ histories of women’s property rights in ancient Rome 
reflected their contemporary interest in property reform in Britain. Pearson, for example, 
spoke to Victorians’ concerns about the potential impact of the Married Women’s 
Property Acts when he explained to his readers that ancient Roman statesmen—
analogous to opponents in Parliament—felt that “with the growth of civilization the 
authority of fathers and husbands was mitigated” and feared these changes “would strike 
at the root of the whole family system.” Despite these anxieties, ancient statesmen 
“conceded in deference to public opinion.” Once the Romans embraced the legal change 
granting ancient women property rights, Pearson reassured his readers, “precisely the 
converse to what English conservatives fear actually happened.” The reforms did not 
inspire familial dissention or increase divorce. Instead, women remained members of 
their family with control over their property.34 
Maine similarly addressed contemporary concerns about how husbands and wives 
would contribute to household expenses if a wife had control over her own income. In his 
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1873 lecture, he explained that, although Roman legal reforms allowed the wife to retain 
control over her own property, the law included one caveat: part of the wife’s property 
was converted into a fund for “contributing to the expenses of the conjugal household.”35 
The detail spoke to contemporary criticisms that women would refuse to contribute their 
separate income to the household expenses if granted property rights. Drawing a contrast 
between the expensive and complex marriage settlements drawn up by English lawyers to 
delineate spouses’ financial obligations, Maine emphasized the simplicity of Roman 
marriage contracts. The Roman “mechanism was infinitely simpler. A few words on 
paper would suffice to bring any part of the wife’s property under the well-ascertained 
rules supplied by the written law for dotal settlements [for household expenses], and 
nothing more than these words would be needed,” he explained.  
By turning to ancient Rome as a model of how to embrace legal change, these 
speakers constructed the era of Imperial Rome as a relative golden age for married 
women’s proprietary rights. For example, Arthur Hobhouse—liberal reformer, barrister, 
law member for the India Law Council, and member of the Social Science Association—
argued that “the Romans, who had singular power of moulding their laws to fit the 
growth of society, found the domestic tyranny intolerable, and they got rid of it by one 
process after another; and the position of a wife under the later Roman law was one of 
great freedom.”36 Through these lectures, reformers drew on the Roman legacy to frame 
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the extension of property rights in Britain as a continuation of Roman progress and 
development.37  
While ancient Roman history provided Britons with a model for thinking about 
legal reform, Rome’s history—and implicitly British legal reform—was also written in 
opposition to the East. For Maine (Hobhouse’s predecessor on the India Law Council 
from 1862-1869), the history of property reform in India provided a lesson in contrasts. 
Although Roman and Indian legal systems shared a common assumption that the family 
formed the basis of all social organization, he asserted, continued Brahmin priestly 
influence had steadily degraded Indian society since antiquity.38 Connecting women’s 
property rights to the practice of suttee, or widow-burning in Bengal Proper, he explained 
that disputes over familial property caused a resurgence of the practice, despite the fact 
the British outlawed it in 1829.39 “[A]s a rule,” childless widows of the upper classes 
most commonly burned themselves upon the funeral pyre, he claimed. Their families, 
under the guise of religious custom, pressured the women to sacrifice themselves in order 
to gain access to the estate’s wealth.40 These arguments positioned married women’s 
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property rights within a broader Victorian tradition of liberal reform that contrasted 
Britain’s progress against a constructed history of India’s decline.41  
For Maine, India’s decline reaffirmed that Britons needed to embrace legal 
reform. While he acknowledged that many factors had contributed to the West’s 
ascension and India’s decline, he concluded his lecture by stating that if forced to name 
one factor that determined their differing outcomes, it was that “one [western society] 
steadily carried forward, while the other [India] recoiled from, the series of changes 
which put an end to the seclusion and degradation of an entire sex.”42 Bengalis’ 
commitment to an outdated religious custom that rejected women’s rightful claims to 
property, Maine argued, impeded India’s development.  
By contrast, the lesson to be learned from Roman history was that openness to 
change had long strengthened Western society and enabled its progress. The history of 
Roman legal reform, and therefore, Western civilization, was that progress and 
development occurred by embracing change. This argument framed change as 
inevitable—for rejecting change led to decline—and placed women’s property rights as 
central to a progressing society.  
If Maine and his contemporaries looked to the Romans as a model “golden age’ of 
married women’s property rights, they also needed to explain how women’s property 
rights became restricted under common law. To do so, reformers argued that coverture 
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was not an original aspect of common law, but a reflection of the “barbaric” influences 
that had permeated the early Church after Rome’s fall.  
This required a careful delineation. Arthur Hobhouse, for example, explained “the 
influx of the ruder Aryan nations brought back many older and ruder customs, and, 
coupled with the influence of Christianity, or at least of the Christian priesthoods, placed 
women in a position far inferior to what they occupied under the civilized imperial 
system.”43 Espousing assurance in elite and enlightened governance, Charles Pearson 
explained that because Christianity “was not the religion of the best-educated or most 
intelligent men” and “recruited its teachers from the lower classes” it could not rise to the 
level of the highest Roman Jurisprudence.” As a result, it “became more and more 
leavened with the feelings of Gothic and Vandalic invaders” and “relapsed more and 
more into the patriarchal conception of the husband as supreme in his family.”44 By 
attributing Christianity’s patriarchal teachings to the influence of invaders from the East 
during the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, reformers challenged conservative 
arguments that the patriarchal family was inherit to Christian teaching.  
In doing so, they reaffirmed the feudal era—after the barbarian invasions—as a 
dark age for married women’s proprietary rights. For example, Maine stated that “the 
disruption of the Roman Empire was very unfavourable to the personal and proprietary 
liberty of women. … The place of women under the new [feudal] system when fully 
organized was worse than it was under Roman law, and would have been very greatly 
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worse but for the efforts of the Church.”45 He credited the early church with preserving 
Roman law codes and “keeping alive” Roman legislation that “respected settled 
property.” In other words, preserving as much as possible, women’s property from the 
barbaric influences coming from the east.  
By establishing the feudal era as the age when women’s property rights were 
curtailed, these histories successfully cast the law of coverture as a barbaric law. Arthur 
Hobhouse countered the claim that a husband’s authority over his wife reflected an 
“enlightened” view of his duties when he asserted that the practice of coverture was “but 
a fragment of a barbarous system rejected by all nations in proportion as they have 
civilized and improved their laws.”46 Similarly, the Liverpool Mercury, understood a 
married woman’s position under common law as a “relic of slavery” from the old Roman 
law that allowed a father to sell his daughter and complained that no other “civilized 
country” still possessed a law like England’s.47 
The debate framing the passage of the Married Women’s Property Act contained 
an underlying ambiguity. Reformers looked to the distant past to make the case for 
granting married women property rights. But they also viewed the 1882 MWPA as a law 
for a modern, enlightened age and the Act’s passage marked the end of a lingering feudal 
influence. An article in the Westminster Review proclaimed that “we have now arrived at 
the last stage of historical development. The Married Women’s Property Act 1882, from 
January 1, 1883, entirely abrogates the old Common Law doctrine of unity between 
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husband and wife, so far as property inter is concerned. Henceforth, they are to have 
separate and antagonistic interests; and the woman whom Mill portrayed as a degraded 
slave is emancipated by statute, with all the attributes and privileges of a freeman.”48  
 
Property Reform in America 
While the history of Ancient Rome maintained a significant hold on Britons’ 
imaginations, it could also be a limiting model. If Britons drew inspiration from imperial 
Rome, the end of the Roman Empire raised questions about imperial Britain’s eventual 
demise. This ambivalence was captured in an 1884 essay, “A History of the Laws 
Affecting the Property of Married Women in England,” by the barrister Basil Edwin 
Lawrence. Commenting on the recently passed 1882 Property Act, which had come into 
effect a year before, Lawrence expressed uncertainty about the Act’s consequences. He 
interpreted the 1882 Act as introducing a new principle, severing “the unit of person” that 
underpinned the assumptions of common law. Changes to a wife’s property rights, he 
noted, were “‘tried at Rome” and were “a failure.”49  
Rome’s failure, however, did not necessarily predict Britain’s demise. In the 
United States, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York had granted married women 
control over their property.50 For Lawrence, English and American society possessed 
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more similarities than England and Ancient Rome; evidence that property reform had 
“apparently been successful” in America led him to cautiously express that “the success 
of the principle in America makes the success of the principle in England more than 
probable.”51 
Lawrence’s attention to legal reforms in the United States exemplified a third 
framework used by activists to argue in favor of reforming the common law. In doing so 
they participated in a broader trend in late-Victorian imperial thought. As Duncan Bell 
has shown, during the late-Victorian period imperial thinkers began to view the United 
States as a potential model for securing the future of “Greater Britain.”52 Debates 
regarding property reform aligned with this tendency to see the United States as a model 
for Britain’s future.53 
The United States, with its origins as a British colony, provided an important 
model for English reformers because common law formed the foundation of the states’ 
legal systems. Furthermore, the United States’ political structure—that states had 
autonomy within the federal system—had the advantage of providing examples of legal 
reforms being successfully introduced in multiple societies. For example, in the same 
essay in which he discussed married women’s property rights in ancient Rome, Charles 
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Pearson asserted that the United States provided the best evidence that property reforms 
could be successful because “the experiments, though guided more or less by a common 
principle, have been almost as numerous as the States of the Union.”54  
Reformers imagined Massachusetts, in particular, as a society that most closely 
reflected their own. The Englishwoman’s Review, reviewing an essay by the American 
lawyer, abolitionist, and suffragist Samuel E. Sewell on women’s legal position in 
Massachusetts, observed that no other state in America retained “so close a family 
resemblance in its social life to England.” Massachusetts, therefore, could “safely be held 
up as an example.” 55  
Just as histories of reform in Ancient Rome closely paralleled histories of Britain, 
reformers found commonality in Massachusetts’ and England’s traditions of incremental 
legal change. Massachusetts, explained the Review, “started with English laws, and has 
proceeded in our British fashion, not violently changing, but mending, patching, and 
remodeling the old laws, till … the fabric of the laws has been almost entirely changed 
through repeated amendments.”56 (Of course, emphasizing Massachusetts’s tendency for 
slow reform required a generous interpretation of the ways Massachusetts’s colonists had 
violently overthrown British rule during the American Revolution.) More usefully, 
Massachusetts’s incremental reform—alterations to the law were passed in 1855, 1862, 
and 1874—reflected a trajectory of legal reform that advocates were trying to achieve in 
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England.57 The 1870 MWPA had introduced limited property rights, with revisions 
introduced in an 1874 amendment. English reformers continued to campaign for a third 
bill that would grant women full property rights, just as Massachusetts had successfully 
done in 1874. 
Similarly, Americans’ testimonies closely echoed reformers’ arguments that legal 
reforms would assist wives at the lower end of the social hierarchy. The Times, for 
example, reprinted a letter from the New York jurist Dudley Field upon Shaw Lefevre’s 
request. (Shaw Lefevre explained that the letter was too long to be read during 
Parliamentary debates but that it “answered objections to the Married Women’s Property 
Bill.”) In his letter, Field acknowledged that the “division” between “American working 
men” and the rest of society was not as great as in England. He instead emphasized the 
law’s benefit for different racial populations, writing that “among the large class of 
foreign-born labourers who throng our large cities, and who are much below American 
mechanics in intelligence and comfort, I think that the beneficial effects of our Married 
Women’s Acts are quite as perceptible as anywhere else.”58 While British reformers 
rarely, if ever, suggested that property reform would benefit immigrants in Britain, 
historians have illustrated the ways Victorians tended to regard the urban poor as a “race 
apart.”59 Field’s attention to “othered” populations in his letter then, echoed Victorians 
own imagining of their urban environments, particularly following on the heels of 
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testimony offered by the Reverend Septimus Hansard, a rector in Bethnal Green, in 
London’s East End.60 
Unreformed property laws in the post-antebellum southern states served as an 
important contrast that reinforced the social benefits of women’s property rights. Field 
acknowledged there was “great dissatisfaction” among ex-slave women. He explained 
that when they were slaves, the women were not legally married and therefore “held what 
little their masters allowed them to hold at all independently of their husbands.”61 
Ironically, emancipation had robbed slave-women of their limited property. Now that 
they could legally marry, “male negroes”—who Field characterized as having “high 
notions of the dignity of their sex”—were “enforcing all their rights against their wives” 
and taking their earnings.62 The assertion illustrated the ambiguous ways critiques of 
slavery existed alongside racial assumptions about America’s recently emancipated slave 
population. It also constituted a deep critique of common law, suggesting that under 
chattel slavery a woman enjoyed more property protections than she did as a free woman.  
Fields also took care to emphasize that married women’s property rights had no 
impact on men’s familial roles, reinforcing English reformers’ promise that property 
reform would not undermine the patriarchal family. He attested that he personally had not 
witnessed any familial dissention caused by the law. More importantly, the reforms had 
not impacted men’s masculinity: men in America continued to be the main breadwinners 
for their families even though the law required woman property-owners to contribute to 
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the family expenses. He maintained that Americans found the idea that a wife would 
contribute to the family to be “utterly repugnant” and “offensive to the pride which all 
men among us have in assuming the responsibilities of their families.”63 The law, 
promised Fields (and implicitly English reformers), had no impact on a husband who 
fulfilled his masculine duties; it simply provided protections to lower-class women that 
enabled them to care for their children when their husbands failed in their familial duties.  
Papers that supported the property reform efforts reiterated Americans’ 
testimonies as evidence that British reform would be successful. The Economist 
concluded that “the Northern states of America have almost all adopted the principle of 
giving married women the same power over their own property which single women 
possess, and we do not find that ‘the family’ has suffered in consequence.”64 Similarly, in 
1875, The Liverpool Mercury argued that “more than 20 years ago, the law, originally the 
same as our own… was repealed in several of the New England states; and there are the 
strongest testimonies to the beneficial results.”65 
Glowing testimonies about the benefits of property reform in America did not 
convince all Britons, however. The Pall Mall Gazette, which opposed reform beyond any 
measure that would protect the earnings of poor women, suspected that Americans’ 
testimonies were not fully honest. “Can anyone who knows anything of Americans, of all 
people in the world, believe that an American would be likely to come forward before an 
English Parliamentary Committee and say: one of the most characteristic of our 
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alterations in the law of England has not been justified?” one article asked. In this case, 
Britain and America’s long history was a reason to question Americans’ experiences. The 
paper doubted that any American would ever concede that “American women are not 
such good wives as Englishwomen, nor are American homes so happy as English 
homes.”66  
Just as opponents expected that Americans would never honestly admit their 
reforms had failed to the country it rebelled from, proclamations about Americans’ 
success also prompted anxieties about the proper boundaries between Britain and its old 
colony. The Grantham Journal opposed property reform in 1868 and 1869 on the 
grounds that “Americanizing the institutions of our land” did not constitute “legislative 
wisdom.”67 An article in the Bradford Observer, on the other hand, questioned American 
evidence by arguing that reforms in New York, passed only eight years prior, was not “a 
long time to pitchfork usages and nature out of doors” and that Americans had not yet 
seen the true effects of property reform. Adopting a tone that implied the long-term 
benefits of British imperial rule, the paper contended that “the majority of American 
women are still under the sentiments generated by the common law of England.”68 
More broadly, for opponents, American reforms reflected the fact that America 
and Britain were different societies that existed under different conditions. The Times 
(which initially opposed the property reform bills but eventually shifted its position) 
captured this sense most acutely when it reflected on the fact that “we have always 
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demurred to the United States … to answer these apprehensions” about women’s 
property rights.” But the paper questioned whether the United States was even a useful 
model. Emphasizing the United States’ geographic expanse, the paper observed that the 
“proportions of society” in America were very different. In America, the country’s size 
and “the wide scope for individual action render a greater degree of personal 
independence, if not necessary, at least innocuous.” By contrast, Britain was “a crowded 
and complex civilization” that “stands in a very different position.”69 Characterizing 
Britain in such a way, of course, overlooked the ways its expanding empire provided an 
outlet for the growing population. But it also captured Britons’ sense of the precarious 
and interdependent nature of their society, and the ways in which they expected changes 
to married women’s rights to carry social consequences.  
Despite the many statements testifying to the Americans’ success, when the 1882 
Property Act finally passed, Britons turned to the diversity in their own empire for 
reassurance that society would continue to flourish. Commenting on the many legal 
implications of the Property Acts, the Times wrote that the “first feeling of many … will 
be one of apprehension that some of the fine features of English domestic life may be 
impaired.” But, the article continued, the second thoughts were likely “to be re-assuring.” 
If one looked to the “state of our colonies, where very diverse laws as to this subject have 
prevailed—the English common law, the old coutume of Paris, the Roman-Dutch law, for 
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instance”—they would be “convinced that tranquility and happiness may exist and most 
domestic virtues flower and flourish under the most unlike conditions.”70 
 
A Social Revolution 
Britons looked to Ancient Rome and the United States as models for legal reform 
because they understood granting married women’s property rights to be a 
“revolutionary” measure. An 1869 Times editorial, for instance, reminded its readers that 
because ‘the married state” was the “foundation of the social state it would be a matter of 
grave and universal concern if a revolution in the law tended to disorganize such a 
relation.”71 Comparing the 1869 property bill to other controversial political legislation, 
the Bradford Observer asserted that the proposal contained “the germs of a change more 
general and sweeping” than the political changes “accomplished by the [1867] Reform 
Bill” which had enfranchised working-class men, or the changes outlined in Mr. 
Gladstone’s Irish Church Bill,” (the Irish Church Act of 1869) that disestablished the 
Church of Ireland.72 In 1870, however, promises of enormous social change went 
unrealized. Because the 1870 Act that passed Parliament was more limited in its scope 
than the proposed bill, many Victorians viewed the 1870 Act as a significant reform that 
addressed the problems faced by poor women, but they did not consider it 
“revolutionary.” 
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Instead, the 1882 Property Act represented a “revolutionary” reform. 
Undoubtedly a major reform, the Act greatly expanded married women’s property rights 
and overturned much of the law of coverture, so that a married woman possessed almost 
the same rights as a feme sole. For activists, the 1882 Act fulfilled the MWPC’s aims, 
evidenced by the fact that the Committee dissolved itself after its passage, which further 
reinforced the sense of conclusive achievement.  
Ironically, for an Act that commentators proclaimed inaugurated a “social 
revolution,” and in contrast to the long debates that preceded the limited 1870 Act, 
Parliament passed the 1882 Married Women’s Property Act after relatively little 
discussion. Throughout the 1870s, the Married Women’s Property Committee 
spearheaded a campaign—deploying petitioning, efforts to sway public opinion, and 
Parliamentary networks—to secure a reform bill that would extend married women the 
same property rights held by a feme sole or widow.73 In 1880 and 1881, versions of their 
bill received second readings in the Commons. Progress was stalled by Sir George 
Campbell, Scottish liberal and MP for Kirkaldy Burghs and Mr. Warton, MP for 
Bridport; both used a parliamentary procedure known as the twelve-o’clock rule to block 
further debate. By 1882, then, the bill had lingered in Parliament for two years, a possible 
reason for its lack of attention.74 In the Commons, the bill received one debate.75 In the 
Lords, the liberal Roundell Palmer, Lord Chancellor and First Earl of Selborne, moved 
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for a second reading of the bill on March 8.76 On May 20 it passed the third reading. Back 
in the Commons, the bill was ordered into Committee in and received a third reading four 
days later. On the day Parliament recessed, the Act received royal assent.77 
As the bill made its way through Parliament, press coverage was also muted. The 
Times, for instance, reported the bill’s passage through the Lords, but did not reprint any 
debates that occurred before the reading, a contrast to the 1870 Act, when Parliamentary 
debates were reprinted in papers across Britain.  
The lack of public debate makes it difficult to determine why MPs supported the 
bill, although Ben Griffin has suggested four factors secured the Act’s passage. Firstly, as 
previously mentioned, the outcomes of various court cases reported in the press 
convinced MPs, particularly John Hinde Palmer, who took charge of the bill, that the 
1870 Act was too limited to fully protect poor women from their husbands. Secondly, 
creditors were lobbying Parliament for changes that would enable them to recover debts 
from married women. Thirdly, the 1873 Judicature Act stated that whenever the rules of 
equity and common law conflicted, equity prevailed, meaning that women’s position 
under common law would be altered as the Judicature Act took effect. Finally, Liberals’ 
large majority after the 1880 election meant the MWPC had many sympathizers in 
Parliament willing to support reforms.78  
Notably, Britons offered different conclusions about the reasons for the Act’s 
passage. In other words, the terms of the bill, as understood by MPs, was not necessarily 
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the same as the ways Britons understood the Act. This is an important point because these 
competing interpretations of the law continued to shape debates about the law’s scope 
and meaning, as the following chapters will show.  
For MPs and some commentators outside Parliament, class perceptions continued 
to inflect discussion of the 1882 Act. As noted, Chambers Journal reiterated a common 
refrain: the 1882 Act would provide a benefit to the “hard-working wife” in “thousands 
of English homes” who “earns the living… while the husband spends his time in idleness, 
and not unfrequently demands money from his wife to waste on strong drink.”79  
More commonly, however, Britons interpreted the 1882 Act’s passage as either 
evidence of a shift in popular opinion with regard to women’s property rights, or 
evidence of Parliament’s ineffective governance. For example, the barrister William 
Andrews Holdsworth regarded the 1882 Act’s passage as reflecting changes in public 
opinion. He explained that the 1870 Act which was passed “in spite of strenuous 
opposition” had been more limited because “public opinion was not ripe for a broad and 
sweeping recognition” of a married woman’s right to control her property.80 By 
implication, the 1882 Act’s smooth passage through Parliament illustrated the public’s 
acceptance of its principles. An article by George John Cox on the “Changed Position of 
Married Women” published in The Dublin Review expressed a similar point. Cox 
observed that “it may be safely said that forty years ago such an Act would have been 
wholly impossible, and yet, public opinion, slowly ripening had so gathered force that the 
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Bill became law without scarcely any opposition, and without vigorous debate at all.”81 
Cox did not consider whether the limited debate reflected the Liberals’ 137-person 
majority, instead viewing the Act’s easy passage as evidence of the public’s wide 
support.82  
By contrast, those who regarded the 1882 Act with deep apprehension, if not full 
opposition, regarded the lack of controversy as evidence of the public’s ignorance of the 
Act’s provisions. In 1882, George Campbell (the MP who successfully blocked the 1880 
bill) argued that “not one woman in a million” or “the country at large” had the “slightest 
idea of what the Bill proposed.”83 Campbell’s invocation of women’s disinterest was not 
unusual. MPs commonly opposed women’s rights bills—in particular suffrage—on the 
grounds that they found no evidence the majority of women in Britain desired a change. 
His complaint that the nation as a whole was unaware of the bill’s provisions, however, 
was reiterated after the Act’s passage, when the public’s ignorance could not be an 
excuse to stall the bill. For example, in 1883 the Derbyshire Times lamented that “neither 
the people of England, nor their so-called legislatures, seem to have known anything 
about it, yet the Bill passed both Houses of Parliament.”84 Chambers Journal suggested 
that the Act had only passed because it was “passed very quietly” during a session of 
Parliament in which the “attention of the public was taken up” with other controversies—
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Irish land reform and Britain’s occupation of Egypt.85 Implicit in these complaints was 
opponents’ assumption that they shared the public’s true opinion, which would have been 
expressed if the public had been made aware of the bill.  
Opponents tended to dwell on the public’s ignorance because it indicated a larger 
problem with Parliament: that “bills slip through Parliament without anything like 
sufficient criticism, and even without any very exact comprehension of their meaning.”86 
One article in the Times compared MPs to “an ignorant labourer at work with a pick and 
shovel among a labyrinth of wires and pipes” who “strikes, as he thinks, a harmless 
blow” that was felt in “far distant places and in unexpected ways.”87 Another complained 
that Parliament “did not deign to accord” the MWPA a “tithe of the attention which it 
ungrudgingly and as a matter of course bestows upon a third-rate Irish measure” despite 
the fact that the 1882 MWPA represented “a sort of wedge driven into our social 
system.”88 For critics, the MWPA was not a legislative victory, but evidence that MPs 
were abrogating their governing duties.  
Regardless of how they interpreted the 1882 Act’s passage, most Britons shared a 
common expectation with regard to its consequences: the Act constituted a “social 
revolution.” George Cox, for instance, described the 1882 MWPA as “one of those 
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revolutions of the silent sort, which, almost unnoticed, change the face of society.”89 In 
reality, both the 1870 and 1882 Act drew on existing legal precedent established by the 
Courts of Chancery. Both laws built on the idea of a “separate trust” established in equity 
when they granted married women a right to her separate property. The major change 
introduced by the statutes was the fact that all women had access to the rules of equity 
(although neither Act was retroactive). Victorians seemed to simply accept the premise 
that married women’s property ownership would change their positions in their marriages 
and families. The extent of disagreement centered on whether commentators expected 
this change to destroy or improve society. 
Therefore, despite its legal continuities, most commentators framed the 1882 Act 
as inaugurating a new era for women’s rights. The Derbyshire Times (which opposed the 
1882 Act but supported women’s suffrage) assured its readers that “social revolution,” 
was “not too large a term” to describe the legal changes introduced by the law.90 The 
paper offered the broadest possible interpretation of the MWPA: it explained that a 
married woman could own, inherit, and dispose of her property; sue and be sued; be 
made bankrupt; trade on her own; and act as if she “were an unmarried woman.”91 The 
explanation is noteworthy because it illustrates how Victorians’ expectations about the 
Acts’ revolutionary potential relied more on a broad acceptance of the general summaries 
of the MWPA, rather than the specific legal details which built on existing practices in 
equity.  
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While the 1882 MWPA greatly extended a married woman’s property rights, it 
did not place a married woman in the exact same position as an unmarried woman. 
Judges continued to hold, for example, that a married woman could only be held liable 
for debts to the extent of her separate estate. A married woman had to conduct her trade 
entirely independent from her husband for her property to be protected under the Act. If 
she received his assistance, coverture remained in effect (the subject of the next chapter). 
But for many, the legal principles the Act introduced symbolized the clear end to the 
“community of property” that had once bonded a husband and wife in marriage.92 
Supporters of the Property Act, on the other hand, celebrated its revolutionary 
promise for the same reason other Britons regarded the law with apprehension. Elizabeth 
Elmy, longtime member of the Married Women’s Property Committee, authored a 
jubilant article in the Englishwoman’s Review in which she characterized the 1882 law as 
“the Magna Charta for Women” and a “veritable Women's Emancipation Act.” For Elmy, 
the fact that the law “wholly destroys the common law incapacity of a wife with regard to 
property" proved just as exciting as it was alarming for opponents. Like the Derbyshire 
Times, Elmy agreed that the 1882 Act marked a “social revolution,” but she expected that 
this revolution would further improve women’s position in society, and therefore advance 
social progress.  
Victorians’ proclamations regarding the revolutionary potential of the Married 
Women’s Property Acts served two significant purposes. First, the 1882 Act introduced a 
break in the history of married women’s rights, establishing a period before and after the 
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1882 Property Act. In this narrative, drawn from histories of Ancient Rome, married 
women’s rights (or lack thereof) under common law cast coverture as a legal relic from a 
more barbarous age. By contrast, the “revolutionary” 1882 Act represented a break from 
the lingering “feudal” or “primitive” laws that previously dictated married women’s 
subordination. Married women’s rights under the 1882 Act reflected the rights of 
individuals in a society that had broken from the influences of its barbaric past.  
Second, and subsequently, the 1882 Property Act seemed to confirm the highest 
ideals of the Victorians’ century, reinforcing their notions of their society as progressive, 
rational, and modern. As early as 1870, after the Lords had dramatically altered Russell 
Gurney’s Bill, an article in the Saturday Review connected a future property reform bill 
to an age of greater enlightenment when it observed that “the cancelled clauses of the Bill 
embodied a great principle” but “must await an age of more complete enlightenment for 
its reception into the system of English law.”93 The 1882 Act’s passage appeared to 
confirm this prediction. For Elizabeth Elmy, the Act was a “most just and salutary” one 
that confirmed a triumph of “reason over prejudice, of justice over selfishness.”94 She 
made a point to celebrate men’s willingness to surrender an “unjust prerogative”—their 
marital claims to their wives’ property. This sacrifice, asserted Elmy, provided “striking 
proof of the growing strength of that spirit of justice which we hold to be the crowning 
glory of this nineteenth century.”95  
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Summary  
These many competing arguments in favor of reform—efforts to help the poor, 
conceptions of Britain as the heir to ancient Rome’s legacy, ideas about Britain’s 
commonalities with the United States, and the law’s revolutionary nature—formed the 
primary strands of debate as Britons considered the Property Acts’ potential 
consequences. In doing so, they reflected the various ways, sometimes in tension with 
each other, that Victorians conceptualized their society. But they also anticipated the 
many ways the Property Acts would be understood after 1882. In other words, because 
there was never one singular argument that secured the Acts’ passage, Britons possessed 
multiple understandings about the Acts.  
The 1882 Act, in particular, constituted a landmark legal reform that enabled 
supporters of women’s rights to make further claims for married women’s individuality 
and equality. But not all who supported the Property Acts agreed that the law had 
conceded the main principle of coverture—marital unity—or had any implications for 
women’s rights. Some recognized that the Acts had the potential to impact family life, 
but generally expected that it provided benefits for working class wives. Others regarded 
the new law as evidence of Parliament’s foolhardy willingness to pass laws without 
reflecting on their long-term consequences.  
These unresolved, competing understandings were important because they 
continued to shape debates over the Property Acts in the decades after their passage. Did 
the Property Acts contain universal principles symbolizing women’s equality or were 
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they a law to protect poor women’s property? This contest—between a universal or 
narrow, class-inflected understanding of the Act—provided much of the tension 
informing arguments about how they should be applied in the years to come. 
Chapter 2. Her Separate property: A Husband’s Authority and a Wife’s Separate 
Business, 1870-1930 
Introduction 
In his treatise, The Married Women's Property Act, 1882, Joseph Samuel 
Rubinstein, a solicitor of the Supreme Court, tried to dispel the idea that the 1882 MWPA 
overturned the common law of coverture. As Rubenstein reminded his readers, the 1882 
MWPA was “neither so sweeping nor so logical as has been represented. Married women 
are still far from having acquired the independent status of feme sole.”96 Instead, he 
explained, the Act “extend[ed] the notion of separate estate.”97 So long as a woman 
possessed separate property, the property was protected under the MWPA; she could be 
held liable for debts only to the extent of her separate estate. If a woman lacked separate 
property, the law of coverture remained in force and she was prevented from entering 
into contracts (except as her husband’s agent) or being sued.98 Despite these continuities, 
Rubinstein predicted that the “equivocal character” of the language of the Act, alongside 
the combination of common law and equity law that determined married women’s 
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property rights, meant that the “Act will give rise to a great amount of litigation to 
determine its meaning.”99 
This chapter turns to the courts, where judges, barristers, plaintiffs, and 
defendants articulated their respective interpretations of the MWPA’s meaning. It 
focusses on one question: how did judges define a woman’s separate property? Both the 
1870 and 1882 MWPA stated that any earnings or profits a married woman earned by 
carrying on a business or trade independent of her husband constituted her separate 
property.100 But, as many commentators acknowledged, no clear standard existed for 
determining when a wife had acted sufficiently “independently” from her husband for a 
business to be her separate property.101 They generally accepted that the circumstances of 
a case would show whether a woman had acted independently. Consequently, cases 
involving a married woman’s separate business required a judge to interpret both the 
married woman’s and her husband’s behavior in order to determine whether the wife had 
acted independently.  
This chapter argues that judges’ assumptions about a husband’s authority over his 
wife shaped their decisions defining a wife’s separate property. Judges took great care to 
find evidence that a husband had granted his authority for his wife to run her business by 
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herself before they determined that a wife’s business constituted her separate property. At 
the same time, this high bar also effectively demonstrated married women’s capabilities 
as independent successful traders. Their success, while reliant on a husband’s authority, 
also existed in contradiction to late-Victorian assumptions regarding a woman’s 
economic ignorance and necessary dependence on a husband or male family member.102 
Over time, the chapter contends, these conflicts undermined Victorians’ ideals of marital 
unity and compelled Britons to contest with husbands and wives’ independent identities. 
Emergent acceptance of married women’s individual property rights generated a growing 
sense among some Britons that men suffered unjust obligations under the law. In either 
view, the MWPA became a means to explain husbands and wives’ changed relationships. 
This chapter focuses on cases that came before the courts between 1870 and 1935. 
The emphasis here is not on the development of case law, but on the ways men and 
women’s behaviors were interpreted. During this period, women in Britain experienced 
many changes in their employment prospects, educational access, and achieved political 
citizenship. My interest here is on the ways the MWPA served as an easy shorthand that 
encapsulated these many changes.103 Ultimately, this trajectory was deeply ambiguous 
and prevents any easy conclusions about whether the Act had a positive or negative 
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impact. Early cases from the 1870s show that judges tended to construe the MWPA as 
narrowly as possible. Over time, judges showed greater acceptance of women’s abilities 
to act independently in marriage. Yet, concerns about the ways the law impacted men 
continued to inform their decisions.  
This chapter primarily draws on records of cases as they were reported by the 
Times Law Reports. Most of these cases occurred in the high courts and are exceptional 
in the sense that those pursuing the suit (or appealing the decision) had the funds to pay 
the high legal costs. This is noteworthy in two respects. MPs passed the 1870 MWPA 
asserting that the law would have little impact on the respectable middle and upper 
classes.104 They were content to let county courts—which were perceived to have 
different legal standards—take care of cases involving poor women. High court cases 
show the ways in which the law’s impact was felt at all social levels. This also means that 
elite judges’ own gender and class assumptions should be remembered as they interpreted 
the law.  
On a more pragmatic level, the Times provides sufficient details of both the cases 
and the judges’ decisions. Court documents were archived as clerks filed them and they 
remain uncatalogued and scatted across boxes at the National Archives. Consequently, 
the Times is a far more reliable source to track the outcome of a case. Times Law Reports 
detail the major arguments and judgements as they developed in court. These reports are 
also useful because they show how the public learned about the cases.  
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The 1870 Property Act and a Husband’s Authority 
Digges v. Godderer, was initially heard in the Court of Common Pleas before 
Justice Willes and a jury in 1872. The case sparked a wider debate about the means 
through which a woman acquired her property and subsequent rights to it. The plaintiff, 
Mrs. Hannah Digges was an actress and married woman living separately from her 
husband. The couple separated in 1868 (at the time of the separation Hannah Digges did 
not secure a protection order). After their separation Hannah Digges supported herself by 
sewing, giving piano lessons, and working as a ballet dancer at Haymarket Theatre. In the 
spring of 1872, the Sheriff of Middlesex seized property from Mrs. Digges’ home to 
satisfy gambling debts her husband owed to a Mr. Godderer. The seized property 
included furniture, jewelry (including one or two diamond rings), and £70.105 Hannah 
Digges then sued the defendant, Mr. Godderer, for the return of her property, arguing that 
the items were her separate property under the 1870 MWPA and could not be seized for 
her husband’s debts.  
As one of the first cases to raise the question of what constituted separate property 
under the MWPA, Digges v. Godderer illustrates two important points: firstly, the 
tenuous position women occupied within Victorian moral and legal frameworks; 
secondly, how high court judges constrained the potential of women’s property rights 
through their reading of the MWPA. 
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The main question for the court was whether “gifts” constituted separate property. 
Mrs. Digges explained that she acquired the furniture and other seized property through 
her own earnings, and “partly with gifts to her by gentlemen who ‘admired her 
dancing.’”106 While the 1870 MWPA clearly stated a woman’s earnings were her 
separate property, it did not mention “gifts.” Determining whether “gifts” were protected 
property generated a wider moral question: were married women’s property rights 
absolute or contingent on the circumstances in which the property was acquired? 
Lawyers for Mr. Godderer (who had seized the property for gambling debts) 
predictably argued that the property was not protected under the MWPA. Their argument 
relied heavily on the implication that Mrs. Digges purchased her property with money she 
earned through prostitution and therefore, the property was not protected under the 
MWPA. Press coverage obliquely explained that “it was contended that the property was 
not acquired by earnings in the ordinary sense of the term,” adding that there was “reason 
to suppose that certain inferences — freely urged in court — are not without 
foundation.”107 The Times reported that “the furniture … had been bought partly by the 
proceeds of her [Mrs. Digges’] industry, and partly with gifts to her by gentlemen who 
‘admired her dancing.’” The paper did not directly accuse Mrs. Digges of infidelity, but 
implicitly questioned that she would have received money from gentlemen admirers 
solely out of admiration, when it added that “she declined to state whether there was any 
other ground for these gifts, which from one gentleman amounted to 60l., from another 
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10l., and from another 5l.”108 Overall, the defense’s argument emphasized that married 
women’s right to separate property was conditional on whether the property had been 
acquired through moral means.  
An alternative perspective was that the law protected a married woman’s property 
regardless of how she acquired it. This line of argument called for a universal application 
of the law, in opposition to skeptics of the Married Women’s Property Acts who hoped to 
see the Act enforced as narrowly as possible. The radical The Examiner, for instance, 
argued that the right to own property should not be contingent on society approving its 
acquisition. The paper tended to downplay the potential that Mrs. Digges’ money was 
acquired through immoral means but still supported her absolute right to it. One article 
argued that even “if we assume the very worst … “it is clear that Mrs. Digge’s earnings 
were her own…” Therefore, regardless of its acquisition, “the money is as clearly her 
own as if she had made it by betting, or by gambling, or by lending it at eighty per 
cent.”109 Social approval did not determine a woman’s proprietary rights because “the 
fact that that it was made in a way of which society does not approve remove it from the 
scope of the Act.” Because there was nothing in the “the Act to show that its operation is 
confined to those earnings alone for which a good ‘consideration’ has been given” a 
woman’s right to her property under the law was absolute.110  
Establishing a woman’s absolute right to her property, supporters emphasized, 
would ensure that the law could not be used to penalize moral women. The Graphic, for 
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instance, expressed hope that the Court would decide in favor of the plaintiff, “not for the 
sake of persons such as Mrs. Digges may possibly be, but for the sake of industrious and 
respectable persons whom the suggested interpretation of the law might expose a cruel 
annoyance.”111 The article noted that it would be “hard upon a woman” who was 
“maintaining herself honestly apart from her husband” to have “the nature of her earnings 
and the possible fruits of pure benevolence subjected to a scrutiny of the kind.”112 In their 
view, excluding “gifts” from the Act’s protection prevented a married woman from 
receiving assistance from friends during a time of need. The paper did not believe that the 
Act could “intend that a woman so circumstanced should not receive assistance from 
friends.” Given the fact that most Britons accepted the law would most help poor women, 
preventing “gifts” from inclusion in the Act’s protections appeared to contradict the very 
aims of the MWPA.113  
The judge, Justice Willes expressed a universal view of the MWPA when he 
issued his judgement in favor of the plaintiff. Hannah Digges’ means of acquiring her 
property, he wrote, did not give her husband a claim to said property, “‘even under the 
circumstances that one may infer took place here; for the man deserted his wife, and what 
she acquired is not his in honesty or fairness, however she came by it.’”114 
While Willes ruled in favor of Hannah Digges, he also thought the matter required 
a full Court’s attention because the case raised a new question that would affect many 
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people. Consequently, in January 1873, the case was heard by Lord Chief Justice Bovill 
and Justices Byles, Keating, and Brett at the Court of Queen’s Bench, Westminster.  
At this point, Digges v. Godderer concluded rather quickly. Again, the defense 
argued that the Property Acts were never intended to protect immorally earned income. 
The barristers contended that “earnings meant lawful earnings and that those in question 
had been obtained by unlawful means.”115 The Justices agreed, ruling that “gifts” given to 
a married woman were not protected by the Property Acts. In his decision the Chief 
Justice casually suggested that the two parties—Mrs. Digges and the Mr. Godderer—
divide the proceeds of the sale of the property in order to avoid further litigation and 
ended the case.116  
Press coverage of the decision gave no indication why the justices’ ruled the way 
they did. The defense’s and justices’ attention to the implication that Hannah Digges 
acquired her money through “unlawful means” raises the possibility that a different 
decision might have followed if the case involved a less morally-suspect and more 
“industrious” plaintiff. Contrasting the outcome of Digges v. Godderer with subsequent 
cases also suggests a second interpretation: that a husband’s approval was important for 
determining whether a lady’s earnings comprised her separate property. Three cases from 
the 1880s–Ashworth v. Outram, Davis v. Artingstall, and In Re Dearmer-James v. 
Dearmer–show that judges proved willing to respect a married woman’s separate 
property when they could confirm a husband also viewed it as such.  
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In all three cases, the justices ultimately decided that the business in question was 
the separate property of a married woman. To arrive at their respective decisions, justices 
relied heavily on evidence demonstrating that the husband conceded to his wife’s 
business and allowed her to run her business independently. In doing so, they recognized 
and privileged assumptions about a husband’s natural authority over his wife.  
Ashworth v. Outram, heard by Vice-Chancellor Sir Richard Malins in the High 
Court of Justice in 1877, emerged from disputes over the administration of the estate of a 
Mr. Thomas Outram, a farmer and manufacturing chemist.117 Thomas Outram died 
intestate in 1877. He was survived by his widow, Sarah Outram (nee Fairbanks). 
Fairbanks had been employed by Outram as his housekeeper; the couple became engaged 
in 1855, but did not marry until 1874, a few months before his death. Throughout this 
time, Sarah Fairbanks had carried on a preserve-making business. The business had 
become very successful, earning about £6,000 over the years.118 Following Thomas 
Outram’s death, his next-of-kin claimed he was entitled to the preserving business as part 
of Thomas Outram’s estate. The question before the judges was whether the preserving 
business formed part of the deceased Outram’s estate or whether it was the absolute 
separate property of his widow.  
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When Malins delivered his judgement, Thomas Outram’s actions provided 
significant evidence that he had viewed his wife’s preserve-making business as her 
separate business. Sarah continued to run her business using her maiden name—
Fairbanks. Furthermore, her account books indicated that she had lent her husband, who 
was repeatedly in arrears, money from her accounts—at one-point lending him £700. 
These transactions, the judge concluded, showed he was aware she kept separate bank 
accounts. Witnesses also testified that Thomas Outram had “again and again declared it 
[the business] was Sarah’s.” These public declarations provided evidence that he 
consented to his wife’s business.  
Malins’ decision, while in favor of Sarah Outram, simultaneously attempted to 
circumscribe the MWPA, revealing the extent to which he regarded the Act on very 
narrow terms. Sarah Outram had argued that her business was her separate business under 
the 1870 MWPA. Malins, however, dismissed this argument. The 1870 Act was not 
“intended to make settlements for spinsters.” It was a law, he emphasized, “relating to the 
property of married women.” Therefore, he explained, “that if Mrs. Outram had set up 
this business after the marriage, her earnings in it would have been protected.” In other 
words, the law existed to protect married women’s earnings. It did not automatically 
protect property a woman brought to a marriage, unless a husband agreed otherwise. If 
the husband did not consent to a settlement, the property became his upon the marriage.  
Malins’ explanation of this logic affirmed Thomas Outram’s authority. Outram’s 
public consent to his wife’s business prevented the property from automatically 
becoming his upon marriage. As Malins reasoned, Outram “might the moment they were 
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married have stopped her continuing it [the preserve business], or have taken everything 
connected with it. But, if he had that right … and the husband did not interfere with his 
wife’s carrying on the business, the conclusion must be that he acquiesced in her so 
doing.” In other words, by not claiming his right to the property upon their marriage, 
Outram demonstrated his consent. Consequently, Malins concluded that “Mrs. Outram 
did carry on the business, and did so successfully, with her husband’s knowledge, from 
the time of her marriage till his death. ... [E]ven independently of the Act of 1870, there 
was enough to make this business the separate property of Mrs. Outram.”119 
Re Dearmer-James v. Dearmer, heard in 1885 by Justice Kay, who succeeded 
Malins as Vice-Chancellor, revealed Kay’s more flexible view of the MWPA, while 
again relying on a husband’s actions to establish that a wife, Mrs. Dearmer, ran a ladies’ 
school she founded before her marriage independently from her husband. Upon her 
marriage, a settlement was drawn up between her and her husband, but it did not mention 
the school. Throughout their marriage she ran the school and contributed to the household 
expenses with earnings from it. When her husband died in 1877, his will made no 
mention of the school. Mrs. Dearmer continued to run the school and then “sold it for a 
considerable sum.”120 The question before the court was whether it constituted her 
separate estate, or whether the children had interests in the business and were entitled to 
the property and effects from the sale. 
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The fact that the husband “did not take any part in the business” led Kay to 
conclude that the business “was, in fact, carried on by the wife separately from her 
husband.” Evidence supporting this included the fact that “the prospectuses of the school 
were in the lady’s name, and he [the husband] did not assist in any manner with the 
tuition.” While the husband invested some of the earnings from the school in his own 
name, he invested another portion in the lease for the school’s premises. The Law Report 
also added that the “husband lived until after the passing of the Married Women’s 
Property Act, 1870.” While it did not elaborate, the aside suggests that the reporter 
assumed Mr. Dearmer would have been aware of women’s rights under the MWPA and 
therefore, the fact that he chose not to include any directions regarding the school in his 
will demonstrated that he viewed the school as his wife’s property. Unlike Malins, who 
proved reluctant to agree that the MWPA protected a woman’s pre-marital business, Kay 
confidently agreed that “it was to all intents and purposes the lady’s own business” and 
therefore protected under s.1 of the 1870 MWPA.  
If a woman could establish that her business was her separate property, the law 
did provide protection, as Davis v. Artingstall showed. In 1880, a married woman, Mrs. 
Davis brought an action against Messrs. Artingstall, auctioneers from Manchester, under 
the 1870 MWPA. Mrs. Davis had married her husband, Frank Davis, in 1872. During the 
1870s they lived in Manchester at a beerhouse Frank Davis ran. Mrs. Davis carried on her 
own business as a “general dealer in boots and shoes, drapery, haberdashery, furniture, 
and similar goods.” Initially, she ran the business out of the top floor of the beerhouse but 
eventually opened a shop next door. In May 1879, Frank Davis arranged for most of the 
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furniture and goods in the shop premises to be removed and stored in a warehouse until 
they could be sold at auction. (The Times did not explain his motives.) After the 
auctioneers advertised the sale, Mrs. Davis notified them that the furniture and items 
listed in the ad constituted her separate property. Despite her warning, the sale continued 
and the furniture sold for £130. The unsold items were returned to Frank Davis. In 
response, Mrs. Davis sued the auctioneers under the 1870 MWPA for the value of the 
furniture, stock in trade, and other effects that had been sold.121  
The outcome of the suit depended on how the courts interpreted Mrs. Davis’ 
business. If it constituted a separate business, her earnings and property accrued through 
the business were protected under the 1870 Act because she married after it went into 
effect. If she had acted as her husband’s agent, running the haberdashery shop on his 
behalf, the furniture and trade goods remained the legal property of Frank Davis.  
In his decision, Justice Edward Fry emphasized three details that allowed him to 
conclude the business was Mrs. Davis’.122 Firstly, although Frank Davis had printed the 
bills and trade cards for the business, they had Mrs. Davis’ name on them, which implied 
that he consented to the business being run as her own. Secondly, Fry noted, other people 
recognized Mrs. Davis as the main dealer: “persons had trusted the wife who would not 
trust the husband.”123 Finally, Frank Davis appeared to have “nothing to do with the 
business” with the exception of “one occasion” in which he sold “a few yards of 
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trimming to oblige a customer.”124 In light of this evidence—that Frank Davis allowed 
the business to be advertised under his wife’s name, his reputation as a less-trustworthy 
trader, and his absence in the store—Fry “held the business belonged to the wife.”125 
Consequently, he ruled, Mrs. Davis was entitled to the “fair value” of the goods (instead 
of what they sold for at auction) as well as all legal costs from the trial.126  
The cumulative effect of these decisions exposed an ambiguity between a 
husband’s authority and a wife’s independence. Judges assumed that a husband occupied 
an authoritative position in his marriage and therefore looked to men’s actions to 
establish a woman’s independence. Unlike Mrs. Digges, who acquired money through 
morally suspect “gifts,” Mrs. Outram, Dreamer, and Artingstall were portrayed as 
industrious and honest women and received the law’s protection. Ironically, they also 
illustrated married women’s capabilities to run a business without their husband’s 
assistance.  
By contrast, Thornley v. Thornley, heard in 1893, illustrated the ways the law 
deferred to the husband if a married woman could not establish that she worked 
independently from him. The Thornleys married in 1860. The husband was a soldier who 
joined the Royal Artillery. Together, the couple worked as peddlers and furniture dealers, 
eventually “putting together several thousand pounds” that they invested in freehold 
property. They separated in 1889 and the husband eventually obtained a decree to 
dissolve the marriage. In the case before the court, heard by Justice Robert Romer, the 
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plaintiff, the wife, sued her ex-husband, arguing that the business and other property was 
her separate property.127  
In this instance, the fact that the Thornleys worked together throughout their 
marriage meant that Mrs. Thornley could only be regarded as her husband’s agent and 
therefore not protected under the MWPA. As Justice Romer explained: “The facts 
showed that it [the business] was not hers. The husband and wife worked together at it, 
and the business was carried on for the benefit of the household.” He acknowledged that 
Mr. Thornley had been “assisted” by his wife, and “no doubt her assistance was of great 
value as she was a very clever woman” but assistance did not make the business hers.128 
In this reading, the wife was not an equal trader alongside her husband. Her benefit 
derived from a man fulfilling his familial duties: the business was not carried on for her 
benefit, “apart from the benefit which any wife got from her husband being prosperous in 
his business and earning the support of his family.”129 The husband’s perceived character 
was important for reinforcing Romer’s interpretation of the evidence that explained these 
facts. He expressed his belief that the husband was “an honest man” and therefore “gave 
full credit to his evidence.”130 
Romer ruled that under the terms of the Married Women’s Property Act, the wife 
was entitled to her share of the interest from property her and her husband had purchased 
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after the 1882 Act came into effect. The business, however, remained the husband’s 
property.  
Consequently, the decision exposed the limits of the ways women’s economic 
activity could be legally conceived. Justices’ upheld a woman’s right to control her 
separate property under the MWPA as long as a woman could demonstrate she acted 
independently of her husband and with his consent. This created a space for women to 
work independently, as respected and successful traders. At the same time, a legal 
commitment to demonstrating women’s complete independence left little room for 
husband and wives who cooperated with each other. While this might never become a 
problem for spouses who remained happily married, when disputes over property arose a 
married woman had little recourse before the law. As the Thornley suit showed, there was 
little room in the law to recognize (and extract) a wife’s contributions from her and her 
husband’s business. So long as they continued to work together—fulfilling the vision of a 
cooperative marriage painted by many MPs—her husband was considered the rightful 
owner of the property.  
 
The 1882 Property Act and a Woman’s Independence 
Husbands’ authority over their wives continued to shape interpretations of the law 
following the passage of the 1882 Married Women’s Property Act. But the 1882 Property 
Act, with its “revolutionary” potential also seemed to broaden the scope of married 
women’s actions. Because the 1882 MWPA allowed married women to enter into 
contracts to the extent of their separate estate, it also subsequently compelled Britons to 
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reconsider the contracts and agreements they made with other individuals in society as 
well.  
This shift is best illustrated by Smith v. Hancock, which was heard by the 
Supreme Court of Judicature in 1894. The defendant, Mr. T. P. Hancock, had owned a 
grocery business in Kidsgrove, Staffordshire, which he ran with his wife and nephew’s 
assistance. In March 1886, Hancock sold the shop, fixtures, utensils, and goodwill of the 
business to the plaintiff, Mr. Smith, for £2000.131 As part of the sale Mr. Hancock agreed 
not to “not to carry on, or be in anywise interested in, the business of a wholesale or retail 
grocer and provision dealer and baker” within five miles of Smith’s store, for a period of 
ten years.132 Seven year later, in 1893, Hancock’s wife used money from her 
housekeeping savings to open a grocery business 200 yards from Smith’s shop. In 
response, Smith sued Mr. Hancock for violating their contract.  
Justice Arthur Kekewich heard the case in the Chancery division of the High 
Court in 1893. He ruled that because the 1882 MWPA Act granted a married woman the 
right to carry on her own separate business, as if she was a feme sole, the existing 
contract between Mr. Hancock and Mr. Smith had no impact on Mrs. Agnes Hancock’s 
grocery business. The defendant appealed the decision and the case reached the Supreme 
Court of Judicature in 1894. Lords Justices Lindley, Kay, and A. L. Smith subsequently 
dismissed the appeal, meaning Kekewich’s decision stood.  
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As in previous decisions, Kekewich and the Justices on the Supreme Court 
continued to defer to men’s actions to define a woman’s separate business. For example, 
Agnes Hancock had started the business with money she saved from the housekeeping 
allowance her husband gave her. While housekeeping money remained a husband’s 
property under law, the Justices emphasized that Mr. Hancock had “assent[ed] to these 
savings becoming her separate property.”133 They also emphasized that Agnes Hancock 
opened a separate bank account under her own name and all money was paid out of that 
account—further evidence the business was her separate property.  
Most notably, Agnes’ explanation for starting the store provided important 
evidence that the store was not a front for her husband’s business. Reports from the case, 
as well as Justices Kekewich, Lindley, and Smith reiterated that Mrs. Hancock had 
opened her grocery store because she was “anxious to start her nephew in business.”134 
Her nephew had worked in her husband’s store; Agnes Hancock employed him as 
manager of her store, Mrs. T. P. Hancock. She paid his salary and a share of the store’s 
profits out of her bank account.135 Kekewich explained that “after having heard the whole 
of the evidence, that I cannot doubt that the intention and object of Mrs. Hancock, with 
the ultimate concurrence of her husband, was to make some provision for the nephew by 
giving him a start in trade…”136 Similarly, Justice Lindley acknowledged that “it cannot 
be denied that this proceedings is calculated to injure the plaintiff,” but still found “it 
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impossible to avoid the conclusion that the business is being carried on by the wife 
primarily for Kerr, and perhaps, to some extent for herself.”137  
By emphasizing that the business was intended to provide for the nephew’s 
future, the justices provided reassurance that the wife’s actions, while morally 
questionable, were providing for the economic future of another man. She was not 
primarily acting for her own economic gain. None of the justices ever noted whether they 
would have arrived at the same conclusion if a wife had opened up a grocery business for 
her own economic future, not for a nephew. Even Lindley, who conceded that the wife 
might gain some small part from the grocery store, immediately added that it was 
unlikely, because “there being at present little or no profit, she has not yet got any money 
out of the business for herself.”138 Given the financial state of the store he was “unable to 
hold that the defendant has done … what he agreed not to do.”139 This line of reasoning 
aligned with one of the general assumptions that surrounded the MWPA, as noted in 
Chapter 1—that if granted separate property rights a woman would use her earnings for 
the benefit of her family, not her own self interests. At the same time, the decision 
established that a wife was not bound by her husband’s agreements and could 
independently enter into contracts.  
Justice Kay, on the other hand, rejected the argument that Mr. Hancock had not 
assisted his wife with the store and did not stand to gain from its success. In his decision 
he pointed out the many ways Mr. Hancock had assisted his wife and nephew. In addition 
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to providing his wife with money to start the business (money accepted by the other 
justices as her separate property), Hancock helped advertise the store by printing and 
distributing a flyer informing old customers that Agnes Hancock’s “well-known mixture 
of tea” which he had once sold would be available in the new shop. He took his nephew 
to Liverpool and Manchester where he introduced him to his old wholesale dealer and 
asked the dealers to supply his wife’s business. He also helped negotiate the lease for the 
shop premises and connected his wife with the lawyers who wrote up the lease. Through 
these actions, Kay determined that Hancock “rendered active assistance in carrying on 
the new business.”140  
His opinion exposed the inherit ambiguity in distinguishing what constituted a 
husband and wife’s independent actions. When Kay pointed out that because the 
Hancock’s “are living together, and any profits she may receive he will have the benefit 
of while that continues” he captured the deep tension the Married Women’s Property 
Acts had produced.141 The Acts decreed a married woman had a right to her separate 
property, but extricating these individual rights from the communal aspects of marriage—
in this case, that a husband could benefit from his wife’s success—had broader 
implications for how individuals in society would interact with each other.  
More broadly, then, Smith V. Hancock illustrated the extent to which the Property 
Acts had opened up possibilities for women to pursue business ventures on their own 
terms. Justice A. L. Smith acknowledged this change in his decision when he stated that 
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“before the passing of the Married Women’s Property Acts of 1870 and 1882 I do not 
doubt that a wife, setting up business in the way Mrs. Hancock has, would have done so 
as agent for her husband, for as long as coverture existed she could do so in no other 
capacity, and her acts would then constitute a breach of covenant by her husband.”142 In 
other words, prior to the passage of the MWPA, a similar scenario would not have raised 
any legal questions, because under coverture a wife would have been bound by her 
husband’s contract. If she had opened a parallel business after her husband agreed to 
restrain from trade, the court would have found her in violation of the agreement because 
she could only act as an agent of her husband. “But,” Justice Smith continued, “this is not 
so now. The wife, although coverture exists, can nevertheless trade with her own separate 
property, apart from her husband and free from his control, as if she were a feme sole, as 
and when she pleases, and, if she does so, she is no more the agent for her husband than 
his father, uncle, or brother would be under like circumstances, nor can the husband 
restrain his wife from so acting.”143 
Ultimately, Justices Lindley and Smith agreed that that Agnes Hancock’s business 
was her separate business under the Married Women’s Property Act. Lindley summarized 
the problem, when he wrote that “an agreement by a husband not to do a thing does not 
oblige him to prevent his wife from doing that same thing if she has a right to do it 
independently of him.” In the future, he advised, conveyancers would be required to 
consider women’s property rights when writing contracts.144 Similarly, Justice Smith 
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condemned the Hancock’s “reprehensible” conduct, but conceded that the Agnes 
Hancock was not bound by her husband’s agreement. If “it is desired to restrain such an 
act of a wife, the covenant of the husband must hereafter be so framed as to meet the 
case” he wrote. It was not the duty of the Court to put a “forced construction” upon a 
contract “in order to put a stop to that of which it disapproves.”145  
 
Since the Married Women’s Property Act 
While defining a business as a married woman’s separate venture remained 
conditional on her husband’s authority, this chapter contends that the high bar of 
evidence necessary to establish a woman’s independence slowly created the possibility 
for a married woman to act independently of her husband in their marriage. Over time, 
the MWPA became abstracted and a means to explain married women’s independent 
behavior, as the high-profile divorce case of Sir Charles Hardtop and Lady Millicent 
Hardtop illustrates.  
Sir Charles Edward Cradock Hardtop married Millicent Florence Eleanor Hardtop 
(nee Wilson) in 1895. Millicent was the daughter of Baron Nonbroiler, Charles Henry 
Wilson, Liberal MP for West Hull and a wealthy ship-builder.146 From the beginning, the 
marriage had been unhappy and became increasingly so, as Sir Charles’ significant debts 
were disclosed. According to Millicent Hartopp’s barristers, at the time of his proposal, 
Charles gave the impression that he had gambling debts ranging from £4,000 to £5,000. It 
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was later revealed they were closer to £8,000 to £9,000. Six months into the marriage, 
Hartopp asked his wife to obtain £1,000 from her father so he could pay and silence a 
mistress. In 1897, Millicent’s mother (Florence Jane Helen—the eldest daughter of 
Colonel William Henry Charles Wellesley, nephew of the first duke of Wellington) 
rented a flat for her daughter because Charles Hartopp could not afford the expense.147 
Even this effort provided little security from Charles’ debts. Bailiffs soon entered the 
house seeking payment. In total, between 1895 and 1900, Charles Wilson secured about 
£16,000 to cover the costs of his son-in-law’s debts.148  
Millicent Hartopp left her husband in 1900. While separated, she developed a 
friendship with Earl Cowley, Henry Arthur Mornington Wellesley. In 1902, Charles 
Hartopp sued for dissolution of the marriage on the grounds that Lady Hartopp 
committed adultery with Cowley. Millicent denied the charge and accused Sir Charles of 
cruelty and adultery with a Mrs. Sands.  
To defend Lady Hartopp’s behavior, her barrister, Sir Edward Clarke, oscillated 
between emphasizing her naivety and arguing that her independence was illustrative of 
women’s changed social position since the 1882 MWPA’s passage.149 Establishing a 
contrast between Sir Charles, a thirty-seven-year “experienced man of the world” and 
Lady Hartopp, a “girl of 22,” Clarke faulted Sir Charles for the marriage’s dissolution, 
arguing that he failed to fulfill his paternal duties and “mould” his wife.150 The 
revelations about her husband—his gambling debts and mistresses—he explained, 
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shocked the young bride. “What did the jury suppose was likely to be the effect of such a 
disclosure upon a light-hearted girl’s mind?” he asked the jury. “The bailiffs being put 
into the flat” provided another blow. “It would,” he asserted, “have been a shock in any 
rank of society.”151 
Through his behavior, Clarke argued, Sir Charles had abrogated his duty as a 
husband to influence his wife, explaining that if Sir Charles “had exercised any ordinary 
care he could have moulded her [Lady Hartopp’s] character as other men mould 
women.”152 One episode provided particular evidence of this. The barrister explained that 
Sir Charles had refused to accompany his wife on a trip to Paris. At the last minute he 
decided to go salmon fishing in Ireland, despite the fact that Paris was a place “where a 
young woman needed the protection of her husband.”153  
After laying out the ways that Sir Charles had shirked his duty to protect his 
wife’s innocence, Clarke’s argument switched to defend Lady Hartopp’s independence. 
The reasoning paralleled previous arguments regarding a woman’s separate business—
that a husband consented to his wife’s business by remaining uninvolved in it. In this 
vein, Clarke explained that Lady Hartopp gained the impression she could act 
independently because “the absolute way in which he [Sir Charles] had neglected her 
allowed her to think she could do exactly what she liked.”154 In other words, her 
husband’s frequent absences and general disinterest in his wife’s life served as evidence 
of his consent for her to act independently.  
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Through the barrister’s argument, the Married Women’s Property Acts provided a 
cause for Lady Hartopp’s independent actions. Sir Charles’s attempts to control his wife, 
exposed the transformation regarding expectations in marriage that occurred since the 
Acts’ passage. “[I]f it had been 50 or 60 years ago” Clarke reasoned, “he [Sir Charles] 
would have been perfectly right” in his efforts to control his wife and expect her 
compliance.155 But, he continued, expectations regarding marriage had changed: “since 
the Married Women’s Property Act women had become more emancipated and had a 
greater freedom and were placed upon terms of equality with their husbands.”156 This, in 
his opinion, “was a very good thing.” The new expectations regarding marriage, as well 
as the many documented instances of the ways Lady Hartopp and Sir Charles generally 
lived separate lives, he argued, only led to the conclusion that “Lady Hartopp had always 
lived a perfectly innocent and moral life.”157 
The barrister’s reasonings exemplified the ambiguous, and at times awkward 
transitions Britons used as they thought through the implications of wives’ independence. 
On one hand, the defense was at pains to demonstrate Lady Hartopp’s innocence, 
particularly since she was accused of adultery. In doing so, they emphasized her youth 
and the shocks that occurred from her husband’s behavior. They espoused paternalistic 
ideals about what Sir Charles, as a good husband would have done—if he had lived a 
moral life, he could have influenced his young wife’s life as well. And yet, a husband’s 
authority was no longer unquestioned. By frequently leaving his wife, gambling, and 
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racking up debts, he no longer had a right to expect her obedience. The cause of this, they 
attributed to the MWPA, whose passage had generated increased equality between 
couples. In this new social climate, Lady Hartopp’s actions were perfectly acceptable. 
Without reciprocity between her and her husband, she had the right to live her life 
independently of him. 
If the Hartopp divorce case exposed tensions between Victorian ideals of a 
husband’s authority over his wife, and emerging claims regarding a wife’s independence, 
Gotcliffe v. Edelston best illustrates the extent to which ideas regarding a husband and 
wife’s independence had become accepted. Both the case, heard in 1930, and the 
judgement issued by Justice Sir Henry Alfred McCardie reveal the ambiguity between the 
changes and continuities that continued to inflect discussions of the MWPA. McCardie’s 
judgement showed how much Britons had come to accept ideas regarding a woman’s 
independence with marriage. But it also showed how a husband’s position in marriage 
continued to shape these decisions. Ideas about a husband’s authority had transformed 
into concerns about the ways the law burdened a husband and privileged a wife. This 
transformation cautions against reading the changes inspired by the MWPA as a story of 
linear progress.  
The main question before Justice McCardie was whether a married woman could 
sue her husband for an ante-nuptial tort.158 The plaintiff, Esther Gotcliffe, sued the 
defendant, Dr. Harry Edelston, a medical officer at the West Riding Mental Hospital in 
Wakefield, Leeds, for personal injuries she sustained when the car Edelston was driving 
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collided with a horse and cart on the road. (Gotcliffe was a passenger.) She eventually 
lost an eye as a result of her injuries. At the time of the accident (October 1928) and 
when the writ for the suit was initiated (January 1929) Gotcliffe and Edelston were 
unmarried. The couple married in April 1929.  
 Barristers for the defendant, Dr. Edelston, argued two points. First, that section 12 
of the 1882 MWPA prohibited a married woman from suing her husband for torts. 
Second, a married woman could not sue her husband under common law. Consequently, 
they argued, the plaintiff’s action could not be sustained.159 Esther Gotcliffe’s barristers, 
on the other hand, countered that the law no longer viewed husband and wife as “one in 
law” and that the case was essentially a matter of a single woman suing a single man.160 
Justice McCardie dismissed the case by taking “the position at common law” that 
husband and wife were one under the law and a wife could not sue her husband. 
McCardie was well-known for his long, exhaustively-researched judgements and 
“veneration” of common law.161 He was also a controversial figure, known for 
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advocating for reform to Britain’s divorce laws, supporting women’s access to birth 
control, lowering the age of consent, and the legalization of abortion. He entered into 
political controversy in 1919, after presiding over a libel case centering on the Amritsar 
massacre. Both the trial, which prompted discussions of the history of the MWPA, and 
McCardie’s researched judgement, illustrated how much opinion with regard to the law 
had changed since the MWPA’s passage.  
For instance, during the trial McCardie asked  how the law came to “regard the 
husband and wife as one.”162 Mr. Diamond, barrister for Esther Gotfliffe, responded that 
he “did not know” but thought “that in the old days the position of women was held to be 
so low that on marriage they were considered to have no rights at all.”163 McCardie 
followed up, asking whether the “the doctrine [of unity] depended on complete 
subordination?”164 To this, Diamond responded: “That is the only reason I can 
suggest.”165 While Victorian Britons had comfortably espoused the view that a wife’s 
natural position was one of subordination, this expressed uncertainty revealed a historical 
distance between the Victorian-era property reform campaign and interwar Britons’ view 
of marriage. 
McCardie’s judgment further reflected this sense of change and illustrated a 
transformation in the idea of “unity” that defined the marriage ideal. The judgment 
echoed the history of common law, as written by reformers in the nineteenth century: that 
a wife’s legal subordination emerged during the feudal era, after the fall of Rome. 
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McCardie wrote that the explanation for a husband and wife being treated as one under 
common law, was that the common law “during the thirteenth century onwards was very 
largely influenced by the theology of the Middle Ages, and that this particular branch of 
the law relating to husband and wife was a marked by many features of ecclesiastical 
influence.”166 Suggesting that rationality had overcome religious thought—again echoing 
nineteenth-century reformers—he noted that “very gradually there has been a dissipation 
of that ecclesiastical influence and the overthrow of the old theological mysticism, and 
both by the growth of the common law and the Act of Parliament, man and wife now 
possess individual existences.”167 
In a passage that deserves to be quoted in full, McCardie listed the many ways 
that husbands and wives lived as independent persons:  
I find it difficult to see how the old and conventional doctrine of unity can 
be said to operate at the present day. There is, of course, no physical unity, 
save in the most limited and occasional sense. There is no mental unity in 
any just meaning of the word. Husband and wife have their individual 
outlooks. They may belong to different political parties, to different 
schools of thought. A wife may be in counsel in the Courts against her 
husband. A husband may be counsel against his wife. Each has a separate 
intellectual life and activities. Moreover, as Lord Bryce says: ‘ The 
modern notion is that it is one’s duty to assert one’s own individuality. … 
we are probably completing the transition from one family to the personal 
epoch of woman.”  
 
In contrast to the Victorians’ concern that differences between husband and wives would 
lead to social conflict, McCardie’s statement seemingly accepted husbands and wives’ 
individuality, in its social, political, and intellectual manifestations.  
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Yet, he continued, marriage required some acceptance of unity: “in spite of all 
this, the fact remains that marriage creates a most important status and one which should 
create also a substantial identity of social and other interests between husband and 
wife.”168 What these social interests were specifically remained undefined. McCardie’s 
“unity” was not that same “unity” that the Victorians had celebrated. He accepted that 
husbands and wives should have some common, albeit undefined interests, but he also 
accepted that they could differ within marriage.  
While pointing to the ways a wife and husband could be independent of each 
other, McCardie’s judgment articulated an emerging sense, increasingly expressed by 
Britons during the 1930s, that men unfairly suffered under the legal regime created by the 
1882 MWPA.169 As scholars have shown, and Chapter 1 discussed, class-based 
perceptions about husbands’ abuse of their wives helped secure the MWPA’s passage. By 
1930, however, this class-based justification for a woman’s property rights had fallen 
away. McCardie’s opinion espoused a strengthening narrative that legal reforms to 
women’s rights in marriage had been gained at the expense of men: “many other aspects 
of injustice spring from the fact that the various changes in favour of married women 
have not been accompanied by the adjustments that were needed to secure a proper and 
adequate code for the regulation of relations between the spouses.”170 
The MWPA came under particular scrutiny because it “conferred no privileges on 
the husband” even though it “conferred many privileges on the wife.” As a result, legal 
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reforms to women’s rights in marriage meant that “wives, however wealthy of purse or 
independent of character, possess powers and privileges which are wholly denied to 
husbands.”171 For McCardie, these burdens included the fact that a husband was liable to 
pay income-tax on a wife’s income even if a wife refused to contribute to the household 
expenses; that a husband remained liable for his wife’s torts while she was not liable for 
his; and a husband was required to provide his wife with “necessaries,” even if she 
possessed a greater income than him.172 
This sense of injustice inflected McCardie’s conclusion that Esther Gotcliffe 
could not sue her husband for torts. He agreed that by driving negligently Edelston had 
“infringed on her [Gotcliffe’s] right of personal safety and security.” But, this right of 
security was not “her ‘property’ in the normal meaning of the word.” In his view, 
although section 12 of the MWPA allowed a wife to sue her husband in respect of her 
separate property, allowing a married woman to sue for damages (such as a missing eye) 
would require such a broad interpretation of the clause that it would enable a wife to sue 
her husband for any tort. The potential “consequences would be striking.” Specifically, 
for McCardie, the possibility that a wife could sue her husband for torts represented a 
wife’s unequal power over her husband: “It would mean that, although no husband can 
sue his wife for any tort whatsoever committed by her against him …. the wife can sue 
the husband for every act of tortious doing against her before marriage, whether it be for 
negligence, libel, slander, or assault.”173 He concluded that “it is plain… that the framers 
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of the Act did not wish to encourage litigation between the spouses. Such litigation is 
admittedly unseemly, distressing and embittering.”174 Consequently, while a supporter of 
controversial causes for women, McCardie’s final decision again illustrated that concerns 
over men’s positions in marriage shaped continued to shape interpretations of women’s 
rights.  
 
Summary 
Attention to the legal questions raised by the Married Women’s Property Acts 
highlights Britons’ changing attitudes towards women’s property rights between 1870 
and 1930. In the years surrounding the 1870 MWPA’s passage, judges showed a 
preference for defining women’s rights under the law as narrowly as possible. For 
instance, only money earned through “lawful” means was protected under the Acts, as the 
actress Mrs. Digges learned. Judges also deferred to evidence that a husband had granted 
his authority for his wife’s business when deciding whether the business was her separate 
property. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Property Acts had become a 
way to explain married women’s independent actions. Britons’ acceptance of married 
women’s independence, however, existed alongside emerging concerns about a man’s 
status within these social transformations. Even as expectations about a husband’s marital 
authority waned, complaints about how men suffered under the law highlighted the ways 
women’s rights seemed to challenge men’s social authority.  
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Chapter 3. A Husband’s Burden: Property Rights and Income Tax Obligations, 
1882-1909 
Introduction  
In 1930, when Justice McCardie wrote his decision in Gotcliffe v. Edelston, the 
case regarding whether a married woman could sue her husband for ante-nuptial torts, he 
expressed his opinion that as a consequence of the Married Women’s Property Act, 
“husbands are placed under burdens from which wives are free.”1 Among the burdens he 
listed, McCardie found it particularly unfair that a husband “living with his wife is liable 
to pay income-tax on her income even though she may refuse to contribute anything to 
the household expenses. If he does not pay the tax he may be sent to prison till he is able 
(if ever) to find the necessary money.”2 Under Britain’s income tax laws, a husband 
remained liable for paying the income tax due on his and his wife’s aggregated incomes. 
Failure to pay tax meant a husband was liable to be imprisoned until he could pay the 
debt, but he possessed little legal power to compel his wife to contribute to the owed tax 
if she refused to volunteer payment.  
When he raised his complaints about husbands’ income tax obligations, Justice 
McCardie participated in an ongoing debate—over husbands and wives’ income tax 
obligations—that originated with the passage of the 1882 Married Women’s Property 
Act. The next three chapters follow the trajectory of this debate, from 1882 to 1921, as a 
way to consider the principled and prosaic contradictions the Property Acts engendered. 
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This chapter will focus primarily on the debate as it emerged in the press and 
Parliament from 1882 through 1909, when David Lloyd George’s “People’s Budget” 
magnified activists’ claims that Britain’s tax regime violated married women’s property 
rights and unjustly burdened men. Chapter 4 will focus on the actions of the Women’s 
Tax Resistance League, as they exploited anxieties about men’s tax liabilities to protest 
women’s disenfranchisement. Finally, Chapter 5 will focus on the debate in the 
immediate post-WWI war period, when it received the attention of the 1919/1920 Royal 
Commission on Income Tax.  
The question of how to categorize married women’s incomes under the Property 
Acts posed a broader question about the extent to which individual rights functioned in 
tension with family and social obligations. Neither Britons nor state officials ever 
completely resolved this question. Instead, both sides settled into a debate that persisted 
long into the twentieth century, drawing on gendered and class-inflected arguments to 
advance their case. Supporters of reform called for the government to tax husbands and 
wives separately. They consistently argued that the current law was unjust, unfair, and 
violated individuals’ rights, although they could disagree over who suffered more under 
the law—men or women. They argued that the law penalized marriage and encouraged 
immoral relations. Government officials, particularly Inland Revenue and Treasury 
officials, continued to support a household income tax. They feared that any substantial 
reform that taxed husbands and wives individually would result in diminished revenue for 
the state and subsequently drew on class-based arguments to defend their stance, arguing 
that a household tax distributed the tax burden more fairly across classes. 
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The 1842 Income Tax Act and a Household Income 
In 1842, Robert Peel secured the passage of the Income Tax Act to cover budget 
deficits. Parliament intended the tax to be a temporary measure and authorized it for three 
years.3 In 1845, however, Parliament re-authorized the income tax, and continued to do 
so in subsequent years. Over the course of the century, the income tax became a 
significant feature in British national identity. Officials believed that its relative ease of 
assessment and general acceptance by British taxpayers signified the stable relationship 
between the state and its subjects, in contrast to other European tax regimes.4 Together, 
Robert Peel and William Gladstone successfully “established the principle that the state 
should not appear to favour any particular economic interest” in matters of taxation.5 This 
helped ensure the British state’s stability because it could frame the state as “neutral and 
above the selfish tussle of interests.”6  
The mid-Victorian state’s claim to neutrality relied on the concept of 
proportionality,” which held that each taxpayer should pay the same proportion of 
income tax.7 Throughout most of the nineteenth-century, taxes were assessed at a flat rate 
(7d on the £) on the assumption that a “fair” tax meant every taxpayer paid the same 
percentage of their overall income.8 The aim of this system, as Martin Daunton explains, 
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was to “ensure that the tax system as a whole fell proportionately on all levels and forms 
of income so that it was neutral and left the social structure as it was found.”9  
By end of the Victorian era, this framework had come under strain. John Stuart 
Mill, for instance, argued that taxation should be based on “equality of sacrifice” and that 
an individual income should provide the basic necessaries for life. In other words, a 10% 
tax had a greater impact on a person with an income of £100, than it did on a wealthy 
industrialist with an income of £1000.10 Therefore, Mill argued, each person should be 
allowed a minimum amount of income—£150 in his view—to purchase “necessaries.” 
All money over £150 should be subject to tax.11 By 1876, incomes under £150 were 
exempt from tax. Incomes under £400 received a £120 abatement (an allowance). All 
taxable income was taxed at a rate of 7d on the £.12 
The passage of the 1882 Married Women’s Property Act, however, created a legal 
ambiguity that undercut state's claims to be a neutral arbiter of taxpayers’ interests so 
long as officials continued to assume that a married man represented the household’s 
interests. Since 1842, income tax had been assessed as a household income tax, in which 
the combined incomes of a husband and wife constituted the household income. 
Reflecting the logic of coverture—that a wife had no legal identity and could not own 
personal property—the Income Tax Act included married women in the legal category of 
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“incapacitated persons” alongside infants and lunatics, who could not be held personally 
responsible for paying the tax. Clause 45 stated that “the profits of any married woman 
living with her husband shall be deemed the profits of the husband, and the same shall be 
charged in the name of the husband, and not in her name, or of her trustee” meaning that 
husbands, as head of the household, were liable for paying the tax on any income earned 
by their wife.13 The MWPA disrupted this relationship when it granted married women 
control over their separate property.  
Although the 1882 Act did not specify any changes to a married woman’s tax 
status, Britons quickly seized on the property protections granted to married women to 
argue that a husband should no longer be responsible for paying tax on an income he 
could not access or enjoy. This view understood the Married Women’s Property Act to 
have introduced a new principle—a married woman’s individual identity—that 
superseded laws premised on coverture. An article in the Law Times aptly expressed this 
perspective in 1885 when it observed that a “[h]usband and wife living together are still 
viewed by the Income Tax Commissioners as one person.” The Tax Commissioners’ 
view appeared in contradiction to the fact that a married woman was “now practically a 
feme sole as regards her separate income” whereas in 1842 she was scarcely deemed to 
have a separate existence from that of her husband.”14 For those who accepted the 
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premise that the MWPA had established married women’s individuality, laws premised 
on the assumptions of coverture needed to be brought into alignment with the MWPA. 
Victorian reformers built on the assumption that the 1882 MWPA had altered the 
principle of the law to articulate three main critiques of Britain’s unreformed income tax 
laws. First, men and women were treated differently under the law. Secondly, the law 
penalized couples who married. And third, by refusing to reform the income-tax code, the 
state inconsistently observed the MWPA’s principles. As with arguments in support of 
granting married women property rights, these critiques did not align with a clear 
“feminist” agenda. Critics agreed that the tax system perpetuated injustice but they 
disagreed over who suffered more under the law—a husband or a wife. These three 
critiques, and Inland Revenue’s response (discussed further below), shaped the major 
lines of debate over Britain’s tax system into the twentieth century (Chapters 4 and 5).  
For supporters of men’s rights, the fact that husbands continued to have financial 
obligations without a corresponding right to their wives’ property was indicative of the 
law’s injustice. The Derbyshire Times, which condemned the 1882 MWPA because it 
enacted a “social revolution,” complained out that the law “very illogically” left a 
husband liable for his wife’s income tax.15 Individual Victorians also expressed their 
discontent. “X.Y.Z” wrote to the Manchester Currier expressing the view that “it was 
clearly unjust” that a husband should be required to continue paying tax on his wife’s 
income while an R. Bruce Dickinson asked in the Times whether would it be “too much 
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to demand that a husband shall no longer be required to pay Income-tax on the property 
of his wife?”16 From this perspective, the 1882 MWPA illustrated the ways women’s 
rights seemed to be achieved at men’s expense.  
An inverse narrative, emphasized by supporters of women’s rights, argued that 
women should be taxed individually as part of a broader commitment to establishing 
equality between men and women. Only when the law treated women on the same terms 
as men—with corresponding rights and obligations—would equality between the sexes 
exist.17 For example, the women’s rights supporter and suffragist Helen Taylor (John 
Stuart Mill’s stepdaughter) called attention to the “‘injustice and anomaly’ of the present 
method of collecting income tax from married teachers” at a meeting of the London 
School Board. She moved for the School Board solicitor to issue an opinion regarding the 
legality of assessing income tax jointly on married teachers “since the passing of the 
Married Women’s Property Act.”18 Reformers argued that as long as women were treated 
differently under the law, men would continue to face unequal obligations. This idea was 
expressed at a suffragist meeting in 1911, when the Irish novelist Mrs. Katharine Tynan 
Tynan Hinkson, commenting on Britain’s tax system, dryly observed that “there was a 
curious anomaly in the change which was brought about by the Married Women’s 
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Property Act. The anomaly fell at least as hardly upon men as upon women. Women 
wanted to give a helping hand, to take some of the burden off men’s shoulders.”19 
Married women’s equal treatment under the law, the argument went, would ensure men’s 
equal treatment.  
In addition to arguing that the law perpetuated injustice between men and women, 
critics further argued that the income tax law penalized marriage because a married 
couple living together could pay more in tax than unmarried individuals. (Husbands and 
wives who were formally separated were taxed in accordance with their individual 
incomes.)20  
To make this point, critics frequently compared the tax obligations of married 
individuals to siblings living in the same household. The familial analogy drew on a 
common assumption—that siblings or married couples who comprised a household 
pooled financial resources to cover their expenses—while allowing critics to point out 
that siblings had access to double the income before becoming liable for income tax. An 
1885 letter from a “Married Woman” published in the Times provided one of the earliest 
examples of this view.21 In 1885, all income over £150 was subject to income tax at £7d 
on the £ (although incomes between £150-400 received a £120 abatement).22 As a 
“Married Woman” pointed out, a husband and wife with joint incomes became liable for 
tax at £150 (after their allowance, they would pay £2. 18s. 4d of tax on the remaining 
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£30). This meant, for example, a husband and wife with incomes of £100 and £50 
respectively would have to pay tax on income that they would not be liable for if they 
remained unmarried. By contrast, if two sisters lived together, each sister would need to 
possess an individual income of £150 before she became liable to income tax. The two 
sisters would have a combined income of £300 a year before paying tax. The married 
couple, on the other hand, paid tax on a yearly income of half that amount. Furthermore, 
a married man or woman could pay tax on money otherwise not eligible for income tax. 
For critics, this amounted to a “tax on marriage.” To resolve this problem, the author 
advocated changing the tax law so that married couples would be taxed on the same level 
as bachelors and spinsters, meaning that married couples should not be taxed until their 
joint income reached £300.23 When Victorians argued that the income tax penalized 
marriage, they articulated a larger point: that marriage should not affect an individual’s 
tax status under a fair and neutral tax regime.  
Through these lines of argument—that that the law inscribed injustice and 
penalized marriage—critics called on the state to consistently uphold the principle of the 
Married Women’s Property Acts. Britons and government officials alike anticipated that 
if husbands and wives’ incomes were assessed individually, fewer incomes would 
become liable for tax because the disaggregated incomes would fall below the £150 
threshold. For instance, the married couple with theoretical incomes of £100 and £50 
would no longer pay tax. This left the state open to criticism that it was unwilling to 
observe the MWPA when it stood to benefit from the status quo. For example, in his 
                                               
23 A Married Woman, “A Tax On Matrimony,” The Times, May 8, 1885, 3.  
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letter to the Times, R. Dickinson warned that “[u]nless in future the properties of husband 
and wife are assessed as two separate properties… there will be good ground for 
concluding that the Government is unwilling to apply the principle of this Act in cases 
where it may be a loser.”24 In his view, the government maintained a double standard 
towards the MWPA. It had demonstrated it was willing to uphold the Acts when the 
circumstances involved a husband and wife. (Dickinson did not provide a specific 
example, but a case from Chapter 2 such as Smith v. Hancock—in which the courts ruled 
a wife’s business was her own separate property irrespective of her husband’s contracts—
likely supported his contention.) In cases where the state stood to benefit if husbands and 
wives were treated as one unit, however, the state proved far more unwilling to recognize 
the MWPA—in this instance, when it expected tax reforms to reduce revenue. Activists 
therefore called on the government to uphold the principles of individual rights, 
regardless of the financial costs to the state. 
Together, these critiques illustrated how the perceived changes introduced by the 
Married Women’s Property Act—that it had overturned coverture—produced a 
conceptual shift in how Victorians understood husbands and wives’ relations to each 
other. Prior to the passage of the MWPA, there could be little debate over how income 
tax was assessed because a married woman had no legal identity. Therefore, with the 
exception of property tied up in separate trusts, a married woman’s earnings were legally 
her husband’s, justifying his obligation to pay tax on them. The Property Acts disrupted 
                                               
24 Dickson, “Income-Tax On Married Women’s Property.”  
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this relationship and for many Britons, meant that husbands and wives should be treated 
as individuals in matters of taxation. 
In contrast to Victorians’ expressed interpretation of the law, Inland Revenue and 
Treasury officials consistently maintained that the MWPA had no impact on Britain’s tax 
laws. In October 1882, a George Hicks sent a letter to Inland Revenue explaining that he 
had seen an article in Justice of the Peace claiming that a married woman’s income 
earned under the 1870 MWPA was not included as part of a husband’s earnings for 
income tax; he paid tax on his wife’s income and wrote to clarify whether he had grounds 
to appeal his past assessments.25 The letter prompted Inland Revenue officials to send an 
“urgent” memo clarifying that neither the 1870 MWPA, nor the 1882 Act, set to go into 
effect in January 1883, had any impact on how income tax was assessed on husbands and 
wives living together.26 
Inland Revenue’s stance relied on a legal interpretation offered by an Inland 
Revenue solicitor that determined the MWPA did not impact the tax laws because the 
Property Acts never mentioned the Crown in the statutes. Because the power to tax 
subjects derived from the Crown, Inland Revenue was not implicated in any statute 
unless the Crown was explicitly mentioned.27  
Despite a Law Times’ prediction that the question of married women’s incomes 
would likely be “judicially solved,” the income tax laws never faced legal challenge in 
the nineteenth century. This is likely because activists potentially interested in 
                                               
25 George Hicks to Inland Revenue, October 16, 1882. IR 75/183. National Archives, Kew. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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challenging the point lacked the funds necessary to pursue a case through the high courts 
and Inland Revenue had no incentive to investigate the question.28 Without a clear 
judicial ruling, however, both Inland Revenue and critics were free to assert the 
correctness of their interpretation of the law.  
Inland Revenue’s own legal interpretation certainly reflected some degree of 
motivated reasoning because officials generally assumed that a shift away from a 
household tax would be detrimental to the nation’s finances. Most directly, if the income 
of husband and wife who once qualified for income tax was disaggregated and fell below 
£150 the state lost the revenue. Officials also feared that allowing married women to be 
taxed individually would encourage fraud.  
Inland Revenue’s concerns about tax evasion derived from the methods it used to 
assess income tax. In 1842, Robert Peel (building on the collection system introduced by 
William Pitt during the Napoleonic Wars) organized income tax assessment into 
“schedules” to assuage Britons’ fears that an income tax would allow the state to pry into 
families’ personal finances and encourage compliance with the system. The five 
schedules were organized according to type of income. Tax from income falling under 
Schedules A (rents from real estate and houses), C (profits from stocks and dividends), 
and E (salaries and pensions from public office) was “collected at the source,” meaning it 
was deducted before the individual received payment. Income from Schedules D (profits 
from trade, commerce, and the professions) and B (profits from land) was self-reported. 
                                               
28 The Women’s Tax Resistance League, the focus of Chapter 4 would begin pursuing a legal test case 
during the suffrage campaign.  
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The schedule system, therefore, shaped Inland Revenue’s opposition to married 
women’s independent taxation in two respects. First, the schedules prevented Inland 
Revenue from ever knowing a household’s total income. Second, Inland Revenue 
delegated tax assessment to local assessors, often tradesman, in order to minimize 
“frictions” between the state and taxpayer. Traders and small shopkeepers, were also one 
of the few classes of people who the state relied on to report their profits under Schedule 
D. Officials therefore recognized that assessors and traders had an incentive to downplay 
profits in order to reduce taxes. At the same time, it was almost impossible to prove 
small-traders reporting income under Schedule D were lying about their profits when 
they reported them for income-tax purposes.29 In one internal memo, for instance, Arthur 
Milner, chairman of the board of Inland Revenue between 1894 and 1897, estimated that 
“the man who really makes 600l a year probably puts it down at 400l if not 300l” and no 
class was as “under-assessed” as shopkeepers.30 Generally, officials resigned themselves 
to their perception that some degree of tax evasion likely existed among traders and 
accepted it as the price for Britons’ more general compliance.31 Whether traders did 
actually evade their taxes is unclear.32  
Officials opposed married women’s individual taxation because they assumed it 
would exacerbate traders’ perceived evasion. They expected married traders would take 
                                               
29 Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, 198.  
30 A. Milner, “Income Tax on Married Women’s Property; Claim to Exemption or Abatement,” May 21, 
1895, Board of Inland Revenue: Budget and Finance Bill Papers, IR 63/5, National Archives, Kew. 
31 Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, 184-185.  
32 Daunton uncritically accepts that small-traders evaded taxation but he relies primarily on Inland Revenue 
documents discussing traders’ evasion as evidence. As discussed here, however, Revenue officials relied 
mostly on their own perception as evidence that traders were evading taxes. See Trusting Leviathan, 197-
198.  
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advantage of the separate property provisions in the MWPA and attribute a portion of 
their income to their wives, lowering the amount of tax they owed. This was not an 
unfounded fear. In 1868, 47.9% of taxpayers falling under schedule D assessments had 
incomes between £100 and £200.33 Any division of income between spouses could 
quickly mean that the largest percentage of Schedule D taxpayers avoided liability for 
income tax. As Milner warned, “the husband has only to attribute such a portion of his 
profits as it may suit his convenience in making his assessment, to the exertions of his 
wife in order to double the exemption or abatement to which he is otherwise entitled.”34 
This needed to be avoided because the “difficulty of disproving the assertion, that such 
portion of the profits of the business is due to the exertions of the wife, appears 
insuperable.”35 His argument downplayed the possibility that married women could own 
and run businesses of their own accord and therefore had a right to be taxed 
independently. Women’s earnings, in this view, were not legitimately subject to 
protection under the Property Acts, but a front for men to hide income.  
Consequently, while Arthur Milner conceded that “it is true that the law on the 
subject is by no means clear,” he stood firm that “Inland Revenue had never admitted” to 
activists’ interpretation of the law.36 He conceded that advocates’ argument for separate 
                                               
33 Numerically this meant 191,342 incomes out of the total 399,597 incomes assessed under schedule D. 
Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, 160, Table 6.1.  
34 Milner, “Income Tax on Married Women’s Property,” 4. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Milner, 1. Milner became Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue in 1894 under Chancellor Sir 
William Hardcourt. Immediately prior, he had been director-general of accounts in Egypt in the Khedive 
Tawfiq government. In 1897 he left Inland Revenue to become governor of Cape Colony and high 
commissioner of South Africa. On Milner’s career see Colin Newbury, "Milner, Alfred, Viscount Milner 
(1854–1925), public servant and politician." Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 20 Oct. 2018. 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.bu.edu/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-
9780198614128-e-35037. 
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taxation was “logical,” but maintained that the “practical objections to giving way to it 
are enormous.” He therefore strenuously warned the Government against granting any 
concession on the matter because it would be “quite impossible for the Inland Revenue to 
guarantee their income tax estimate for the present year if such a course were adopted.”37 
Such a stance prioritized efficacy and stability so that Inland Revenue could fulfill its 
duties to the nation. Dismissing claims regarding the rights of a married woman as “mere 
pious opinion,” Milner maintained that Inland Revenue would continue to administer its 
interpretation of the law unless it was challenged in court.38 
 
Challenging a Fair Tax 
Critiques of Britain’s income tax laws that had filtered through the press after the 
MWPA’s passage gained limited attention in Parliament during the 1880s.39 By the final 
decade of the ninetieth century, however, the fiscal consensus secured by Gladstone 
during the mid-Victorian era was coming under strain as military expenditures, imperial 
unrest, and pressure for social welfare programs—for instance, education services, old 
age pensions, and agricultural relief—increased the state’s financial obligations.40 For 
Daunton, the years between 1894-1906 mark a period in which Britain’s “fiscal 
                                               
37 Milner, “Income Tax on Married Women’s Property,” 3-4. 
38 Ibid. 
39 In 1885, James Rankin, a Conservative MP for Leominster and Captain Charles Selwyn Conservative 
MP for Wisbech betook up the call for spouses’ incomes to be taxed individually. During parliamentary 
questions each MP would ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to clarify how husbands and wives’ incomes 
were taxed and whether joint assessment was allowed under the Married Women’s Property Acts. In all 
instances, the Chancellor responded that the MPWA had no effect on the tax laws. Beyond these questions, 
however, there was no concerted effort among MPs to reform the tax laws. “House Of Commons, Monday, 
July 13,” The Times, July 14, 1885, 6; “House Of Commons, Tuesday, Sept. 7,” The Times, September 8, 
1886, 6; “Parliamentary Intelligence,” The Times, September 11, 1886, 6. 
40 Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, 303-304. 
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constitution” was re-written, as politicians searched for means to widen the tax-base in 
order to meet revenue demands.41 In this context, married women’s property rights and 
their implications for husbands and wives tax obligations gained renewed attention.  
During the 1890s, MPs in Parliament continued to draw on existing arguments to 
argue that married women should be taxed separately from their husbands. In 1894, 
Conservative MPs Walter Goldsworthy (Hammersmith) and Charles Darling (Deptford, 
eventually Baron Darling and a High Court Judge) articulated a version of the “tax on 
marriage” argument when they drew attention to the “great hardship” felt by married men 
and women teachers whose incomes were jointly assessed for income tax even though 
their individual salaries would not have qualified for taxation.42 (Their support highlights 
again how MPs support for women’s rights did not necessarily divide along clear lines. 
Two years prior, Goldsworthy had voted in favor of the 1892 Women’s Franchise Bill, 
which Darling opposed.43) 
The Exchequer supported a reform that would address the issue of married 
teacher’s salaries but persistent concerns about evasion and its impact on revenue 
informed the extent of its support. In Parliament, Chancellor of the Exchequer William 
Harcourt explained that he supported a reform that would allow married teachers to be 
taxed individually because “the case of a schoolmistress, for instance, was that of pure 
                                               
41 Ibid, 304-305. 
42 The suffragist Helen Taylor had complained about the “injustice and anomaly” of married teacher’s 
income tax to the London School Board over a decade before, but the issue did not make headway in 
Parliament until 1894. House of Commons, “The Income Tax” (Hansard, March 30, 1894), HC Deb 30 
March 1894 vol 22 cc1043-59, Hansard (online). 
43 The Debate, 1892, In the House of Commons on Women’s Suffrage (20, Parliament Square: The Central 
National Society for Women’s Suffrage, London, 1892), 60, 65. 
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earnings, the result of the mere exertion and occupation of the wife herself.”44 By 
contrast, he opposed allowing a married woman trader to be taxed independently because 
he could not guarantee she earned income entirely through her own exertions. He 
explained: “... trade must involve some degree of capital. The woman might be a lodging-
house keeper, and yet the purchase of the house might be made by the man.”45 The fact 
that married teachers were not likely to evade income tax because the tax was deducted 
from their salary also likely enabled Harcourt to support the measure, even if he justified 
it on the grounds that a married-woman teacher’s income was easily separated from her 
husband’s.  
The terms of the 1894 Finance Act further illustrate how officials’ concerns about 
evasion shaped the government’s willingness to recognize married women’s claims. The 
Act contained a clause that allowed a married woman’s income to be taxed separately if 
particular conditions were met: the combined household income of husband and wife 
could not exceed £500 and the wife’s income had to be “derived from any profession, 
employment, or vocation chargeable under” Schedules D or E.46 This meant that a 
married woman who earned an income entirely separately from her husband and through 
her own exertions in a profession or other employment could be assessed independently. 
Notably, married women who earned incomes through investments or trade were 
                                               
44 “Income Tax” Hansard Online. HC Deb 23 May 1895 vol 34 cc153-70.  
45 House of Commons, “Application of Income Tax Act” (Hansard, July 8, 1896), HC Deb 08 July 1896 
vol 42 cc1040-5, Hansard (online). 
46 The limit was set at £500 to parallel other adjustments in the tax code made in the same Act. Income 
under £160 was exempt from tax. Incomes between £160-£400 were entitled to a £160 abatement and 
incomes between £400- £500 were granted a £100 abatement. William Lawson, “The Liability of Women 
to Income Tax,” Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 1894-1900 X (1899), 434. 
“Married Women and the Income Tax,” Daily News, October 17, 1894. 
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excluded from the provision, reinforcing the extent to which Inland Revenue feared 
married-men traders’ potential evasion.  
The provisions introduced in the 1894 Finance Act did not end calls for reform. 
Mr. George Bartley, Conservative for Islington North continued to call for all women to 
be taxed individually, regardless of how they earned their incomes.47 Over Inland 
Revenue’s opposition, Parliament passed reforms allowing married women traders to be 
taxed independently in 1897. The 1897 Finance Act stated that if a wife derived income 
from a business carried on by her own personal labour and her husband earned income 
from a business through his personal labour, they could be taxed independently. If a 
husband earned income from investments, the wife could not be taxed independently. 
Implicit in this caveat was the assumption that a husband would actually run the business 
but attribute it to his wife so as to reduce his total income from investments and trade.48 
In addition to concerns about fraud and the revenue impact, MPs also began to 
express a third anxiety regarding the potential consequence of tax reform: the creation of 
anomalies. Concerns about anomalies between individuals tax obligations illustrated a 
growing tension between MPs’ acceptance of women’s property rights under the MPWA 
and a commitment to a neutral tax regime that treated all taxpayers objectively and fairly. 
From the perspective of the Exchequer and Inland Revenue, married women’s 
independent tax status posed a threat to the system’s “neutrality” because it raised the 
                                               
47 “The Finance Act And Married Women,” Hansard, February 14, 1895.  
48 Lawson, 434. 
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possibility that families would have different tax obligations despite having similar 
incomes, therefore undermining any claims to fairness.  
For instance, William Harcourt explained his reluctance to expand the principles 
of the 1894 Finance Act because it would “create very much greater anomalies than those 
which at present existed.” He presented an example in which a husband and wife who 
were both engaged in trade would take advantage of the exemption and have their 
incomes assessed separately. The exception, he explained, would give a “great 
advantage” to childless married persons because both spouses could employ themselves 
in trade. This would be unfair to those married with children because the “children would 
necessarily require the care of the wife, so that she would not be able to devote her 
services towards assisting the husband in the shop.” Furthermore, if his wife died the 
shopkeeper would be left a widower. At the moment he would need to employ a person 
to look after his children, his income tax “would be raised.” Consequently, Harcourt 
asserted, the clause actually increased a widower’s tax burdens because after having 
advantage of the exemption in “his wife's lifetime” it would not “would not be extended 
to him in his new position.”49 While Harcourt’s logic rested on a very specific theoretical 
example, it does illustrate officials’ public commitment to upholding a neutral tax system. 
Exemptions that recognized married women’s independent incomes inherently 
undermined this public commitment because they raised the possibility that men 
taxpayers could have disparate tax obligations. In addition to these social anomalies, 
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Harcourt added, “his advisers at the Inland Revenue assured him that the effect of  the 
Amendment would be to create a very large deficit.”50  
By the conclusion of the nineteenth century, the basic outline of the debate over 
how the Married Women’s Property Acts affected husbands and wives’ tax obligations 
under the 1842 Income Tax Act was well established. Britons were aware of the uneven 
financial burdens the income tax placed on husbands and wives. Reformers argued that 
the law was unjust because it violated women’s property rights, unduly burdened 
husbands, and penalized the married. Inland Revenue was also cognizant of the legal 
ambiguities between the two Acts, but its concerns about losing revenue or creating 
anomalies by disrupting the status quo meant it remained committed to the existing 
household income tax model. These concerns existed as a slow-burning debate in the 
press, in Parliament, and Inland Revenue until the Edwardian-era, when David Lloyd 
George’s “People’s Budget” introduced a new round of political controversy.  
 
The 1909 Budget and the Super-Tax 
The introduction of a graduated income tax in David Lloyd George’s 1909 
“People’s Budget” returned the MWPA to the forefront of political debate.51 The Budget 
provided suffragists with an opportunity to politicize the income tax in order to draw 
attention to women’s continued disenfranchisement and the state’s violation of married 
women’s property rights. Debates over the new Super-Tax also shaped debates over 
                                               
50 Ibid. 
51 A graduated tax was first introduced on death duties, in 1894. On how graduated death duty taxes “paved 
the way” for Lloyd George’s reforms, see Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, 224-255.  
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spouses’ tax obligations that suffragists capitalized on during the height of the militant 
movement. Chapter 4 will examine suffragists’ use of the MWPA. The remainder of this 
chapter will consider how Parliamentary and public debates over the Super-Tax exposed 
multiple fault-lines between class and gendered economic interests in British society, 
revealed underlying anxieties about husbands’ position under the law, and spurred the 
emergence of a new feminist critique of “wealth.” 
Historians have long recognized the significance of the 1909 Budget, which 
ultimately prompted a constitutional crisis that resulted in the House of Lords’ loss of 
veto and Irish Home Rule.52 To raise revenue for his ambitious plan of social spending 
without alienating married middle and working-class liberal voters, David Lloyd George 
introduced a “Super-Tax” into the Finance Bill.53 Any household with an aggregate 
income over £5,000 was liable to pay “Super-Tax”—an additional tax levied at a rate of 
6d on the pound for all income over £3,000. 
Less recognized is how the mechanisms of assessing the new tax intersected with 
the long-standing question of husbands’ and wives’ tax obligations. While critics had 
argued that the joint assessment of incomes under the 1842 Income Tax Act violated 
married women’s property rights, the fact that the 1842 Act was passed long before the 
MWPA allowed Revenue officials to claim that the 1882 MWPA did not impact the 
income tax laws. Because Super-Tax continued to assess tax on husbands and wives’ 
                                               
52 The classic account is George Dangerfield’s The Strange Death of Liberal England (New York: 
Capricorn Books, 1961). For a contrasting view, that argues Lloyd George’s budget was designed to avoid 
conflict with the Lords see Bruce K. Murray, “The Politics of the ‘People’s Budget,’” The Historical 
Journal 16, no. 3 (1973): 555–70, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638204. 
53 The budget also introduced a system of child allowances— granting a £10 allowance per child under 
sixteen for families with incomes under £500 a year. Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, 364, 367. 
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aggregated incomes, despite being introduced after the MWPA, it constituted a “new and 
unexpected attack upon the rights and property of married women” wrote the suffragist 
and liberal Laura McLaren in the Times.54  
William Joynson-Hicks, the Conservative MP for Manchester, echoed McLaren’s 
point when he called on the government “not to perpetuate the injustice of the Act of 
1842” during Parliamentary debates. He urged the government to recognize that “when 
you are putting on a new tax, you should realize the new conditions of modern society, 
and you should treat these incomes separately instead of jointly.”55 In fulfillment of this 
view, he introduced an amendment that would extend the idea introduced in the 1894 
Finance Act (that husbands and wives earning less than £500 a year could be taxed 
separately) and called for Britain’s tax laws to apply equally to the wealthiest and poorest 
in society—so that all married incomes would be assessed individually.  
In Parliament, opposition to the aggregation of incomes for the purposes of 
assessing Super-Tax emerged from a coalition of Conservative MPs, women’s rights 
supporters, and MPs concerned about men’s position under the law. For instance, 
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William Joynson-Hicks, Frederick George Banbury (Conservative, City of London), and 
Philip Snowden (Labour, Blackburn) upheld a common understanding that the MWPA 
protected a woman’s right to privacy. All three pointed out that since the Married 
Women’s Property Act’s passage, a wife had enjoyed both control over her own property 
and the ability to keep the amount of her property from her husband. During one debate 
Banbury beseeched Parliament to “remember the Married Women’s Property Act.” His 
speech reflected a full commitment to women’s individual privacy with regard to her 
property when he stated:  
For under the Married Women's Property Act [a wife’s] property is her 
own, just as much as the husband's is his own, and if she likes to say, ‘It is 
my property, and I will not allow you to interfere with it,’ what legal 
power has the husband to say, ‘I intend to investigate your property, 
because the Inland Revenue have assessed me at such and such a sum.’56 
 
 In support, Snowden stated that he rarely agreed with Banbury on any matter—Snowden 
was an active champion of women’s suffrage while Banbury was regarded as “one of the 
bitterest enemies of votes for women” —but he fully supported Banbury’s view that the 
MWPA protected a married woman’s property and prevented her husband from gaining 
knowledge about her property.57  
These debates revealed how the principle of the MWPAs had conceptually 
expanded since the Act’s passage. Snowden, for example, espoused the perspective that 
the MPWA had overturned the law of coverture when he argued that reform would show 
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the state’s recognition of married women’s individuality: “that women may belong to 
themselves, that they may own their property, and they may not be in the eyes of the law 
economic ciphers.”58 By 1909, however, supporters also possessed a tangential 
assumption that a married woman’s right to own property guaranteed her a right to 
privacy with regard to her property. They assumed that husbands and wives enjoyed 
access to their separate incomes and rarely, if ever, shared knowledge about their 
personal incomes with their spouse.  
These assumptions —that a married woman enjoyed a right to privacy with regard 
to her personal property—consequently informed anxieties about a husband’s precarious 
legal position for Super-Tax assessments. The Budget required all husbands to report the 
aggregated income of both spouses and held husband’s liable for non-payment of tax. 
Glaringly, the bill offered no way for a husband to learn his wife’s income if she refused 
to share the information with him.  
During the debate, most MPs generally seemed to accept the claim that under the 
MWPA a woman had a right to privacy with regard to her property and could not be 
compelled to share the information with her husband. For instance, the Liberal Unionist 
for St George's, Hanover Square Alfred Lyttleton asked the government to answer how it 
intended to “enforce the obligation upon the husband to return his wife's income” when 
the wife had every right to refuse to share the amount of her income with her husband.59 
Given this assumed privacy, the Super-Tax laws law opened up the possibility that a wife 
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could refuse to share information about her income while leaving her husband legally 
liable for the owed tax. Consequently, questions about a husband’s liability for Super-Tax 
renewed anxieties about men’s unequal legal and financial burdens.  
The debate took a more humorous tone in June 1910, when the Times published 
Shaw’s correspondence with Warren Fisher, the clerk to the Special Commissioner of 
Income Tax, after Shaw had written to him inquiring into how he should report his 
income for purposes of Super-Tax. 60 Shaw explained that his wife had refused to share 
the amount of her income with him. She maintained an entirely separate bank account 
and retained a different solicitor. So long as she continued to refuse to share her income, 
he lacked a means to compel her to disclose the information. As he explained:  
Clearly … it is in the power of the Commissioners to compel my wife to make a 
full disclosure of her income for the purposes of taxation; but equally clearly they 
must not communicate that disclosure to me or to any other person. It seems to me 
under these circumstances that all I can do for you is to tell you who my wife is 
and leave it to you to ascertain her income and make me pay the tax on it. Even 
this you cannot do without a violation of secrecy, as it will be possible for me by a 
simple calculation to ascertain my wife’s income from your demand.”61  
 
In other words, the protections granted to his wife’s property under the Property Acts 
meant the state could not reveal the information to Shaw without violating her rights. 
Perhaps most disconcerting for Britons, then, the contradiction created by the 1882 
MWPA and a household income tax exposed a husband’s legal vulnerabilities. When 
faced with questions about how Inland Revenue would respond if a wife refused to share 
her income, officials provided little reassurance that they possessed a fair response.  
                                               
60 Geoffrey K. Fry, “Fisher, Sir (Norman Fenwick) Warren (1879–1948), Civil Servant.,” Oxford 
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 For example, Sydney Buxton, the Postmaster-General, acknowledged critics’ 
point but downplayed their argument by promising that “these difficulties had not arisen 
in the past, though the husband’s and wife’s incomes were aggregated; and the Inland 
Revenue authorities did not anticipate they would arise in the future.”62 In many ways, 
Buxton’s faith in the system’s efficacy relied on a vague assumption that wives would 
comply with their husbands’ authority and men and women would ultimately comply 
when the state asserted executed its power.  
When asked by MP Earnest Pretyman how Inland Revenue would assess a 
husband whose wife refused to share her income, Buxton explained that Inland Revenue 
would estimate the household income. The husband retained the onus of proof if he 
wanted to contest Inland Revenue’s estimate. 63 As supporters of separate assessment 
recognized, the approach did not address the underlying problem: if a husband had no 
access to his wife’s income, he could not dispute Inland Revenue’s assessment, because 
he could not prove what the actual household income was. This loophole left households 
open to government abuse, because Inland Revenue could arbitrarily assess a household 
for a certain amount of tax as long as a wife refused to divulge her income. If she did 
share her income to avoid an arbitrary tax, her own rights were violated. 
Throughout the debates, MPs’ own conceptions of proper masculinity and social 
obligations continued to shape their understanding of women’s property rights. MPs who 
opposed Super-Tax emphasized a husband’s respect for his wife’s separate property 
                                               
62 “House of Commons. Debate Clause 47. (Super-Tax on Incomes over £5,000).” 
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rights to argue that it was unjust for a husband to pay tax on an income he had no rights 
to. For example, the Conservative MP for Cambridge John Rawlinson explained that his 
experience as a solicitor revealed the extent to which husbands and wives kept their 
incomes separate, saying: “I have been perfectly surprised at the cases laid before me 
during the past year showing the general ignorance of the husband as to the income of the 
wife.” Adding, “I can give cases where the husband has literally gone so far as to refrain 
from asking his wife the amount of her income sooner than give the information in order 
to apply for the exemption” his speech suggested that a constructive masculinity was tied 
to respecting a wife’s right to her separate property.64 Husbands suffered under the law 
because they were silently shouldering a greater economic burden and paying the 
household tax rather than violate their wives’ property rights.  
Supporters of a household Super-Tax, on the other hand, emphasized an 
alternative view of masculinity, tied to a husband’s ability to provide for his family. Mr. 
Curran, the Labour member for Durham, questioned the masculinity of members who 
supported the amendment, when he said that “the members of the Labour party listened 
to the discussion with amusement.” Labour, and implicitly working-class men, “knew 
their wives’ incomes, because themselves supplied them. (Laughter.) It did not enhance 
their respect for rich people to hear that it was not uncommon for a wife to conceal her 
income from her husband.”65 By suggesting that working-class men provided their wives’ 
income, Curran articulated a view of the husband as a provider for his family who 
                                               
64 Ibid. 
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possessed authority over his wife; a household tax was not a problem because the 
husband provided his wife with her income. Implicitly, this challenged the authority and 
masculinity of wealthy husbands, or husbands whose wives provided the majority of the 
household income, and were left legally exposed by their wives’ actions.  
Overall, the legal contradiction made MPs acutely aware that the MWPA 
undercut a husband’s authority over his wife by protecting her property while continuing 
to hold him responsible for the taxes. It left a husband exposed to legal consequences if 
his wife chose not to go along with the behavior the law expected from her.  
As MPs expressed concerns about the ways the Super-Tax could burden 
husbands, the introduction of the Super-Tax spurred the emergence of a new feminist 
critique of how “wealth” was understood. Supporters of women’s rights, of course, had 
been concerned with matters relating to women’s poverty throughout the Victorian era 
and had criticized Britain’s income tax laws since the 1882 MWPA came into effect. The 
introduction of a graduated tax added a new class dimension to this critique because it 
carried implications for the rate of tax applied to a married woman’s income. During the 
nineteenth-century, debates over joint assessment of married couple’s incomes centered 
on incomes in the £100-£200 range because the £160 exemption limit meant the 
aggregation of incomes could determine whether a couple was liable for income tax. 
Once an income exceeded the exception limit, it was taxed at the same rate as all other 
income. The introduction of a graduated tax—intended to ensure the wealthy paid a fair 
share of taxes—spread this tension through the tax system by establishing different tax 
rates for different income levels.  
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Therefore, for feminists, taxing married women’s incomes as part of an effort to 
tax the wealthy ignored married women’s relative poverty. The suffragist Laura McLaren 
articulated this argument when she charged that the Super-Tax “made a new and 
unexpected attack upon the rights and property of married women” in the Times.66 Her 
argument relied on the principle introduced by the MWPA—a woman’s right to 
individual property—as the basis for her broader argument regarding economic inequality 
between sexes. She pointed out that even in wealthy families, women could be very poor: 
a wife’s only income could be her £150 dress allowance, while her husband lived off 
£4,900 a year. Yet under the current proposal, the wife’s allowance would be taxed under 
Super-Tax rates, even though an individual with an income of £150 a year was exempt 
from paying any income tax at all.67 Suffragist Ruth Cavendish Bentinck expressed a 
similar point when she wrote that “the mistake we make is to speak of rich men’s wives 
as ‘rich women’” in the Labour-supporting Daily Herald.68 Because a woman did not 
own the clothes her husband bought (unless they were clearly defined as her separate 
property), it was incorrect to assume a well-dressed woman was wealthy. In reality, the 
wife of a rich man reflected her husband’s wealth: “She is expected to appear in an 
ornamental garb suitable to her husband’s position; it does not follow that she can obtain 
more money to spend on her own pleasures if these happen to be of the unostentatious 
sort that furnish no advertisement to the man who pays for them.”69 Because Britain’s 
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maintenance laws only required a husband to provide his wife with necessaries, spouses 
in marriage did not necessarily share equal access to wealth. 
For activists, then, the Married Women’s Property Acts provided important 
protections that enabled them to develop this feminist critique—a recognition of 
economic inequality within marriage—that exposed how a graduated income tax assessed 
on a household income ignored a dimension of the gendered nature of individual poverty. 
This early critique would gain further strength in the post-war years, as Chapter 5 will 
discuss.  
 
Summary 
The years between 1882-1909 saw the development of multiple, competing 
strands of argument with regard to husbands’ and wives’ respective income tax 
obligations. For Britons who understood that the MWPA had introduced a new 
principle—a married woman’s independence—into law, Britain’s tax code, predicated on 
the law of coverture, demanded reform. They argued that the law inscribed injustice 
between men and women: husbands faced unfair legal and financial burdens because they 
were expected to pay tax on income they did not control; married women’s property 
rights and privacy rights were violated if she shared information about her income with 
her husband for him to pay tax. The law could also penalize married couples because an 
aggregated income could qualify for a higher rate of tax than spouses would individually. 
These critiques challenged the British state’s claims to neutrality because they exposed 
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how the income tax was predicted on the legal assumptions of coverture—that a husband 
and wife formed one unit.  
Despite calls for reform, Inland Revenue and Treasury officials, and some MPs 
effectively avoided any major changes to the tax code by maintaining that the MWPA 
had no impact on the tax laws. Their opposition to these principle arguments was shaped 
by more prosaic concerns: fears about the impact on revenue, the creation of further 
anomalies between taxpayers, and the potential for fraud. 
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Chapter 4. The Possession of Money Means the Possession of Power: The Property 
Acts and the Women’s Tax Resistance League, 1909-1914 
Introduction  
On September 18, 1912, Inland Revenue officials arrested and imprisoned Mark 
Wilks, a London county schoolteacher. His warrant charged him with failure to pay £37 
in income tax and committed him to prison “during the King’s pleasure,” until the debt 
was paid.1 The £37 was the amount of tax owed on the income his wife, Elizabeth Wilks, 
earned through her medical practice in London’s East End. Elizabeth Wilks, a suffragist, 
had refused to pay any taxes for the previous four years as a protest against her 
disenfranchisement. Revenue officials initially tried to secure payment for the unpaid tax 
by distraining furniture from the couple’s home. This effort failed, however, after 
Elizabeth claimed the furniture was her separate property; as separate property, it was 
protected under the 1882 Married Women’s Property Act (MWPA) and could not be 
seized for a debt for which her husband was liable under Britain’s income tax law. In 
response, officials executed a warrant for her husband’s arrest and imprisoned Mark 
Wilks in Brixton Gaol.  
The arrest confirmed many Britons’ anxieties that husbands faced unjust financial 
and legal liabilities under Britain’s tax laws. Under the governing income tax law—the 
1842 Income Tax Act—men, widows, and single women who failed to pay their taxes 
were liable to have property distrained by Inland Revenue and sold at auction as payment 
                                               
1 Mark Wilks, “Unjust Imprisonment of Mark Wilks,” c. September 1912, Scrapbook 10/03, Women’s 
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for the unpaid tax. As discussed in the previous chapter, women and men’s rights 
advocates had argued since the 1882 MWPA’s passage that the clause in the 1842 
Income Tax Act which held husbands liable for the entire household income tax both 
violated married women’s property rights and unjustly burdened men left responsible for 
paying their wives’ taxes without access to their income. This debate persisted as a slow-
burning issue in Parliament—with minor reforms introduced in 1894 and 1897—until the 
late-Edwardian period, when David Lloyd George’s “Super-Tax” and the actions of the 
suffrage society, the Women’s Tax Resistance League (WTRL), brought renewed 
attention to the legal contradiction. 
Wilks’ imprisonment marked the culmination of a campaign spearheaded by the 
Women’s Tax Resistance League to protest the contradictory laws governing husbands’ 
and wives’ tax obligations in Edwardian Britain and claim women’s rights under the 
Married Women’s Property Acts. The WTRL, which formed in 1909, directed the tax 
resistance campaign until its suspension at the outbreak of World War I. During this time, 
the League effectively exploited the legal contradiction between the 1842 Income Tax 
Act and the 1882 MWPA to advance their primary cause—women’s enfranchisement—
by demonstrating the consequences husbands could face when the conflicting laws were 
enforced. 
This chapter resuscitates the WTRL’s role in the Edwardian suffrage movement. 
Thus far, the WTRL has been obscured by historians’ attention to the larger and better-
known suffrage organizations: Millicent Garrett Fawcett’s constitutionalist National 
Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS); Emmeline Pankhurst’s militant 
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Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU); and the Women’s Freedom League 
(WFL), headed by Charlotte Despard after a contingent of suffragettes broke away from 
the more autocratic WSPU.2 For instance, Jill Liddington asserts that the WTRL never 
achieved the inspirational clout of the WSPU or WFL due to its relatively small size, and 
that its significance was therefore mostly symbolic.3 Indeed, in 1912 the WTRL had 550 
members and associates.4 Out of these women, the official League history recorded 212 
women tax resisters who participated in the protest between 1910 and 1914.5 By contrast, 
the NUWSS boasted 50,000 members in 1914.6 Dismissing the WTRL’s influence on 
account of its size, however, ignores the League’s role in advancing a debate about 
husbands’ and wives’ tax obligations under the Married Women’s Property Acts that 
compelled the government to make concessions to suffragists in the 1914 Finance Act. 
As Chapter 5 will discuss, the WTRL’s critique was taken up in the post-war years by 
other women’s societies, including the National Union for Societies of Equal Citizenship 
(the NUWSS’s successor), the National Council of Women, and the Women’s Freedom 
League.  
                                               
2 For existing scholarship on the WTRL see Hillary Frances, “‘Pay the Piper, Call the Tune!’: The 
Women’s Tax Resistance League,” in The Women’s Suffrage Movement: New Feminist Perspectives, ed. 
Maroula Joannou and June Purvis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 65-76; Crawford, The 
Women’s Suffrage Movement, 672-673; and Laura E. Nym Mayhall, The Militant Suffrage Movement: 
Citizenship and Resistance in Britain, 1860-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 59-60.  
3 Jill Liddingon, Vanishing for the Vote: Suffrage, Citizenship and the Battle for the Census (New York, 
NY: Manchester University Press, 2014), 69-70. 
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5 Margaret Kineton Parkes, The Tax Resistance Movement in Great Britain; A Brief History of the Women’s 
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Although historians have long recognized suffragists’ participation in the late-
Victorian campaign to reform the property laws, they have given far less attention to the 
meaning suffragists attached to married women’s property rights after the Acts’ passages. 
This is surprising given the Property Acts’ prominent position in leading suffragists’ 
early political careers. For instance, many suffragists, including Emmeline Pankhurst and 
her husband, Richard, served as members of the Committee to Reform the Property Laws 
Relating to Married Women after the 1870 Act’s passage. Furthermore, historians 
frequently reference an anecdote from Millicent Garrett Fawcett’s memoir that recounts 
her surprised reaction upon hearing in court that her purse, which had been nabbed by a 
pickpocket, was listed as the stolen property of her husband, Mr. Henry Garrett Fawcett.7 
Scholars have used this story to suggest that Fawcett’s experience awakened her to her 
legal invisibility and inspired her to join the suffrage movement. Yet, despite suffragists’ 
stated awareness of the property laws as they related to married women and their 
involvement in the campaign to reform the law, scant attention has been paid to how 
suffragists asserted their new rights following the Acts’ passage. 
Not only were suffragists aware of the MWPA, as this chapter shows, the 1882 
Married Women’s Property Act formed a cornerstone of the League’s tax resistance 
strategy. The WTRL continued to lay claim to the principle of the 1882 MWPA—a 
married woman’s independence and right to privacy with regard to her property—when it 
advised women to refuse to share information about their incomes with their husbands or 
Revenue officials to protest both women’s disenfranchisement and Britain’s tax laws.  
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Ultimately, the WTRL unleashed a debate that exposed a continuing tension 
between Victorian ideals regarding a husband’s authority over his wife and married 
women’s established claims to property rights under the MWPA. As Chapter 1 discussed, 
many MPs supported the Property Acts' passage, confident that the statutes would reform 
the behavior of the violent and frequently-drunk husbands amongst England’s poor 
without jeopardizing the domestic harmony that characterized the idealized middle-class 
and upper-class home.8 The WTRL’s campaign showed, however, that a husband and 
wife could have conflicting interests and that a husband could face legal consequences if 
his wife chose to assert her rights. The ensuing public outcry illustrated a deep ambiguity 
between Britons’ acceptance of women’s property rights and their misgivings that these 
rights imperiled husbands’ positions within their households. Outrage over husbands’ 
liabilities for their wives’ taxes never contested a wife’s right to privacy with regard to 
her property. Instead, it called attention to the “absurdity” that husbands continued to be 
responsible for their wives’ taxes. While historians have asserted that separate spheres 
ideology began to wane by the end of the nineteenth century, the tax resistance campaign 
revealed how these ideals did not naturally fade, but were instead subject to sharp 
contestation into the twentieth century.9 By exposing the extent to which middle- and 
upper-class women could exploit their husbands’ precarious legal positions to protest 
their own disenfranchisement, the WTRL effectively challenged prevailing ideals 
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regarding a husband’s authority over his wife and, by extension, the state’s authority over 
its subjects. 
 
Women’s Tax Resistance League Forms 
The Women’s Tax Resistance League emerged from a meeting held at the home 
of Louisa Garrett Anderson on 22 October 1909. Anderson was the daughter of Elizabeth 
Garrett Anderson, Britain’s first female doctor, and the niece of Millicent Garrett 
Fawcett.10 By the turn of the century, suffragettes began to explore tax resistance as one 
tactic within a wider militant campaign.11 Dora Montefiore refused to pay taxes in 1904 
and 1905. The WSPU called for members to resist paying taxes in November 1907, and 
the WFL echoed the call shortly after.12 The meeting at Garrett-Anderson’s house was a 
response to this growing interest. After a brief discussion, attendees pledged financial 
support to establish the League as an independent suffrage society committed to tax 
resistance.13 
The decision to remain an independent, non-party society enabled the WTRL to 
attract supporters from both the constitutional and militant wings of the suffrage 
movement. Mrs. Margaret Kineton Parkes left her position with the WFL to become 
                                               
10 Jennian Geddes, Anderson, Louisa Garrett (1873–1943), Surgeon and Suffragette (Oxford University 
Press, 2015), https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-
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12 Mayhall, 60; Parkes, 3.  
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Tax Resistance League, Vol. 1, 1909-1913, Records of the Women’s Tax Resistance League, 2WTR/1, 
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WTRL secretary.14 She remained League secretary throughout its existence and travelled 
all over Britain to speak to other suffrage societies about the tax resistance effort.15 
Siblings Clemence and Laurence Housman were affiliated with the WTRL, the WSPU, 
and the Suffrage Atelier.16 Suffragists affiliated with the NUWSS also joined the WTRL 
and framed their actions as a constitutionalist protest.17 For example, Mrs. Fyffe, a 
committee member of the WTRL and NUWSS, explained that she “adopted tax 
resistance as a method of making a dignified and constitutional protest.”18 Although the 
WTRL remained closely associated with the non-violent WFL, tax resisters also retained 
memberships in The New Constitutional Society for Women’s Suffrage, the Conservative 
and Unionist Women’s Franchise League, The Free Church League, the Catholic 
Women’s Suffrage Society, The Church League for Women’s Suffrage, the Actresses’ 
Franchise League, the Artists’ Franchise League, and the Women Writers’ Franchise 
League.19 Overall, their participation in these overlapping networks defies a neat 
distinction between militancy and constitutionalism. The WTRL did not consider its 
                                               
14 Margaret Wynne Nevinson, “Five Years’ Struggle for Freedom: A History of the Suffrage Movement 
from 1908 to 1912” (Women’s Freedom League, c. 1912), Women’s Freedom League Pamphlets, Vol 1., 
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campaign to be a form of militancy. Instead, the League framed tax resistance as 
“actively passive,” which meant they employed “passivity to produce a deadlock.”20  
While drawing support across suffragist networks, the WTRL’s membership was 
in many ways exceptional. The existing tax laws established a minimum income 
threshold for participation. Resisters also required the financial means or property to 
afford the costs associated with resistance. Although some lower-income women did 
participate by refusing to pay license fees, League members tended to be financially 
independent.21 Furthermore, women who could refuse to pay income tax constituted a 
very small proportion of the population. In 1913, about 1,130,000 Britons out of a 
population of 42,582,300 were liable for income tax.22 Women, particularly married 
women, who had incomes greater than the exemption limit, £160, therefore represented a 
very small group.  
Consequently, the League’s leadership—dominated by professional, middle-, and 
upper-class women—reflected the narrow pool of women for whom questions of taxation 
were relevant. In addition to Dr. Garrett-Anderson and Dr. Elizabeth Wilks, who served 
as honorary treasurer, other women medical doctors who served as WTRL committee 
members included: Mrs. Kate Haslam, MD, Dr. Winifred Patch, and Dr. Jessie Murray. 
The painter Mrs. Mary Sargant Florence was one of the League’s founders and designed 
                                               
20 Although some WTRL members participated in militancy, I refer to WTRL members as “suffragists” 
because that is the term they used themselves and because they framed and understood their actions as 
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21 Crawford, “Women’s Tax Resistance League,” in The Women’s Suffrage Movement, 672. 
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the WTRL badge and banner.23 Ethel Ayres Purdie, who joined the London Association 
of Accountants in 1909 as Britain’s first chartered female accountant, provided the 
League with critical legal expertise. She ran her own accounting business, the “Woman 
Taxpayer’s Agency,” and since 1907 had audited the WFL and other suffrage 
organizations, including the International Women’s Suffrage Association.24 The 
participation of well-known, upper-class women such as the Duchess of Bedford and the 
Lady Princess Sophia Dunleep Singh also helped grant legitimacy and respectability to 
the cause.25 Given the WTRL leadership’s economically exclusive and socially elite 
character, the controversy its campaign generated illustrated how effectively it tapped 
into broader social anxieties about Britain’s gender order.  
The Women’s Tax Resistance League had two aims. First and foremost, it argued 
that taxation guaranteed individuals the right to political representation under the British 
constitution.26 Margaret Kineton Parkes, for instance, explained that the “law clearly said 
that whoever paid taxes must be represented.” Tax resistance illustrated women’s 
realization that “the possession of money meant the possession of power” and “the power 
                                               
23 Florence also designed the WFL banner, “Dare to be Free.” Crawford, “Florence, Mary Sargant Mrs. 
(1858-1954), 223-224. 
24 For Purdie’s exchange with the I.W.S.A see I.W.S.A. Headquarters Correspondence Files, File: P and Q.  
GB 133 IWSA/2/25, John Rylands Library.  
25 “Duchess of Bedford’s Cup Sold,” The Times, May 2, 1913, 8. “Princess Sophia Dunleep Singh’s 
Jewels,” The Times, January 27, 1914, 4.  
26 Of course, this view had enormous precedent. For example, in 1852 Charles Babbage, a professor at 
Cambridge and founder of the Statistical Society, calculated that 850,000 out of one million voters had 
incomes below the income tax threshold. This induced Gladstone, in 1853, to lower the exemption rate 
from £150 to £100, allowing incomes between £100 and £150 to pay lower rates. The £100 marked the 
division between the “educated and labouring” and the voter and non-voter. Because the franchise was 
based on a £10 household qualification he estimated that this required £96 a year to qualify for the vote. 
Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, 150, 152. 
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to refuse to pay taxes” until they were granted Parliamentary representation.27 League 
members also consciously placed their resistance efforts within a historical narrative that 
celebrated tax resistance as a moral and constitutional response to government tyranny by 
celebrating their “spiritual kinship” with the “great constitutional reformer” John 
Hampden.28 Hampden had refused to pay taxes for ship money to protest Charles I’s 
levying of taxes without Parliamentary consent—the contest between the king and 
Parliament over who possessed the right to levy tax eventually sparked the English Civil 
War. Women’s tax resistance, therefore, upheld the foundational principles of the 
constitution and English liberty. The League’s “black list” of imperial taxes (taxes levied 
by Parliament) that women could refuse to pay in order to resist government tyranny 
included: income tax, property tax, inhabited house duty, taxes on male servants and 
armorial bearings, and dog-, carriage-, motor-car, and gun licenses.29  
Because a woman’s marital status determined how the government assessed her 
tax obligations, the ways in which a suffragist could practice tax resistance depended on 
both the forms of property she owned and her marital status.30 For example, Inland 
Revenue collected tax from “unearned income”—income derived from investments and 
stocks— “at the source,” meaning tax was deducted before an individual received 
                                               
27 “No Vote, No Taxes,” Bristol Daily Press, November 10, 1910, Scrapbook of Press Cuttings relating to 
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payment. Taxation at the source made it impossible for a woman to resist tax on unearned 
income. Therefore, League literature advised all women with income classified as 
“unearned income” to transfer their stocks to foreign securities to prevent Inland Revenue 
from collecting the tax. An unnamed foreign suffrage society, in collaboration with the 
WTRL, agreed to act as agent and promised to collect and remit interest payments back 
to the suffragists as they came due.31  
Unmarried or widowed women possessed the same economic rights and liabilities 
as men. These suffragists could directly register their resistance by refusing to pay taxes. 
Those who refused to pay property tax, income tax, or inhabited-house duty could have 
property distrained and sold as payment. If they lacked property, they were liable to go to 
jail.  
Married women, on the other hand, did not directly pay taxes. Their husbands 
were responsible for submitting the tax forms and paying the aggregate tax. As a second 
aim, therefore, the WTRL intended for its campaign to highlight how Britain’s income 
tax laws violated married woman’s rights under the 1882 MWPA in order to secure 
reforms recognizing married women’s individual tax status.  
To this end, the League advised all married women to protest the contradictory 
laws and assert their rights under the MWPA by refusing to divulge the amount of their 
separate incomes to their husbands and Revenue officials. One pamphlet explained that 
“[Women] should resolve to keep the amount of their separate income an inviolable 
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secret from the Revenue authorities, and also from their husbands, which, under the 
Married Women’s Property Act of 1882, they are now able and entitled to do, just as a 
man need not disclose his income to his wife (and we know that many of them never 
do.)”32 In other words, a married woman’s right to her separate property under the 1882 
Act ensured a wife’s income remained private. As George Bernard Shaw had pointed out 
in his correspondence with the clerk to the Special Commissioner of Income Tax, Warren 
Fischer, contemporaneously published in the Times (Chapter 3), the protections afforded 
to married women’s separate property under the 1882 Property Act meant that if a wife 
refused to reveal her income, her husband lacked any legal means to ascertain the 
amount. By implication, it also meant the state lacked any means to learn a wife’s income 
so long as it insisted on obtaining the information from the husband. The state, however, 
still considered the husband liable for the total tax owed.  
Here, married women’s property rights functioned as a linchpin in the League’s 
broader strategy. The WTRL maintained that “no married woman is liable for any” direct 
taxes, including “Super Tax, Income Tax, Property Tax and Inhabited House Duty,” and 
it was “illegal to demand payment from her, to enforce or attempt to enforce payment, or 
even to ask her to furnish particulars of her property or income.”33 By asserting married 
women’s property rights, the WTRL drew attention to the very legal contradiction it 
wanted resolved: that there was “a marked conflict between the spirit of the Act of 
1842”—passed at a time when a wife could have no income and no property—“and the 
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spirit of the Married Women’s Property Act of 1882 (which gives her both).”34 If married 
women refused to divulge their incomes to their husbands, who remained liable for the 
tax, the League “fully anticipated that … it will involve the Revenue authorities in 
remarkable complications, and will most probably lead to the status of married women 
being raised above that of infants, lunatics, &c.”35 
Of course, suffragists had undertaken individual tax resistance efforts to protest 
their disenfranchisement since the 1870s. Historians frequently cite the efforts of Anne 
and Mary Priestman, who first refused to pay taxes in 1870 and 1871 only to have their 
taxes paid anonymously. (They subsequently abandoned the effort.) Charlotte Babb and 
Rose Anne Hall called for tax resistance campaigns in 1871 and 1872. Miss Henrietta 
Müller (sister of suffragist Eva McLaren) refused to pay taxes in 1884.36 These women, 
however, were all single and could more directly refuse to pay tax.  
A more analogous precedent for the WTRL’s campaign to reform married 
women’s tax obligations lay in a dispute over a married woman’s eligibility under the 
1870 MWPA to participate as a member on the boards of Guardians. At the time, the 
editors of the Englishwoman’s Review saw the situation as a “test case” for determining 
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who was the legal occupant of a premises, but it also provided the first instance 
illustrating the potential consequences of a married woman’s refusal to cooperate with tax 
collection.37  
Before her marriage, a Mrs. Shearer, née Downing, leased premises at 126 
Hemingford Road. As a single-woman ratepayer, she sat as an elected Guardian for St. 
Mary’s Parish in Islington, London. When she married Mr. J. R. Shearer, the premises 
(where the couple continued to live) along with other furniture were settled upon Mrs. 
Shearer as “her own absolute property, under the Married Women’s Property Act 
1870.”38 After the marriage, the local vestry clerk removed “Miss Downing” from the list 
of rate-payers, replacing her name with her husbands’, Mr. J. R. Shearer. Consequently, 
at the next Guardians election Mrs. Shearer was disqualified because she no longer 
appeared on the list of rate-payers. She took her case before the Local Government 
Board, who elevated the question for the consideration of the Law Officers of the 
Crown.39  
 The case anticipated questions regarding spouses’ tax liabilities because, as her 
case was pending before the Local Government Board, Mrs. Shearer made a further effort 
to establish herself as the rate-payer at the couple’s home. She offered to pay the owed 
taxes on the condition that she “receive a receipt in her own name.”40 (She never 
explained her strategy, but her insistence on a receipt likely arose from her desire to 
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establish that she was a ratepayer and therefore eligible to remain a Guardian.) Officials, 
however, refused her offer. Instead, her husband received a summons to appear before 
one of the Justices for the county of Middlesex, for “non-payment of rates, levied on 126 
Hemingford Road the previous January.” The Englishwoman’s Review explained that if 
Mrs. Shearer was deemed the rate-payer, the summons against her husband would be 
withdrawn. If Mr. Shearer was held liable for the outstanding rates, then the case would 
go before a local magistrate. Significantly, the paper explained, “a magistrate will be 
asked to commit him to prison, and should the magistrate feel bound by the rather 
stringent terms of the local Act, Mr. Shearer must be so committed.”41 While the outcome 
of the case is not clear, Mrs. Shearer’s actions showed the potential consequences a 
husband could face if she refused to abide by authorities’ demands. The Women’s Tax 
Resistance League exploited these same contradictions as it commenced its own 
campaign in 1910.  
The campaign took shape at a moment when both tax resistance and taxation were 
already subject to sharp political debate. The 1902 Education Act, the payment of MPs, 
and the 1910 Budget Debate ensured the dual issues of tax resistance and women’s 
property rights were at the forefront of the public’s attention when the League announced 
its own campaign in the wake of the failed 1910 Conciliation Bill.  
The 1902 Education Act had established a national system of secondary 
education, replaced the local school boards established in 1870 with Local Education 
Authorities, and, most controversially, allowed denominational schools to be supported 
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through rates.42 Nonconformists opposed the use of rates to support Catholic and 
Anglican schools and organized a passive resistance effort in which they refused to pay 
education rates until the law was repealed.43 Resistance persisted until 1914.44 Indeed, on 
at least one occasion, education-rate and suffragist tax resisters’ goods were put up for 
auction alongside each other.45 At these moments, the WTRL was quick to draw attention 
to the disparate treatment that education- and suffragist tax resisters received. For 
instance, after Clemence Housman’s arrest for non-payment of inhabited house duty, the 
Men’s League for Women’s Suffrage (MLWS) made sure to point out that many people 
who condemned resistance in the matter of women’s suffrage had adopted their own 
methods of passive resistance to protest the Education Rates.46  
The announcement that MPs would be paid salaries exacerbated suffragists’ 
resentment that their taxes were paying politicians who refused to allow women a voice 
in determining how the money would be used. For those sympathetic to the WTRL’s 
cause, the announcement seemed to strengthen suffragists’ moral claims. At a drawing 
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room meeting in Knightsbridge, for instance, the speaker “Mrs. Cecil Chapman reminded 
her audience that Mr. Sydney Buxton and others in the House of Commons, who were 
deserting the women in their hour of need, were really paid for their services there by the 
women taxpayers, and for that reason alone women ought to now refuse to pay their share 
of their salaries.”47 The Englishwoman, which regarded the case for women’s suffrage as 
“already strong,” predicted that for “many naturally quiet and law-abiding women,” the 
payment of MPs “will be the last straw—the one insult too much—to bear.”48 
These complaints developed as Parliamentary debates over the budget continued. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1909 “People’s Budget” had raised the question 
of how married women’s incomes were assessed under the new “Super-Tax.” The same 
questions carried into 1910, partly because the resulting constitutional crisis had 
prevented the state from collecting revenue the previous year.  
The 1910 Budget debates provided suffragists with yet another opportunity to 
argue that the combined taxation of husbands and wives violated married women’s 
property rights under the 1882 MWPA. Both Ethel Purdie and Charlotte Despard 
published open letters to David Lloyd George calling attention to the matter. In 
Parliament, Leonard Hobhouse had agreed that married women’s tax position was 
“anomalous” and would have to be dealt with eventually, but he opposed any change at 
the moment because it would “mean a loss of £1,500,000 to the Exchequer.”49 In 
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response, Purdie wrote to David Lloyd George (the letter was published in the Common 
Cause) asking him to “[address] this matter by immediately refunding to married women 
all the tax which has been illegally charged upon them and deducted from their incomes 
for some 28 years past.” In contrast to the cost to reform the tax laws, she estimated that 
refunding married women their money would “probably amount to about £100,000,000 
on a very modest and conservative estimate.”50 Despard’s letter echoed a similar rhetoric. 
She wrote asking David Lloyd George to meet with a WFL delegation who found 
themselves “seriously aggrieved by the present administration of the Inland Revenue 
Department.” The members’ general grievance was that they continued to be taxed 
without receiving political representation, but they also had two specific “injustices” they 
wanted addressed: the new land taxes assessed on women landowners and the income tax 
levied on married women. “[I]t is our contention that at present a married woman is 
subjected to grave injustice by the inclusion of her earnings or income as that of her 
husband, with the consequent payment of tax upon a larger sum and at a higher rate, and, 
further, that this procedure on the part of the Inland Revenue officials can be proved to be 
absolutely illegal,” she wrote. They asked for a meeting where they could lay their case 
before Lloyd George and present “documents which prove definite breaches of the 
Married Women’s Property Act and of the Income Tax Act.”51 
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About three weeks after the Times published Despard’s letter, the 1910 
Conciliation Bill provided the impetus for the WTRL to launch its campaign: if the bill 
failed, WTRL supporters would commit to non-payment of imperial taxes the following 
year.  
 
Mark Wilks’ Arrest and a Husband’s Authority 
The press’s initial response to the WTRL’s campaign was characterized by a 
sense of curious anticipation about the League and its methods. The Financial News 
described League members as “a number of clever and determined women” whose 
confrontation with the government was “proving a source of considerable 
embarrassment.”52 One correspondent expressed his “irrepressible admiration for the 
[members’] boundless and unfailing pluck,” adding that “as a rule, a British 
Government’s answer to a strong argument is the application of brute force to compel 
silence. But these ladies are not to be ‘squelched’ even by the official bludgeon.”53 
Soon, however, the press seized on the potential consequences a husband could 
face if his wife joined the tax resistance effort. Journalists recognized that the WTRL’s 
argument extended beyond the divisive issue of suffrage because it challenged a 
husband’s idealized role as breadwinner and source of domestic authority in his family. 
In articles responding to the WTRL, the husband who earned less income than his wife 
emerged as the object of concern. As the Dundee Currier noted, there were many 
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examples of married couples in which the wife was “a woman of means and the husband 
is, financially speaking, a man of straw.” In these families, a husband relied on the 
presence of a “docile wife” who sat with him while he filled in the income tax form “with 
her assistance, pays, and there’s an end [to it].”54 A husband’s presumed authority 
remained intact so long as his wife remained compliant. “[I]f the wife is strong-minded 
and has views” the paper continued, “she may refuse to tell him” anything about her 
income, leaving her husband no choice but to return the “form with a polite intimation 
that he has no income, and that his wife is standing upon her legal rights and refusing to 
divulge hers."55 Vignettes like these exposed a tension between a husband’s idealized 
place in the home—as a patriarchal authority figure whose labor provided for his 
family—and families’ disparate financial realities. Most troubling, a husband’s presumed 
authority within the household had little legal backing.  
The fact that the state could penalize a husband for non-payment of taxes on 
income to which he had no claim sparked a wider debate about the state’s abuse of its 
power that cut across established pro- and anti-suffrage divisions. The Leicester Mail 
noted that “many who have no real sympathy with woman’s suffrage will share the 
feeling that it is a gross injustice to punish a man for not complying with an abstract 
demand or paying taxes on property which is no more his own than is the property of his 
next-door neighbor.”56 Papers that did not support women’s suffrage or remained 
skeptical about militancy acknowledged the power of the WTRL’s argument and 
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expressed concern about its implications. The Queen: The Lady’s Newspaper “set aside” 
the League’s “ulterior motives”—women’s suffrage—but agreed that “if the present 
agitation leads to nothing else but the regularization of the law governing income tax… it 
will have resulted in considerable good.”57 An article in the Looking Glass, while 
assuring its reader of its disapproval “of the suffragette, her claims and her methods,” 
expressed “admiration” for the WTRL’s “astuteness” after receiving a copy of Ethel 
Purdie’s pamphlet, “Married Women and Tax Resistance.” If Purdie’s claims were 
correct, the author predicted, “Mr. Lloyd George is in for a bad time.”58 
As the WTRL built its case in the press, it also pursued legal cases whose 
outcomes reinforced the League’s claims that married women could not be held liable for 
taxes. In November 1912, Ethel Purdie successfully argued a case on behalf of Alice 
Burns, a Medical Inspector for Durham County, before the Durham Commissioners of 
Taxes. Burns, originally from New Zealand, had moved to England around 1902 to study 
medicine and then remained in the country, working as a medical doctor. The case rested 
on the commissioners’ interpretation of what constituted “living together” for the 
purposes of taxation. Clause 45 of the Income Tax Act stated that if a husband and wife 
were living together, the husband was responsible for paying the tax; if they were 
separated, each was responsible for paying income tax. The Crown representative argued 
that the Burnses were separated and Alice should therefore pay taxes. Purdie argued that 
Alice should be exempt from paying taxes because she and her husband should still be 
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considered to be “living together.” Purdie contended that the “separation” contingency 
referred to married couples who obtained a legal separation order, not married couples 
who were physically separated. The Burnses, while living in different countries, were not 
legally separated, and therefore, Alice was not responsible for paying the tax. The 
commissioners ruled in Purdie’s favor. At the same time, Inland Revenue could not 
collect the tax from her husband, who lived in New Zealand and remained outside its 
jurisdiction. The ruling, therefore, seemed to confirm that liability for income tax 
remained with a husband, and the state had few means to collect income tax from married 
women if they refused to cooperate.59 
Britons’ anxieties about husbands’ legal liabilities were subsequently realized 
when Inland Revenue arrested Mark Wilks. Wilks’s arrest marked the culmination of a 
four-year long tax resistance effort by his wife, Elizabeth Wilks. Elizabeth Wilks was 
honorary treasurer of the Women’s Tax Resistance League and a medical doctor with a 
practice in Hackney. Inland Revenue’s initial response to Elizabeth’s protest showed a 
typical ambivalence with regard to the government’s observance of women’s claims 
under the law. Initially, the government sent a tax assessment to Elizabeth Wilks. She 
refused to pay taxes in 1908 and 1909, writing “taxation without representation is 
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tyranny” across the form.60 In response, Revenue officials seized her dining room 
furniture, a sideboard, and a piano. 
By 1910, the WTRL had developed its strategy with regard to married women’s 
tax resistance and began to develop the Wilks’s effort as an exemplary case supporting its 
argument. Importantly, the Wilks’s financial situation aligned with Britons’ expressed 
concerns about men with wives who earned more income and chose to assert their rights 
under the MWPA. As a schoolteacher, Mark earned an income around £150 a year. By 
contrast, Inland Revenue estimated Elizabeth earned £700 a year through her medical 
practice.61 The same year, Revenue officials gave up their effort to collect tax from 
Elizabeth and informed Mark he would be held liable for both his and his wife’s taxes.62 
Mark paid the amount due on his income but claimed it was impossible for him to pay his 
wife’s taxes of £37: firstly, because she refused to tell him her income; secondly, 
because, as a teacher with an income considerably lower than his wife’s, he could not 
afford to pay the amount assessed.  
When officials returned to the Wilks’s residence to distrain another dining room 
set as payment for the outstanding tax, Elizabeth Wilks claimed the furniture as part of 
her separate property under the 1882 MWPA. She owned the house and furniture, 
meaning that under the Act the property could not be seized to pay a debt for which her 
husband was liable, even if those debts were taxes owed on her income. Inland Revenue 
relented. Importantly, however, in recognizing Elizabeth Wilks’ rights under the MWPA, 
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Inland Revenue officials also appeared to concede to her interpretation of the tax law—a 
point that reinforced the public’s perception that officials overreached by arresting Mark 
Wilks.  
By 1912 the situation had reached an impasse. In a May interview with The 
Standard, Elizabeth Wilks explained that the outstanding tax “could only be recovered 
(by reason of an anomaly in the Married Women’s Property Act) by the imprisonment of 
her husband. But as yet the authorities had not resorted to this step.”63 In September, 
unable to secure payment for another year’s incomplete taxes, Inland Revenue obtained a 
warrant for Mark Wilks’s arrest. They first tried to arrest him on September 3, but 
refrained because he had a bad cold. Officials formally arrested him on September 18.  
For the Women’s Tax Resistance League, Wilks’s arrest ensured welcome 
controversy and supported the League’s contention that married women possessed no 
liability under Britain’s income tax laws. The fact that Mark earned less income than his 
wife but could be imprisoned for her refusal to pay income tax realized the scenario 
painted by the press—that a “woman of means: could stand “upon her legal rights” and 
leave her husband to face the consequences for her unpaid tax.64 On the day of his arrest, 
the WTRL’s Urgency Committee, which had been organized in anticipation of Wilks’s 
coming arrest, finalized plans for a publicity campaign intended to bring attention to “the 
Wilks’ case.” They mailed 600 letters to WTRL members and other suffrage societies 
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notifying them of the League’s plans and organized multiple events to raise awareness of 
the unjust laws that led to Wilks’s arrest.65 The WTRL, in conjunction with the Men’s 
League for Women’s Suffrage (Mark Wilks was a member), the WFL, and the WSPU, 
organized large public demonstrations to protest the arrest and lobbied MPs to help 
secure Mark’s release. The Men’s League hosted nightly meetings outside the jail.66 
Public meetings were held in Trafalgar Square and Hyde Park. Other events included a 
Saturday meeting co-hosted with the Women’s Freedom League and a planned public 
procession to Brixton Prison followed by a demonstration on September 23. Three days 
later, the playwright George Bernard Shaw gave the keynote speech at a public meeting 
held at Caxton Hall. 
As Mark Wilks sat in Brixton Gaol, his supporters lost no time reinforcing the 
universal implications of his arrest: under the current tax law, any man with a wealthy 
wife could suffer the same fate if his wife refused to pay taxes. Elizabeth Wilks’s sister, 
Mrs. Charles Stansfield, pointed out that “every man who is married to a woman with an 
income of her own is in [Wilks’s] position, and if he cannot pay his wife’s taxes he is 
liable to imprisonment. It seems to place an enormous weapon in the hand of rich 
wives.”67 Israel Zangwill, a fellow member of the MLWS and supporter of the WFL, 
reinforced the point when he warned that the Wilks case showed “marrying an heiress 
may be the ruin of a man."68 
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In his speech at Caxton Hall, George Bernard Shaw connected Wilks’s experience 
to his own previous exchange with Inland Revenue regarding his difficulties paying 
Super-Tax. For Shaw, both experiences exemplified the ways husbands had become 
victims under the law. As things stood, “from the unfortunate Prime Minister downwards 
no man was safe.”69 He agreed that the MWPA marked an important reform because it 
protected poor women whose husbands would otherwise sell the household furniture and 
get drunk on the proceeds. But, he complained, the law left men with more 
responsibilities than rights: “the husband retained the responsibility of the property and 
the woman had the property to herself. Mr. Wilks was not the first victim. He (Mr. Shaw) 
was the first victim.”70 To delay reform any longer was “mere senseless stupidity.”71  
By using the legal contradiction between the 1882 MWPA and income tax laws to 
undermine a husband’s presumed familial authority, the WTRL challenged men’s 
broader social and political authority. This was made most apparent in the public 
response to Adeline Chapman’s tax resistance effort. A member of the WTRL and 
President of the New Constitutional Society for Women’s Suffrage, Chapman was 
married to Cecil Chapman, a metropolitan magistrate and male suffragist.72 Officials 
distrained and sold a gold watch and chain after she failed to pay inhabited house duty on 
a summer cottage she owned.73 For critics, her tax resistance reflected Cecil Chapman’s 
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weak authority over his wife and therefore raised questions about his ability to uphold the 
social order as a magistrate. In a letter addressed directly to Cecil Chapman and 
published in John Bull, the author expressed his “sorrow not unmixed with surprise” that 
Chapman’s wife had chosen to defy “the laws of the realm” by refusing to pay tax. He 
found himself “astounded that a gentleman occupying your judicial position should 
permit rebellion against the law to find a footing in your own household, and that you 
have failed to prevail upon the lady who promised to move, honor, and obey you, to 
conform to the laws of the land.”74  
Mark Wilks faced similar criticisms for not insisting on his authority over his 
wife. Modern Man announced that it refused to regard Wilks as a “martyr” for the 
suffrage movement, instead recommending “he ought to have a spanking for not insisting 
on his wife dubbing up her tax.” The paper had “to put it mildly” a “very poor opinion of 
Dr. Elizabeth Wilks for allowing her husband to be sent to prison to satisfy her paltry 
grievance.”75 
More broadly, these husbands’ inability to assert their influence over their wives 
illustrated how the WTRL effectively used the MPWA to challenge the British state’s 
authority. Mark Wilks had been released from Brixton Gaol despite the fact that the owed 
tax remained unpaid. Furthermore, in Parliament, David Lloyd George faced questions 
from Felix Cassel, Conservative for St. Pancreas West; the Liberal MP for Islington West 
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Thomas Lough; and George Lansbury, Labour MP for Tower Hamlets Bow and Bromley 
and active WSPU supporter. All inquired how Lloyd George planned to address the 
injustice husbands faced under the law. In response, Lloyd George stated that he was 
open to amending the law, but would not stop administering it as it stood. He stated that it 
was not the policy of the government to arrest husbands for their wives’ debts, but did not 
explain how a husband could report or pay for the household taxes if his wife refused to 
tell him her income.76  
The government’s demonstrated willingness to arrest husbands while proving 
unable to explain how taxes could be collected from married women without violating 
their rights under the Property Acts exposed the state’s weak authority over its subjects.77 
The Aberdeen Free Press declared “the victory was... wholly on the side of the defiant 
husband and wife, and the authorities have been made to look very foolish.”78  
Perceptions about the state’s inept governance were reinforced by a story that 
gained renewed attention during Wilks’ imprisonment. In the spring of 1912, Marie 
Stopes was employed by the British Museum to help create the catalogue of cretaceous 
flora for its geological department. (Although best known for her work as a birth control 
advocate, sex educator, and eugenicist during the interwar years, in the Edwardian era, 
Stopes had a reputation as a respected scientist of paleobotany, the study of fossil 
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plants.79) Upon receiving payment from the British Museum, she engaged in a lengthy 
back-and-forth with Revenue officials in order to have her income tax refunded to her 
and not her husband. While the income was legally Stopes’ under the MPWA, Inland 
Revenue only paid refunds from tax collected at the source to husbands, at which point 
the refund became his legal property. For supporters of women’s rights, this constituted a 
clear contravention of the 1882 MWPA. Stopes eventually persisted in compelling 
Revenue officials to pay the refund directly to her and then published her account in The 
Standard, upon the advice of Margaret Kineton Parkes.80  
The story gained renewed attention in the fall of 1912, probably because  The 
Vote, the Women Freedom League's publication, reprinted the story during Mark Wilks’s 
imprisonment. In her article, Stopes framed Inland Revenue officials as incompetent and 
unaware of the laws pertaining to women’s property rights, explaining that a resolution 
occurred only when she “wrote direct to Mr. Lloyd George, calling his attention to the 
need of his personal supervision of this department.”81 Press coverage echoed this 
perspective in headlines such as “An Income-Tax Comedy,” and articles connected 
Stopes’ effort to Mark Wilks’ imprisonment, writing: “coinciding with the imprisonment 
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of Mr. Mark Wilks … comes the story of how a woman scientist outwitted Somerset 
House and the British Museum on exactly the same point.”82  
Through these stories, the law’s unjust treatment of husbands, men’s victimhood, 
and the state’s weak authority intertwined. For instance, Modern Man viewed the entire 
“Wilks income tax muddle” as the best demonstration that Britain’s laws were “entirely 
framed for the benefit of the fair — is it unfair? — sex.”83 It called for the government to 
enact reforms that “make the present state of affairs impossible.”84 The “latest 
governmental ‘screaming absurdity’” had resulted in an unpaid tax that left Wilks “free to 
pose as a glorious martyr before all the militant suffragists in the country” while the 
Government “made itself look like a fool.”85 In this view, the fact that the law treated 
men unjustly enabled women to undermine the government’s authority. In this vein, 
Christian Commonwealth complained that “judicial procedure is being reduced to a farce, 
the law is being brought into contempt, and we are becoming the laughing-stock of the 
world,”86 while the Times offered the ironic observation that “somehow … in a 
Parliament elected by men, laws placing them in a position of inferiority and 
disadvantage are passed.”87 
While Mark Wilks’s arrest seemed to prove to many in the press that both men 
and the state lacked clear authority, the response simultaneously illustrated the extent to 
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which Britons had come to accept the principle of the Married Women’s Property Act. 
Some publications, such as Modern Man or John Bull, lamented that a husband couldn’t 
force his wife to share information about her income. But neither the press nor any 
politicians in Parliament ever contested the WTRL’s main claim—that under the MWPA 
a wife had a right to privacy with regard to her property. Instead, public opinion 
coalesced on the assumption that the government would bring Britain’s tax laws into 
compliance with the Married Women’s Property Acts.  
This line of argumentation, while respecting married women’s property rights, 
emphasized the law’s unjust treatment of men and argued that any reform should ensure 
men’s equal treatment under the law. Characterizing Wilks’s arrest “as a puerile and 
peevish act,” The Aberdeen Free Press called on the government to implement reform: 
“the obvious requirement of the situation—if the law is to conform to common sense and 
justice—is to bring the Income-Tax Acts into conformity with the Married Women’s 
Property Acts, instead of perpetuating an irritating official fiction and congruity.”88 
Similarly, the Times expressed little sympathy with Elizabeth Wilks’s reason for refusing 
to pay her taxes but agreed that it was unjust for her husband to go to jail for a law that 
“sins against good sense.” The paper described the 1842 Income Tax Act’s treatment of a 
husband’s and wife’s income as an “official fiction, more and more in discord with facts. 
The justification for such a presumption, if any ever existed, is gone. … the Married 
Women’s Property Acts [had] entirely altered the position of things.”89  
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The State’s Response: the 1914 Finance Act 
Despite popular expectations that Parliament would quickly address the problem, 
officials’ concerns about revenue losses continued to impede any major reform in 1913. 
Reformers did, however, successfully compel the government to introduce minor 
concessions in the 1914 Finance Act.  
 In Parliament, Felix Cassel emerged as the MP who repeatedly brought the issue 
before the Commons.90 The Wilks case served as a turning point for Cassel, who 
explained: “I confess, quite frankly, that from the moment the case occurred I made up 
my mind to not let the question rest until we had forced the Government to alter such an 
absurd position.”91 Cassel sought to hold Lloyd George responsible for two public 
statements he made in response to Wilks’ arrest—that he was open to amending the law 
and that the law constituted a “legal humiliation” to married women—to commit Lloyd 
George to introducing a government amendment addressing the situation for either the 
1914 Revenue or Finance Bill.92  
During the 1914 debate, MPs who had long supported separate taxation built on 
arguments they previously articulated: the law violated women’s rights, was unjust 
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towards men, and penalized marriage. Cassel gave multiple examples illustrating how the 
law was unjust to both the husband and wife and placed a “penal tax on marriage.”93 The 
first case illustrated how, through marriage, a couple could be forced to pay income tax, 
while unmarried individuals with the same income avoided the tax. In this example, a 
clerk earned £160 a year. A woman inherited money from her father and possessed £100 
a year. Before their marriage neither paid income tax. After they married, despite the fact 
that their income remained the same, their tax amounted to £5. At the same time, a joint 
household comprised of a father and son or brother and sister paid no tax.  
For Cassel, separate taxation supported the institution of marriage. The question 
of justice revolved around individuals who married and individuals who remained 
unmarried. He considered it “indefensible” that a bachelor or spinster should pay at the 
same rate or lower rate than a married couple, who had at least double the expenses and, 
most likely, children to provide for: “it is impolitic and unjust for the State to select 
marriage as the one relationship for special and penal taxation when it is the married 
people to whom the State has to look to bring up its future-citizens.”94 
David Lloyd George, the most frequent voice articulating the government’s and 
Treasury’s position, allowed some concessions, but continued to emphasize the revenue 
losses and new financial burdens other classes would have to take on, if reform of Super-
Tax and Income tax as envisioned by Cassel and the WTRL became law.95 Lloyd George 
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tended to emphasize the way separate assessments would burden single-earner 
households, whose husbands provided the entire income: 
Take an income of £5,600 a year. If it all belonged to the husband, and 
was unearned, that household would contribute £27 10s. to the Income 
Tax. If it were divided between husband and wife, the household would 
contribute only £12, although the income and the expenses were the same 
as in the other case. ... the first household would have to bear a 
considerably heavier burden, in order to make up the deficiency caused by 
giving relief to the second household.96      
 
His argument illustrated a shift away from Victorian officials’ understanding that a “fair” 
tax required all taxpayers to pay an equal proportion of their income. Instead, he 
emphasized that revenue losses from reform would have to be made up by other classes, 
implicitly poorer classes, if wealthier families lucky enough to possess multiple forms of 
income were assessed separately. This view would gain further expression in the post-
war years, as Chapter 5 will discuss.  
Ultimately, however, the WTRL secured some concessions from the government 
in the 1914 Finance Act. The Act contained a clause that allowed husbands and wives to 
apply for separate assessment, although the rate of tax continued to be assessed on their 
aggregated incomes. Inland Revenue viewed the measure as the best limited concession 
they could make to satisfy supporters of separate taxation. The clause was designed, 
explained one Revenue memo, to address the problems raised by the Wilks case which 
had “been found in practice to be a point of special friction” but avoided “interfering with 
the principle [of a household tax] as a whole.”97 
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The WTRL and other women’s rights advocates opposed the change on the 
grounds that it did not fully recognize married women’s independent property rights. 
They resented that the individual assessment required a voluntary application and that 
each spouse’s property was liable to be seized if the other did not pay.98 
The outbreak of the First World War shortly after the passage of the 1914 Finance 
Act shifted the public’s attention away from debating methods of tax assessment. The 
war also put an abrupt end to the WTRL’s activities. A general meeting was held on 
August 26, 1914 to discuss a response to the national crisis. The League voted to suspend 
official activities for the war’s duration but left members to decide individually whether 
they would continue tax resistance during the war.99 
Over the long term, the controversies the WTRL raised about husbands’ and 
wives’ respective financial obligations towards each other and the state persisted long 
after women’s limited enfranchisement in 1918. The rights granted to married women 
under the Married Women’s Property Acts formed a cornerstone of the Women’s Tax 
Resistance League’s legal strategy in its pursuit of women’s enfranchisement. But the 
League’s strategy generated further questions about husbands’ authority over their wives, 
the state’s authority over its citizens, and exposed the ways in which women’s 
independent property rights under the MWPA could effectively challenge long-standing 
legal conventions. In 1919, a royal commission convened to consider the current income 
tax structure. The pre-war controversies outlined in this chapter ensured that the Royal 
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Commission examine the question of husbands and wives’ tax obligations. Again, 
government officials proved reluctant to introduce any major change to Britain’s tax 
code. But they were forced to respond to arguments laid out by the WTRL as they 
worked to re-affirm the value of a taxation model premised on a patriarchal household.  
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Chapter 5. A Joint Grievance: The Property Acts and the Royal Commission on 
Income Tax, 1919-1920 
 
Introduction 
In March 1919, Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain announced that 
the Royal Commission on Income Tax promised by the coalition government had 
received royal assent. The Financial Times reported that the announcement was “received 
with a hope of relief by the many taxpayers labouring under the grievance of a heavy and 
frequently unjustly apportioned tax upon their incomes.”1 The article expressed a 
common sentiment: Britain’s income tax no longer functioned fairly and a broad re-
assessment of the system was necessary to secure the nation’s financial future. In this 
spirit, the Commission was tasked with undertaking a general review of the income-tax 
system and issuing recommendations for its reform.  
Of the many issues brought before the Commission, the question of how the 
Married Women’s Property Acts affected husbands and wives’ tax obligations, 
established in the 1842 Income Tax Act and reaffirmed in the 1918 Income Tax Act, was 
intrinsic to the broader debate over what constituted a fair and equitable tax. As the 
previous chapter has shown, the Women’s’ Tax Resistance League exploited the legal 
contradictions between the two Acts to challenge both husbands and the state’s authority 
during the Edwardian-era suffrage campaign. The League ended its protest upon the 
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outbreak of the First World War in 1914. The passage of the Representation of the People 
Act in 1918, which enfranchised women over thirty who met the property qualifications, 
quelled much of the suffrage unrest. (The Women’s Freedom League continued to argue 
for women’s enfranchisement on the same basis as men; a goal that was realized in 
1928.2) Women’s limited enfranchisement, however, did not resolve the long-standing 
debate regarding husbands and wives’ tax obligations under the Married Women’s 
Property Acts. The war’s end brought renewed attention to the question once Britons, 
government officials, and commissioners began to consider what a post-war equitable tax 
regime would look like.  
During the Commission, the WTRL’s argument was advanced by representatives 
from the National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship (NUSEC), successor to the 
National Union of Suffrage Societies, the Women’s Freedom League, the National 
Council of Women of Great Britain and Ireland (NCW), and the Industrial Women’s 
Organizations (IWO) who invoked the principles of the Married Women’s Property Act 
of 1882 to present their support for separate assessment– the shorthand term used to refer 
to a tax regime in which husbands and wives would be assessed individually and in 
accordance with their independent incomes.3  
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In doing so, they continued to articulate two critiques of Britain’s tax regime that 
had originated with the 1882 MWPA’s passage. First and foremost: Britain’s income tax 
law violated married women’s rights under the 1882 MWPA. Second, the aggregation of 
incomes penalized marriage because couples paid a higher rate of tax than they would 
individually. They called on the government to redress what one Times editorial 
described as “a most serious moral wrong” and bring Britain’s tax laws into compliance 
with the Property Acts by taxing husbands and wives individually.  
In addition to these long-standing critiques, the 1882 Married Women’s Property 
Act provided activists with language to articulate a feminist social vision in which sex 
equality was the primary organizing principle between the state and its citizens.4 For 
feminists, married women’s independent taxation furthered the ideals the Married 
Women’s Property Acts represented because it marked the state’s recognition of women 
as individuals. Their argument challenged the state’s claim that it was a fair arbiter of 
taxpayer’s interests because it exposed the deeply gendered assumptions that structured 
Britain’s “neutral” tax regime: that “the taxpayer” was a man, and likely a married man. 
By contrast, Inland Revenue officials, Trade Union representatives, and tax 
experts called as witnesses urged the Commission to continue jointly assessing incomes 
for the purposes of taxation. Supporters of joint assessment articulated a class-oriented 
argument, in which a household’s “ability to pay” constituted the primary consideration 
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of a fair tax system. Separate assessment, they predicted, would result in lost revenue 
because disaggregated incomes would be assessed at a lowered tax rate and therefore 
require the state to raise rates, adding further financial burdens onto the already-
struggling taxpayer. Through this argument, officials successfully re-framed a question 
about women’s individual rights to one that focused on social and economic fairness 
across classes.  
In their 1920 Final Report, the Commissioners concluded that women’s 
arguments represented a “grievance more vocal than real” and recommended that the 
aggregation of a husband and wife’s income continue.5 Most notably, the Commissioners 
recommended increasing the marriage and child allowances, an adjustment they expected 
“the taxpayer” would regard as a “welcome recognition of his family responsibilities.”6 
As a result, a bachelor would not pay income tax until his income exceeded £150; a 
married couple would not pay income tax until their income exceeded £250; and a 
married man with a wife and three children would not pay tax until the household income 
exceeded £350.  
The recommendations aligned with a broader shift in early-twentieth century 
British government policy that privileged a married man with children as the normative 
taxpayer and beneficiary of government benefits.7 Historians have argued that these 
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policies helped re-gain middle class consent for the tax regime during a period of high 
taxation by using a system of allowances to alleviate married men’s financial burdens, 
shifting the tax incidence onto bachelors and households with high incomes.8 
But treating this as the end of the story overlooks how the state positioned itself as 
a “fair” and “neutral” arbiter of a tax system ingrained along deeply gendered lines. 
Attention to these debates reveals how the Married Women’s Property Acts provided 
activists with an important mode of making claims about married women’s individual 
economic rights, one that compelled the state to respond in defense of the status quo. 
Consequently, debates over the meaning of the Property Acts shaped post-war social 
policies, even if these policies did not accord with feminists’ hoped-for reforms.  
 
“The Taxpayer” 
Recognizing who constituted “the taxpayer” is important for understanding both 
feminists’ and Revenue officials’ arguments before the Commissioners. In the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War, any discussion of income tax reform revolved around 
three competing interests: securing revenue to pay Britain’s war debts, concerns about the 
rate of taxation on married men, and married women’s claims to independent taxation 
under the Property Acts.  
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The British government had incurred enormous debts fighting the First World 
War and the state’s ability to maintain revenue streams was essential for it to make 
payments on the debt. By 1920/21, interest on the war debt amounted to 22.4% 
(£308,700,000) of the government’s gross income.9 Income tax and Super-Tax payments 
provided a critical revenue stream; in 1919 they constituted about 35.9% of the net 
receipts paid to the Exchequer.10  
Consequently, debates about taxation—in other words, who would bear the costs 
of the war—cut to the center of debates about Britain’s post-war social order.11 At a 
moment when Britons’ tax payments were critical to the state’s long-term financial 
stability, there was a growing sense that Britons were increasingly unwilling to continue 
paying high wartime taxes during peacetime. In March 1919, the Financial Times 
reminded its readers of the “resentment” felt by the “higher paid workmen” and warned 
that “as an instrument for raising revenue, the income tax has been carried much too far, 
and if persisted in during peace times is likely to have unfortunate consequences.”12 
Taxpayer resentments, widespread social suspicion of rentiers who had made immense 
fortunes from war profits, and Labour calling for a one-time capital levy to pay off the 
debt, meant the re-establishment of a financial system that the taxpayer perceived as fair 
and equitable was essential for Britain’s post-war future.13  
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By the time the Commission, chaired by Lord Colwyn, convened in 1919, tax 
policies introduced over the previous two decades had ingrained gendered assumptions 
about “the taxpayer” and his responsibilities that defined tax obligations along family 
lines. Throughout the nineteenth century, income tax was assessed at a flat rate. No 
exemptions or allowances existed for children or wives, meaning a bachelor paid the 
same rate of tax as a married man.14 Indeed, as noted in Chapter 3, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer William Harcourt had explained his reluctance to allow husbands and wives 
with incomes under £500 to be taxed separately because it would give a “great 
advantage” to a married couple without children who could both earn income from trade. 
For nineteenth-century officials, different financial obligations between taxpayers 
undermined the state’s claim to oversee a “fair” tax across classes. 
In the early-twentieth century, however, attitudes about what constituted a fair tax 
began to shift. Politicians argued that the tax rate should reflect a household’s “ability to 
pay.” A fairer tax, they argued, would consider an individual’s financial obligations and 
recognize that wealthier individuals had a greater ability to pay than individuals with 
lower incomes.15 In 1907, the Liberal government introduced “differentiation,” meaning 
that types of income were taxed at different rates.16 Supporters of differentiation argued 
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that wage-earning men needed to set aside income to support their family when they no 
longer earned a wage, either during retirement or after their death, and therefore should 
be taxed at a lower rate.17 Individuals with unearned income (income from investments 
and stocks) could afford to pay a higher tax because they lived off a more secure source 
of income. (In this view, the income was “more secure” because it was not reliant on the 
wage-earner’s health.) In 1909, David Lloyd George introduced a graduated income tax, 
“Super-Tax” in his controversial “People’s Budget,” in order to pay for his ambitious 
plan of social spending.  
While these reforms aimed to secure revenue flows without alienating middle-
class men, they also exacerbated feminists’ contention that the government was running 
roughshod over married women’s property rights, as discussed in Chapter 4. Graduation 
meant that married women’s incomes, when aggregated with their husbands, could be 
taxed at a higher rate than they would be if assessed separately.18 As John Butcher, 
Conservative MP for York, explained to Austen Chamberlain in 1919, “the grievance 
which undoubtedly existed was far less acutely felt than it is at the present day. … The 
effect of this graduated income tax is to impose liabilities on the husband and wife when 
their incomes are graduated from which they would be entirely free if … they had not 
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and Investment in Great Britain, c. 1870–1935,” The Economic History Review 64, no. 1 (2011): 157–87. 
17 Daunton, Trusting Leviathan, 218. 
18 The Budget levied a new “Super-Tax” on incomes over £5,000. Any household with an aggregate 
income over £5,000 was liable to pay Super-Tax, an additional tax levied at a rate of 6d on the pound for all 
income over £3,000. 
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gone to the altar.”19 These policies, critics argued, introduced new violations of married 
women’s property rights and continued to penalize men and women for their decision to 
marry.  
Wartime tax policies reinforced the relationship between a taxpayer’s marital 
status and tax obligations. In 1915, Lloyd George doubled the standard tax rate and 
lowered the exemption rate from £160 to £130, increasing the proportion of the British 
population potentially liable for income tax.20 Most significantly, the lowered limits 
meant miners became eligible for income tax. In 1917, three years into the war, miners in 
the South Wales Miner’s Association began protesting the income tax rates by limiting 
how much they would work in order to avoid becoming liable for tax. To quell unrest, 
Lloyd George promised to include a “wife allowance” in the 1918 budget that would 
recognize married miners’ familial obligations.  
Increasingly, family status determined a man’s tax liabilities.21 Initially set at £25, 
the wife allowance was increased to £50 a year later. Consequently, an unmarried man 
became eligible for income tax at £130; a married man without children became liable for 
tax when his income exceeded £155; and a married man with three children would not 
become eligible for income tax until his income exceeded £220.22  
                                               
19 “Assessment of Income Tax on Joint Incomes of Husband and Wife,” 13. 
20 He also lowered liability for Super-Tax from £5,000 to £3,000 and eventually, £2000. 
21 This wartime system of allowances meant that while the number of potential taxpayers increased, the 
percentage of individuals who actually paid tax decreased. In 1913, 94% of eligible taxpayers paid some 
amount of tax. By 1917/1918 only 66% of potential taxpayers paid tax, and by 1919/1920, 50% of potential 
taxpayers paid tax. See Daunton, Just Taxes, Table 2.2. p. 42. 
22 “Tax Concession To Married Men,” The Times, October 8, 1917: 9. 
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The cumulative impact of these policies shaped both Britons and Inland 
Revenue’s assumptions about the normative “taxpayer” and the aims of income tax 
reform in the post-war years. Inland Revenue officials, Commissioners, the press, and 
witnesses before the Commission commonly assumed “the taxpayer” was a man with 
dependents to support. For example, the Commissioners referred to “the taxpayer, 
himself, his wife, children, and dependent relatives.”23 In their recommendations, they 
acknowledged the “legal obligation resting upon the taxpayer” to support his wife and 
children.24 These conceptions of the “taxpayer”—bachelor or married man—ignored 
widows or single women (who remained liable for income tax) and assumed married 
women would be financially dependent on their husbands.25 
For Inland Revenue officials and witnesses who testified before the Commission, 
the central question for the Commissioners was what proportion of tax relief would be 
given to men with dependents in comparison with bachelors “who have to bear none of 
the financial burdens of dependents.”26 “No question can be graver,” the Times asserted, 
“for it is very certain that the load of direct taxation upon the breadwinner is a potent 
influence on the size of families.”27  
 
Married Women’s Property Rights and Sex Equality in Taxation 
                                               
23 RCIT, Report of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1920), 31.  
24 RCIT, Report of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, 63. 
25 This oversighted is highlighted by Lillian Knowles’ reservation, opposing the Commission’s 
recommendation to continue jointly assessing husbands and wives. Knowles referred to “single persons,” 
“and spouses” acknowledging that men and women could pay taxes. See “Reservation to Part III” in Report 
of the Royal Commission, 151. 
26 “Income Tax Incidence,” The Times, March 28, 1919: 13. 
27 Ibid. 
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By contrast, the women’s societies that submitted evidence to the Commission 
contested the narrative that tax relief for the male breadwinner was the “gravest concern” 
of all Britons. Eva Hubback, NUSEC’s parliamentary secretary, stated that the taxation 
point her members felt most strongly about was “the taxation of the incomes of married 
people as one income.”28 Emphasizing the extent of women’s grievance, she added that 
the Union, with its 300-400 branches in Britain, spoke for “a large number of organized 
women.”29 Mrs. Oglivie Gordon, President of the National Council of Women of Great 
Britain and Ireland, claimed that after the Mother’s Union, the NCW had the highest 
number of married women members out of any organization in Britain. (Educated, 
middle class women comprised much of the NCW membership.)30 When Gordon 
explained that she was “commissioned to put forward the absolute unanimity of our 
women with regard to [the recommendation for separate assessment]” she therefore 
claimed to present the views of middle-class women throughout the nation.31 By 
reinforcing the breadth of their membership, women’s societies countered the gendered 
assumption that the high tax rates born by the male breadwinner constituted Britons’ 
universal concern, arguing that in fact, married women felt the violation of their rights far 
more acutely.  
Through their testimonies, feminists called for a universal application of the 
Married Women’s Property Acts in which the state recognized married women’s 
                                               
28 RCIT, Second Installment of the MOE, 140. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Caitríona Beaumont, Domesticity and the Women’s Movement in England, 1928–1964 (Manchester, 
England: Manchester University Press, 2013), 22 http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1mf71x2.1. 
31 RCIT, First Installment of the MOE, 69. 
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individuality. As Eva Hubback explained to the Commissioners, under Britain’s tax laws 
“a woman loses her individuality,” which was “degrading in itself and unjust in its 
working out.”32 In other words, the income tax laws continued to retain the spirit of 
coverture, which had denied a married woman’s legal existence. Consequently, the 
NUSEC held that the taxation of aggregated incomes was a “direct contravention of the 
spirit of the Married Women’s Property Act.”33 The National Council of Women 
similarly urged the “immediate reform of this system of taxation, both on the grounds of 
morality and equity” and as a “method, moreover, wholly inconsistent with the intentions 
of the Married Women’s Property Act.”34  
More forcefully, Ethel Ayres Purdie, speaking on behalf of the Women’s 
Freedom League, urged that separate assessment would mark “the Crown’s recognition 
and acceptance of the Married Women’s Property Acts, which have been in force for 
forty years, and acceptance of which is imposed on all others.” She added that separate 
assessment would resolve the “impasse” over married women’s tax obligations in a 
“rational and dignified manner,” a suggestive aside, given her role in organizing the 
                                               
32 RCIT, Second Installment of the MOE, 140. 
33 RCIT, First Installment of the MOE, 138. Eva Hubback was actually filling in for Harriet MacMillan, 
who was detained abroad. MacMillan had met with Austen Chamberlain as a member of a deputation to 
discuss separate assessment. NUSEC formed in March 1919, after a vote to amend the NUWSS’ 
constitution. See Crawford, “National Union Societies for Equal Citizenship,” in A Suffrage Reference 
Guide, 435. On Hubback see: "Hubback [née Spielman], Eva Marian (1886–1949), social reformer and 
feminist." Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
34 RCIT, First Installment of the MOE, 65. Gordon was a geologist and first woman geologist granted a 
PhD. She also served as Vice President of the International Council of Women and was active in Liberal 
party politics. Mary R. S. Creese, Gordon [Née Ogilvie], Dame Maria Matilda (1864–1939), Geologist and 
Women’s Activist (Oxford University Press, 2004), 
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WTRL’s tax resistance campaign that had directed so much political attention to the 
question of married women’s tax liabilities.35  
Purdie’s testimony provided the staunchest example of a woman’s commitment to 
her individual rights under the Property Acts. She became the first British woman to join 
an accountancy organization, the London Association of Accountants, in 1909, and she 
ran her own accounting business, the Woman Taxpayer’s Agency.36 Despite the fact that 
Purdie ran her own business under her name, Inland Revenue solicited tax payments from 
her husband. Tax forms were sent to “F. S. Purdie,” her husband, at her business address, 
Hampden House. Such bureaucratic procedure exemplified Revenue officials’ 
presumptions, both regarding who the normative taxpayer was, and women’s assumed 
compliance. Consequently, Purdie’s testimony caused much consternation when she 
announced that she had not submitted a return or paid any tax on her income during the 
twelve years she had been in business as a professional accountant.37 “Of course,” she 
explained to the commissioners, “there is no F. S. Purdie at Hampden House” and the 
forms simply remained at the office.38  
When justifying her actions, Purdie insisted the state recognize her as an 
individual, separate from her husband. She explained: “I am not recognized as an 
individual, and the country makes me pay as part of my husband. Well, I am an 
                                               
35 RCIT, Third Installment of the MOE, 330. 
36 On Purdie’s life see Stephen P. Walker, “Ethel Ayres Purdie: Critical Practitioner and Suffragist,” 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 79–101, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2010.09.001.  
37 RCIT, Third Installment of the MOE, 334. Purdie made the same announcement as a member of the 
deputation to Austen Chamberlain the previous March. “Assessment of Income Tax on Joint Incomes of 
Husband and Wife.. 
38 RCIT, Third Installment of the MOE, 332. 
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independent person. I am not a chattel of my husband. I must be regarded just the same as 
anybody else—as a man or my husband is. … I claim to be treated as an individual and to 
be treated as any other individual is.”39 When asked by a commissioner whether she felt 
any obligation to pay tax as other women did, Purdie reiterated that she certainly felt the 
obligation but would not pay tax until she was recognized as an individual.40 Her 
testimony reinforced similar statements provided by other representatives: that married 
women’s separate tax identity marked the state’s recognition of a married woman’s 
individuality and her rights as a citizen. 
Following in the wake of the 1918 Representation of the People Act, feminists 
also tried to align married women’s individual tax status with their new responsibilities as 
voters. “We want separate assessment, as recognition of separate citizenship,” Ogilvie 
Gordon explained. This argument aligned with the NCW’s broader mission to show how 
new women voters could best contribute to local and national life.41 It was important, 
Gordon explained, for women “especially now they were voters” to “realize … their 
individual responsibility in the upkeep of the state.” Taxing women individually, in this 
view, “would give a tremendous impulse to the whole enlightenment of women.” She 
predicted that once women became cognizant of the way their personal money was 
implicated in the state’s upkeep, they would begin to take a greater interest in politics—
becoming involved in discussions of the Finance bills, tracking MPs’ actions, or reading 
                                               
39 RCIT, Third Installment of the MOE, 334. 
40 Purdie died in 1923. At the end of her life, Inland Revenue estimated that her husband owed £850 on 
outstanding taxes. Inland Revenue, “Arrears: recovery of income tax from married women” IR 40/4827, 
Kew.  
41 Beaumont, 22.  
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statements of accounts. In other words, women’s individual taxation would inspire them 
to apply their assumed skills in domestic economy to the nation’s economy.  
Arguments that separate assessment would encourage women to contribute to the 
nation in their capacity as citizens did not necessarily convince the Commissioners. The 
Chairman Lord Colwyn replied to Gordon’s explanation by saying ‘that is a very clever 
answer.”42 The blunt response and the lack of follow up suggests that the commissioners 
remained skeptical of women’s new status as citizens and viewed feminist as using the 
1918 Act to make a convenient point in service to another cause.  
Consequently, while feminists expected that separate assessment would 
encourage women’s engagement as citizens, more often, they expressed a commitment to 
the principle of equality between the sexes as their primary motive for reform. Purdie, for 
example, explained that her object in presenting her case was to: “obtain equal treatment 
for women so that married women shall be treated the same as single women, or the same 
as married men if it comes to that—that there shall be equality as between the sexes.”43 
For feminists, recognition of married women’s individuality required the state to 
re-structure Britain’s tax regime in order to reflect the principle of men and women’s 
equality. Scottish suffragist and barrister Chrystal Macmillan, representing the NUSEC at 
a meeting with Austen Chamberlain, rejected any effort to introduce minor reforms to the 
tax code.44 NUSEC wanted “something very much larger,” she explained, “we want the 
whole principle altered.”45 A commitment to equality, feminists insisted, meant that all 
                                               
42 RICT, First Installment of the MOE, 71.  
43 RCIT, Third Installment of the MOE, 333 
44 “Assessment of Income Tax on Joint Incomes of Husband and Wife.” 24.  
45 “Assessment of Income Tax on Joint Incomes of Husband and Wife,” 24-25. 
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individuals should be taxed upon their own income. Maria Gordon testified that “the 
money made or held by either wife or husband could presumably be made or held by 
them whether married or unmarried, and should not be taxed differently, whatever the 
state of the individual is, single or married.”46 In sum: marital status should not affect an 
individual’s tax obligation.   
This commitment to sex equality posited an alternative, individualistic 
understanding of both wealth and inequality in British society. Feminists’ framework 
recognized that a wife could be “poor,” living off a small settlement while her husband 
was wealthy, earning income from his business or profession.47 Alternatively, a wife 
could be “wealthy” and a husband could be “poor,” and each would pay tax according to 
their individual, not combined ability. Treating married women as taxable individuals 
was fairer than a household assessment because it allowed women with small incomes to 
be taxed at a fair rate relative to their individual property. In other words, feminists 
argued that inequality could exist within marriage, and therefore, individual income 
should determine an individual’s tax obligations.  
A system of taxation based on the principle of sex-equality remained at odds with 
the dominant understanding of income as a household asset. According to this view, held 
by Commissioners and Inland Revenue officials alike, the household formed the taxable 
unit because the fairness of the tax was measured in relation to other households. They 
                                               
46 RCIT, First Installment of the MOE, 65. 
47 This point had been articulated many years before, by suffragist Laura McLaren when she wrote an 
editorial in the Times arguing that Super-Tax would exacerbate women’s poverty. She pointed out that even 
in wealthy families, women could be very poor: a wife’s only income could be her £150 dress allowance, 
while her husband lived off £4,900 a year. McLaren, “Women and The Finance Bill,” The Times, August 
28, 1909. 
  
174 
understood that a bachelor, a married man, and a married man with three children who all 
had incomes of £400 had different “abilities to pay.” A bachelor had the greatest ability, 
because he only had to support himself. A married man with a wife and or children had a 
smaller ability to pay because he had additional financial obligations.  
Feminists calls for a system of taxation based on the principle of sex-equality 
jarred against Commissioners and Inland Revenue officials’ assumption that any “fair” 
tax reform would consider the tax-payers’ ability to pay. Commissioner Sir Thomas 
Whittaker pressed Gordon on this point, asking how she squared individual tax 
assessments with what he viewed as the “sound basis of taxation:” ability to pay. He 
offered two examples. In the first, a husband and wife each had an income of £500 a year, 
making their aggregate income £1,000. In the second, the husband had a yearly income of 
£1,000 while his wife had no income. Didn’t these two households, he asked, have the 
same “ability to pay” and should be taxed at the same rate?48 Gordon responded by 
contesting Whittaker’s assumption that “ability to pay” should be the first principle of 
taxation: “I think that the first great principle of equality of men and women … should be 
superior in the eyes of the State, to what you are suggesting as the first basis, namely; 
ability to pay.”49  
Eva Hubback expressed a similar view when she presented evidence on behalf of 
the NUSEC a few weeks later. Ernest Pretyman, Conservative MP for Chelmsford and 
Civil Lord of the Admiralty, asked whether Hubback supported a household with a high 
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aggregate income of £10,000 being allowed to pay tax on two incomes of £5,000. Her 
response reiterated women’s commitment to economic independence, stating that if both 
husband and wife possessed streams of income, the Society desired that they be taxed 
separately: “We desire that married people should count as separate individuals the same 
as a brother and sister living together each with an income of £5,000; it would be taxed in 
that way, and not as one income of £10,000.”50  
The exchange illustrated the gap between feminists’ vision of equality in taxation 
and the dominant understanding of wealth as a household asset. Gordon did not deny that 
“ability to pay” was a consideration, but, she emphasized, it should constitute the 
secondary principle of taxation. Neither the Commissioners nor feminists accepted the 
premise of the other’s argument. For women’s societies, separate assessment was the 
only way to recognize the burdens of all taxpayers, exposing the deeply gendered 
assumptions about “the taxpayer” that informed arguments in favor of “ability to pay.” 
 
Inland Revenue and a Household Assessment 
In response to feminists’ claims, Inland Revenue and the Treasury continued to 
deny that the Property Acts possessed any implications for the tax law, relying on the 
legal interpretation provided by an Inland Revenue solicitor shortly after Parliament 
passed the 1882 Act. The solicitor had determined the MWPA did not impact the tax laws 
because the Acts never mentioned the Crown. In other words, because the power to tax 
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subjects derived from the Crown, and the Crown was never mentioned in the Property 
Acts, Inland Revenue was not implicated.51 
The primary reason for officials’ opposition stemmed from the assumption that a 
shift away from a household tax would be detrimental to the nation’s finances and have 
political consequences. In 1919, for instance, R. V. N. Hopkins, Joint Secretary at Inland 
Revenue, warned Austen Chamberlain that separate assessment would result in about 
£20,000,000 of lost revenue, possibly reaching as high as £50,000,000.52 Hopkins 
assumed that if husbands and wives were allowed to be taxed independently, they would 
divide their wealth between them in order to lower their tax burdens. By implication, the 
revenue losses would have to be made up through other taxes, a strategy both Inland 
Revenue and the Government wanted to avoid at a moment when the press continued to 
report that Britons were increasingly resentful of their unprecedently high taxes.53  
The government’s response to feminists’ arguments revealed how far 
interpretations of the Married Women’s Property Acts had diverged since their passage. 
By 1919 the Property Acts’ symbolic meaning for feminists was just as powerful, if not 
more so, than the specific rights it had granted. The Acts had provided a powerful symbol 
for the WTRL’s protest. And in 1919, when the Conservative MP for Wood Green, 
Godfrey Locker-Lampson reminded Chamberlain that the Acts were “the Magna Charta 
of women’s rights” he relied on the ideals attached to property rights in Britain—
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independence, individuality, and privacy—to make a more universal claim about the 
ways the Property Acts should structure British society.  
By contrast, Austen Chamberlain, commissioners, and Inland Revenue officials 
espoused a far narrower interpretation of the Property Acts. They continued to express 
the view that the Acts were laws to protect women’s property, not a code for women’s 
rights. When meeting with a deputation of women’s organizations in April 1919, as the 
RCIT was assembling, Austen Chamberlain expressed his “entire acceptance” that a 
married woman have “absolute and complete control” over her property. He begged the 
deputation “to believe that in spite of my action on the suffrage question I am not trying 
to whittle away the rights which the Married Women’s Property Acts gave.”54 His 
earnestness highlighted how, in some respects, the Acts were no longer controversial—
Chamberlain accepted the specific rights granted to women under the Acts. But for him 
and other officials, because the Property Acts made no mention of taxation they were 
irrelevant to questions about income tax.  
The attitude was similarly encapsulated in an exchange between the 
Commissioner Duncan Kerly, chairman of the Board of Referees, and C. G. Spry, 
Assistant Secretary to the Board of Inland Revenue. Spry appeared to provide Inland 
Revenue’s position on the question of how the MWPA affected separate assessment. 
During the examination, Kerly asked Spry whether he agreed with the view that “the 
Married Women’s Property Act was directed to dealing with the control of a married 
woman’s income and had nothing to do with the rate at which the woman and her 
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husband should pay tax.” To which Spry agreed: “precisely.”55 For these men, a woman’s 
control over her property had no impact on the rate of tax she or her husband might have 
to pay on the property. 
To counter arguments in favor of separate assessment, Inland Revenue officials 
struck a careful position in which they either denied the relevance of the MWPA for tax 
purposes or claimed to have already addressed women’s grievances. Revenue officials 
and private witnesses repeatedly denied that Britain’s income tax laws violated married 
women’s individual rights.56 For example, Mr. G. O. Parsons, an accountant and 
Secretary to the Income Tax Reform League reported that the aggregation of income was 
“not unduly oppressive and the public agitation … is mainly misconceived.”57 Through 
their testimonies, witnesses and government officials successfully reframed the question 
of separate assessment as an economic and social problem that would place additional 
financial strains on men with dependents.  
Officials did need to demonstrate, however, that they were attuned to public 
sentiment in order to maintain consent for taxation. To do so, they pointed to small 
reforms like the 1894 and 1897 Finance Acts, which they argued showed their 
willingness to adjust the income tax to address the needs of lower-income taxpayers. As 
Chapter 3 discussed, the 1894 and 1897 Finance Acts had allowed married women who 
earned income through their own labor, independently of their husbands, to be assessed 
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and taxed as though they were a feme sole if the aggregate family income was under 
£500.58 The £500 standard remained in effect, although two opposing interpretations of 
the law existed by 1919.”59 Women’s groups viewed the £500 limit as evidence that the 
government was not upholding the universal principles of the Property Acts, a sentiment 
captured during Gordon’s testimony when she expressed that equality existed between a 
woman and man “when they are taxed upon their own earnings up to a joint income of 
£500.”60 Inland Revenue, on the other hand, regarded the limit as “a concession to the 
material circumstances of the husband and wife, and not to an alleged right possessed by 
married women.”61  
Officials also pointed to the more recent 1914 Finance Act as evidence that “no 
such suppression of the individuality of married women now continues.”62 Passed in the 
wake of Mark Wilks’ imprisonment, the 1914 Act contained a clause that allowed a 
husband or wife to apply for separate assessment. The rate of tax continued to be based 
on the spouses’ aggregated income and both spouses were liable for any unpaid tax.63 
Privately, officials acknowledged that “it will be argued with a certain degree of truth that 
                                               
58 As a result of changes to the cost of living since the 1890s, the £500 limit no longer necessarily captured 
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the only way of really dealing with the question is to abolish the present system of 
aggregating the husband’s and wife’s income.”64 Publicly, however, they used the 1914 
Finance Act to dismiss arguments that a household tax violated married women’s 
property rights.  
For example, the Commissioner Mr. Armitage-Smith explained to Eva Hubback 
that he understood her “alleged grievance” to be comprised of two elements: “the method 
of assessment and, secondly, the amount that has to be paid.” When Hubback agreed that 
the method of assessment was a grievance, he pointed out that the 1914 Finance Act 
allowed a woman to be separately assessed if she felt the usual method was a problem 
and denied her claim by concluding “that part of the grievance is nonexistent.”65  
Officials argued that because the 1914 Act allowed spouses to voluntarily apply 
for individual assessment, women incorrectly viewed taxation as a “sex issue” between 
men and women when it was actually a question about the fairness of tax between the 
married and unmarried. A typical exchange occurred during Armitage-Smith’s 
examination of Eva Hubback. He asked whether Hubback considered the high tax rates 
endured by married couples to be “more a woman’s grievance than a man’s grievance?” 
Hubback conceded that the rate of taxation was a “joint grievance,” one felt by both 
spouses. Armitage-Smith had already denied Hubback’s contention that an aggregated 
income tax violated married women’s rights because any woman could apply to be 
separately assessed under the 1914 Finance Act. Consequently, her concession returned 
                                               
64 “Note on 1914 Amendment,” c. 1914, IR 75/183, National Archives, Kew. 
65 RCIT, Second Installment of the MOE, 140. 
  
181 
the question of the rate of tax back to one based on “ability to pay” and re-affirmed the 
household income tax as the basis of assessment.  
Similarly, when Ethel Purdie announced that she did not pay income taxes 
because she insisted on being recognized as an individual, the Commissioner Ernest 
Pretyman expressed his disappointment that Purdie had squandered her opportunity by 
presenting a “personal view.” He explained it was important to him she understood “that 
the object is not in any way to make a sex difference.” “When you come here in this way 
we want you to help us try and look at it from the national point of view, not only from 
the sex point of view or the personal point of view, but to help us about a real difficulty,” 
he continued.66 Pretyman acknowledged that the Commission hoped to satisfy the “very 
proper and reasonable aspirations of women to be treated on exactly the same basis as 
men” but reminded Purdie that the Commission had to do so without making an 
“enormous hole in the Revenue” or allowing “very rich people” to take advantage of any 
reform that would treat a husband and wife as “entirely separate persons.”67 
Individual witnesses reiterated the government’s argument that the household tax 
was not an effort to suppress married women, but the fairest way to assess tax. One paper 
submitted by Messrs. Diggines, Harris, Healslip, and Mylam denied that an aggregate 
household income tax reflected a wife’s subordination to her husband and asserted that it 
recognized the reality that a wife with an income contributed to the family’s expenses. 
“The reason for the aggregation of the income of the husband and wife is not the 
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conception of their union as a ‘social unit’ nor is it the medieval idea of their unity in the 
eyes of the law; but it is their practical identity as a taxable unit,” the authors explained.68  
Of course, this stance—that the aggregation of incomes was a pragmatic question 
of finances and economic fairness—ignored the historic reasons why a wife’s income 
was aggregated with her husband’s– that the income tax laws had been passed at a time 
when a wife’s income was legally her husband’s.69 But by dismissing women’s 
arguments as a divisive “sex issue,” supporters of a household tax were able re-frame the 
problem as a question about the fairness of the tax between married and unmarried 
individuals, one that affected both married men and women.  
While Inland Revenue successfully shifted the question away from married 
women’s individual rights to an income-oriented one, the debate also illustrated the ways 
the Property Acts provided feminists with a way to demand the state to justify the status 
quo. Consequently, debates over the rights granted under the Property Acts informed 
what tax reforms Revenue officials were willing to concede in order to mitigate activists’ 
claims.  
 
The limits of separate assessment and the appeal of marriage allowances 
Questions about ability to pay exposed the limits of feminists’ arguments for a 
commitment to sex equality and the universal application of the Married Women’s’ 
Property Acts. When asked how the government should recoup the anticipated lost 
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revenue, supporters tended to suggest that tax rates could be raised across all incomes. 
The suggestion aligned with women’s views of their rights under the MWPA but it also 
left politicians’ concerns about men’s tax resentments unaddressed.  
The lack of a potential policy was most apparent during Maria Gordon’s 
testimony. After a tense and frustrated examination, one commissioner, Mr. Synnott tried 
to push Gordon to present the NCW’s plan to pay for the revenue losses if their 
recommendations were implemented. Gordon responded: “…while I really do not wish to 
be aggressive, if the men do not ask the women to form a committee or join them in 
thinking out those points, you cannot blame us if in the midst of our hurried lives we do 
not do it.”70 She added that she would like her “formal reply to be that she should like 
women to think it out and to be given time and a commission to do it.”71 While her 
statement captured activists’ frustration that only one woman had been named as a 
commission member, indicative of a general disregard for women’s opinions on 
economic matters, it also proved unable to provide a concrete solution to the revenue 
problem. 
Claims for a universal application of the Property Acts also fractured along class-
based lines, as Marion Phillip’s testimony showed. She spoke on behalf of the Industrial 
Women’s Organization, whose membership was comprised primarily of poor and 
working-class women earning up to £4 a week.72 At an income of about £200 a year, their 
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members likely paid the lowest rate of tax, “2s. 3d. in the £,” if they qualified for income 
tax at all.73 In a testimony that departed from the universal-rights claims of the NUSEC, 
NCW, and WFL, Phillips acknowledged that while the IWO supported separate 
assessment for regular income tax, it did not object if the Treasury continued to aggregate 
spouses’ incomes for the purposes of assessing Super-Tax.  
When asked by Commissioner Kerly why a rich woman and a poor woman 
should receive separate treatment, Phillips explained that the IWO felt that in cases where 
the income was “at a level very high above a living amount” there was sufficient “special 
reason” for aggregating the incomes.74 The scheme paralleled the existing tax regime, in 
which a woman’s ability to be taxed independently was not a right derived from the 
MWPA, but contingent on her income levels. While this position aligned with the IWO’s 
goals to advocate for the interests of the poor and working classes, it also undermined 
arguments that women’s property rights should be absolutely upheld.  
Because feminists’ principle-based argument could not address the more prosaic 
concerns of Inland Revenue, officials were able to successfully frame marriage 
allowances as addressing the main concerns of British taxpayers. Internally, in 
preparation for the Commission, Revenue officials decided that adjustments to the “wife 
allowance” would address the question of separate assessment without conceding any 
claims regarding married women’s property rights. As noted, the “wife allowance”—a 
tax abatement for married men with incomes under £700—had been introduced in 1918 
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as a way to recognize the financial burdens born by wage-earning married men and quell 
discontent among South Wales miners.75 Revenue officials seized on wife allowances as 
a means to mitigate the criticism that the income tax penalized married couples by taxing 
their combined incomes at a higher rate than they otherwise would be. One internal 
memo recommended that if the allowance limits were adjusted and based on the 
assumption that “it costs one and a half times as much for two people to live together, as 
for one to live separately,” complaints that the income tax penalized marriage would be 
resolved. In short, the memo concluded, “there would be no point left in the argument for 
the separate treatment of a married woman.”76 
Revenue officials carefully pursued this strategy by separating any discussion of 
married women’s rights from wife allowances during commission hearings. This was 
most apparent during C. G. Spry’s testimony. Spry was the Revenue official who 
officially presented evidence pertaining to the question of separate assessment and 
married women’s property rights. He assured commissioners while the question of 
separate assessment was “sometimes represented as one which affects the political or 
social status of women in relation to that of men,” that was “not actually the case.” In 
fact, it was a question “affecting married people (either men or women), as compared 
with bachelors, spinsters, widowers and widows.” During his examination he agreed that 
increasing the wife allowance would likely address the feeling that the income tax 
penalized marriage. Yet, despite repeated questioning from Commissioners, he 
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steadfastly refused to offer any statement regarding what a more appropriate allowance 
amount should be. The question of allowances, he maintained, was a matter relating to 
“ability to pay” and “graduation,” subjects that another Revenue official, R.V. N. 
Hopkins, would present on later in the Commission.77  
Throughout the Commission then, Inland officials emphasized that if the 
allowance system were replaced by separate assessment, 2,800,000 “unfortunate” men 
who supported wives without separate incomes would be in a “far greater degree affected 
than the women.”78 They reiterated that increasing allowances would have the double 
benefit of alleviating economic pressures felt by the “family man” and address the feeling 
that the income tax currently penalized marriage without offering tax relief to “people of 
considerable means.”79  
Their argument was reinforced throughout the hearings, as Commissioners heard 
repeated testimony that the income tax pressed too hard on wage-earning breadwinners. 
Indeed, Maria Gordon took care to emphasize that “most cases of real hardship crop up 
within the limits of £300 and £1,000.”80 Sidney Webb, speaking on his own behalf, told 
the Commission that miners in northern England were skipping work to avoid earning 
wages that would make them eligible for income tax.81 The assertion went unchallenged 
by the commissioners, possibly because miners in the South Wales Miners Association 
had already refused to pay their taxes in 1918 to protest the high rates. Webb emphasized 
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that it was “imperatively and urgently necessary to remedy the present disproportionate 
burden … imposed on heads of households and especially upon the fathers of several 
children,” warning that the current high tax rates were “already having results that are 
disastrous to the nation.”82  
The burdens born by working class men were drawn in sharp contrast to Britain’s 
wealthy taxpayers, who experts repeatedly testified, would take advantage of any 
separate assessment to evade their tax obligations. William Cash, speaking on behalf of 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants, testified that “evasion by legal means”—the use 
of trusts and other legal devices that reduced an individual’s tax burden—was 
“continually going on and increasing.”83 When asked about his views on separate 
assessment, he expressed his confidence that enabling separate assessment for spouses 
with high incomes would exacerbate the problem. He did not have strong feelings on 
whether the limit could be raised slightly, from £500 to £1000, but warned he did not 
“think the law should be altered so as to enable joint incomes to be split up for the 
purpose of evading tax.”84 He anticipated that “especially on large incomes” a husband 
would divide up his income, establishing a “post-nuptial settlement or a trust to the wife 
for life” that would then be bequeathed to their children in order to lower his tax 
burden.85  
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Testimonies such as these illustrated how Britons’ attitudes about “the taxpayer” 
shifted in relation to discussions of women’s rights under the MWPA. During the late-
Victorian era, officials had opposed reform on the grounds that a small tradesman, with 
an income between £100-£200 would evade his tax obligations by attributing his income 
to his wife. In the midst of the WTRL’s campaign, “the man of straw”—a husband with a 
wife who possessed a greater income—represented men’s victimhood under the law. 
Only a few years later, however, these “men of straw” had been replaced by wealthy men 
who would again transfer money to their wives to avoid fulfilling their social and 
financial obligations.  
Consequently, these examinations exposed Commissioners’ and witnesses’ 
gendered assumption that financial relationships in marriage were distinct from other 
economic relationships. Ethel Purdie testified that she knew of a solicitor who lived with 
his mother and his four sisters. Each person possessed an income and paid tax based on 
their personal income. She asked why a married couple’s income should be combined 
and assessed at a higher rate if this household’s income was not aggregated. Ernest 
Pretyman responded that the four individuals did not pay more because their income was 
“really their own income.”86 He expanded his point, clarifying that he did not consider a 
husband and wife’s income one income, but assumed they “could interchange” their 
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incomes to reduce their tax burdens. Therefore, the only way to ensure a married couple 
paid their fair share was to aggregate their incomes. As Purdie responded, any persons in 
a household could shift incomes to lower a tax burden. But Pretyman’s response provided 
a telling example that illustrated how overlapping concerns about tax evasion and 
gendered conceptions of women’s income informed the conversation about married 
couple’s assessment.  
For example, Mr. Roger N. Carter, the author of the book Murray and Carter’s 
Guide to Income Tax, argued that business partners should be allowed to file separate tax 
assessments, but did not extend the same logic to women. He complained that present 
system of having business partners jointly file tax assessments was unduly complicated 
and violated a man’s privacy. “Even in these days there is supposed to be something 
private about a man’s total income, but the present system gives every partner exact 
knowledge of the finances of his co-partners, a highly objectional thing,” he argued.87 By 
contrast, marriage formed a different kind of partnership. Carter expressed his opinion 
that “there did not seem to be any unfairness” in the current method of aggregating a 
husband and wife’s income since they “essentially form one fund.”88 This assumed that 
marriages functioned as co-operative economic relationships, in which couples pooled 
their incomes to support the family.  
Carter considered the aggregate income tax as the fairest way to guard against 
husbands avoiding income tax by dividing their income with their wives. “The system of 
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taking the wife's unearned income as being the husband’s, is inconsistent, but probably 
necessary to guard against a division between husband and wife of the unearned income 
of the husband” he explained.89 In this view, women’s ability to own unearned income 
functioned more as a means for men to re-allocate wealth in order to reduce their tax 
burdens, than as a legitimate form of property married women owned in their own right. 
As witnesses repeatedly emphasized that any policy of separate assessment would 
“create anomalies of a startling character” and allow the wealthy to escape their share of 
taxation, a consensus view emerged between commissioners and Revenue officials that a 
“marriage allowance” would resolve many grievances without burdening married men.90 
Inland Revenue emphasized that if the allowance system were replaced by separate 
assessment, 2,800,000 “unfortunate” men who supported wives without separate incomes 
would be in a “far greater degree affected than the women.”91 Witnesses reiterated that 
increasing the allowances would have the double benefit of alleviating economic 
pressures felt by the “family man” and address the demand for separate assessment 
without offering tax relief to “people of considerable means.” In doing so, the allowance 
system shifted a greater tax burden onto bachelors and spinsters, strengthening the 
“distinction” “between those [married] persons having commitments for the benefit of the 
State and those with no such responsibilities.”92  
 
Conclusion  
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The Commissioners’ final recommendations reflected many of the arguments 
articulated by Inland Revenue over the course of the hearings. Dismissing women’s 
claims as a “grievance more vocal than real,” the Commissioners wrote that the question 
of separate assessment “should not be regarded as a political question, but purely as one 
of finance and revenue,” and one that must be decided “not on any theoretical grounds of 
equality of citizenship, but in accordance with the outstanding principle of ‘ability to 
pay,’ which we recognize as governing all questions of taxation.”93  
Many of the Commission’s recommendations, intended to reduce the tax burdens 
of family men, were implemented in the 1920 Finance Act. This included new exemption 
limits based on marital status.94 For the unmarried, the limit was raised from £130 to 
£150. Married couples on the other hand, would not be liable for tax until their annual 
income reached £250. If they had children they received an additional child allowance, a 
£30 abatement on taxable income for each child. This meant that the “normal citizen”—a 
man with a wife and three children, would not pay tax until his income exceeded “£350 
per annum.”95 
These reforms aligned with an ongoing shift in early-twentieth century social 
policies that privileged married men with dependents as the beneficiaries of government 
benefits. But as this chapter has argued, questions over the meaning of married women’s 
property rights formed a locus of these debates. The Property Acts provided activists with 
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a significant means to call on the state to recognize married women as economic 
individuals.  
Revenue officials were ultimately able to elide these claims by denying the 
Property Acts’ relevance to matters of taxation. Nonetheless, they were compelled to 
provide a response. Revenue officials and politicians reframed the problem—not as one 
of women’s rights, but a matter in which women’s independent incomes would 
exacerbate economic inequality and allow the wealthy to escape their financial 
obligations.  
Marriage allowances offered a desirable policy because they enabled the 
government to show that it recognized the economic burdens faced by a family man, 
while neutralizing arguments that the tax penalized the married. Ultimately, this policy 
was shaped, in part, by the contest over married women’s property rights, even if it was 
enacted without conceding the broader principle that women’s rights groups wanted 
recognized: a married woman’s individuality. 
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Epilogue. The Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935  
 
Parliament’s passage of the 1935 Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) 
Act appeared to fulfill the changes to married women’s legal status the Property Acts first 
introduced. The 1935 Tortfeasors Act ended the legal category of a feme covert and 
struck out “separate” from references to married women’s property. It abolished the 
practice of restraint on anticipation for any wills or trusts coming into effect after 1935. 
All married women became personally liable for their torts, debts and contracts, and were 
subject to all bankruptcy laws (they had only been liable to the extent of their separate 
property). Correspondingly, it ended a husband’s liability for his wife’s torts, debts, or 
contracts made before or after marriage. In sum: the Tortfeasors Act established that 
married women possessed the same individual rights as unmarried women or men.1  
Vestiges of the principle of marital unity that defined coverture during the 
nineteenth century remained, however. The Act specifically retained interspousal tort 
immunity—that a husband and wife could not sue each other; Parliament abolished the 
principle in the 1962 Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act.2 Husbands also continued to 
be liable for taxes due on their wives’ income. In its final report, the Law Reform 
Committee, which provided the recommendations for the Tortfeasors Act’s reforms, 
suggested that the law with regard to a household tax be changed, to address the 
“hardship” a husband faced in paying tax. It refrained, however, from issuing a formal 
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recommendation because questions relating to taxation remained outside its original 
remit. Although adjustments to the tax code were introduced in subsequent years, British 
men and women would not be independently assessed for income tax until 1990.3 
The Tortfeasors Act’s passage also prompted a reconsideration of the Married 
Women’s Property Acts that illustrated how Britons’ understanding of the MWPA had 
changed since the nineteenth century. For instance, “A Correspondent” for the Times 
offered a history of married women’s property rights. The correspondent explained that 
in the “sixties of that century women, or a few of the more determined of them, began to 
rebel, with the result that in 1882 (after some feeble and tinkering efforts in the seventies) 
a revolutionary statute was passed called ‘The Married Women’s Property Act.”4  
In this narrative, the MWPA was transformed into a feminist law—one of the 
early political successes of the Victorian women’s movement. The Victorians’ 
motivations for reform that existed alongside women activists’ claims—as a way to 
reform the lives of the poor—were absent in retrospect. The 1870 Act was a “feeble and 
tinkering effort” and the 1882 MWPA, the result of “determined women” who had begun 
“to rebel.” Even the 1882 Act, in the words of the correspondent, “did not satisfy the 
feminist lust for complete equality” and feminists continued to argue that marriage should 
not impact a woman’s status, property rights, contracts or torts.5 Undoubtedly, the 
persistent efforts of the MWPC throughout the 1870s, helped secure the 1882 MWPA’s 
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passage. The retrospect illustrated, however, the success of feminists’ interpretation of 
the MWPA.  
The Times correspondent’s assessment of the Married Women’s Property Acts 
reflected one understanding of the MWPA that this dissertation has traced: that it 
provided activists, and eventually feminists, with a significant means to claim married 
women’s rights to be recognized as individuals.  
But as this dissertation has also shown, feminists’ understanding of the Property 
Acts existed alongside other conceptions of the Acts: as a law to protect women’s 
property, but never a law that conceded women’s equality. The passage of the MWPA, 
particularly in 1870, was shaped far more by the paternalistic motives of MPs who did 
not think that women’s property rights would undermine their own authority in the 
household.  
Indeed, the passage of the Tortfeasors Act continued to reflect how MPs’ 
concerns about men’s rights shaped the terms on which they were willing to grant women 
rights. While interwar feminists advocated for legal changes that erased a distinction 
between a feme sole and a feme covert, the Tortfeasors Act also emerged out of a social 
context in which Britons perceived that married men were unfairly suffering under the 
MWPA. As other scholars have noted, in many ways, the 1935 Tortfeasors Act reduced 
men’s obligations for their wives more than it recognized married women’s equality.6  
Through its attention to these competing concerns, “Reforming the Married State” 
has argued that the ensuing social, legal, and cultural conflicts the Acts inspired engaged 
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Britons in a broader debate that required them to re-define (or at the very least, defend) 
men and women’s rights and obligations to each other, to society, and to the state. 
Married women’s property rights compelled Britons to consider what constituted equity 
in their society. The question at the core of this problem was whether women constituted 
individuals with individual rights, or members of a household, defined along class-based 
lines. Importantly, Britons never fully resolved this question. Their efforts to negotiate 
these tensions, however,  reveals how the “married state” continued to serve as the 
foundation for the “social state” long after coverture’s demise.  
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